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With Special Reference to the Press

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#### PREFACE

No effort has been made in this study to present a connected history of Japan, but matters which seem to have received, in English, an insufficient treatment, or which are necessary for the proper understanding of certain phases of the press in relation to social progress, have, of course, been briefly noticed.

In order to secure a uniformity of treatment and to avoid confusion the titles applied to certain distinguished statesmen may not, in every case, coincide with the title used by them at each period of their lives. Viscount Goto, for example, has been known at different times as Dr. Goto, or as Baron Goto. Where promotion has been granted, the higher title is applied throughout, involving a minor measure of anachronism, but avoiding misunderstanding as to identity. Similarly, by ancient social custom, distinguished service has been sometimes recognized by posthumous ennobling. The emperor is unofficially notified that a distinguished man has died. Before the announcement is made public, a title or a decoration may be granted. Count Takaaki Kato was raised from a viscountcy in such fashion. Marquis Okuma, likewise, was probably better known as Viscount or as Count during the major portion of his service. In histories, however, the higher title is applied in such

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instances, and has been thus used here in order to promote conformity.

Because of the widespread belief in Japan that a persistent and vehement anti-Japanese bias has animated many studies of Japanese affairs, a special effort has been made to cull material from sources known to be most friendly to the Empire, and, so far as possible, to present Japan's activities in the spirit in which those activities were undertaken. In this endeavor the writer has enjoyed the benefit of close association, not only with foreigners whose friendliness to Japan is cordially indorsed by private subjects and by officials of the Empire, but also with Japanese of high official station. While not sacrificing fairness, the writer has endeavored to give to Japanese the benefit of every doubt.

As a further safeguard against inaccuracy, as well as against the inclusion of frivolous or meaningless criticisms of Japan, a wide range of authorities has been cited. In the securing of these references, the writer is under particular obligation to Gilbert Bowles, of Tokyo, to whom no labor was too great in arranging conferences with leading Japanese and in offering suggestion and advice. It was largely due to his influence that editors, librarians, and scholars threw open their files for exhaustive analysis. The valued co-operation of President Kiroku Hayashi, of Keio University, and of many members of his faculty and of the student body must also be gratefully acknowledged,

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since it is owing to them that so wide a range of Japanese periodicals has been examined.

The preponderance of evidence adduced on certain contested topics has necessarily resulted in a perhaps unduly bulky series of "Notes" at the close of some chapters. As a device for better co-ordination, the writer has prepared an "Index to References," which, it is hoped, may be of service in unifying and clarifying the whole.

Finally, in conformity to a well-established and growing practice among foreign residents in China and Japan, the clumsy term "extra-territoriality" has been frequently replaced by the more commonly used term "extrality." No Western dictionary has, as yet, listed the contraction, but its use is general throughout the East and bids fair to become standard.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

PHILADELPHIA May, 1027

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#### CHAPTER I

#### THE CULTURE CLASH OF EAST AND WEST

Misunderstandings of Japan may be inherent in the divergent social codes of East and West. It is difficult, at best, for one people to appreciate another, but if the French fail to understand the German temperament, or if the British cannot comprehend the Celt, it is not surprising that Occidentals find it wellnigh impossible to understand the Orientals, whose environment and social heritage vary so widely from the accepted Western type (1).

But other, and not wholly unavoidable, factors aid the misconstruing. For nearly two generations the idea that Japanese are different from other peoples has been drilled into the minds of schoolboys. It perhaps originated in the days of Tokugawa isolation, through the lack of comparative data, but was later ordered by Prince Ito to be inculcated to promote the national unity (2). In consequence there is a Japanese conviction that they, descended from the plains of heaven, are of a nobler origin and under a special guardianship not accorded others.<sup>2</sup> Since, therefore,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Numbers in parentheses refer to notes at end of each chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Marquis Okuma, in his semi-official history, expounded this idea. "From the idea that Japan is the land of the kami (gods), her people have been led to believe that she is under the special protec-

the Empire, the Imperial Family, and indeed, the whole population of Japan are descended from the blood of gods and protected by it, the measuring of either Japan's motives or of her practices by standards applicable to men of baser breed cannot be comprehended. Nor are the duties owed by foreigners toward Japanese identical with those that Japanese may owe to foreigners. Aliens must make concessions, especially in affairs of etiquette and deference, unnecessary between Western peoples, in order that apparent, but unintentional, discourtesy may not offend the more delicately attuned sensibilities of Japanese.

Again, a potent cause for misunderstanding may be traced to the cryptic language of the Japanese. Occidentals fail to recognize that an elasticity in the colloquial vernacular provides linguistic subtleties not comprehended by the Westerner. By peculiarities of sentence structure, by nice choice of honorifics, or by insertion of words carefully adjusted to the rank of listeners, delicate nuances may be expressed that

tion of these heavenly beings. There is, of course, no theoretical certainty for this belief, yet events which have occurred during her long career as the kami's country have not unnaturally been attributed to the favors of the unseen" (3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> The difference in attitude toward the appearance of antiforeign items in the Japanese press and toward anti-Japanese items printed in the foreign press is a case in point, even after all allowances have been made for national complacency and for inertia.

completely alter the meaning of a Japanese sentence. The differences are far more sharp, and, by the Japanese, are much more keenly apprehended, than the shades of meaning which are well known to exist in the technical phraseology of the diplomatic corps.

Foreigners resident in Japan, and masters of the language, experience grave difficulty in distinguishing these overtones of rhetoric. Still more serious is the task for semipermanent residents, such as newspaper correspondents, unskilled in the finer differentiations of the spoken word.<sup>4</sup> News coming from Japan may sometimes fail, for this reason, accurately to reproduce the spirit of the orator. Nor can translators always apprehend in English the elusive praise bestowed by honorifics, nor express the slighting innuendo concealed in their omission.

Words and phrases, moreover, even when accurately recorded, may not always convey the same impressions to the Oriental and the Occidental minds. Between Indo-European and Asiatic idioms a high linguistic discount rate exists. Overpraise and overcriticism cannot, therefore, always be accepted at face value, but must be evaluated at some rate of inter-

<sup>4</sup>Of the foreign correspondents resident in Tokyo in 1924 and registered with the official International Press Association, only one professed an ability to speak or understand the spoken tongue. The one exception, himself soon thereafter transferred to Geneva, was far from fluent. "I studied Japanese," he told the writer, "on my trip across the Pacific."

national exchange.<sup>5</sup> The customary Asiatic etiquette of self-deprecation and of undue praise of auditors requires an almost non-existent excellence of understanding if the correspondent is to steer a skilful course and is to arrive, without prejudice, at an absolutely just interpretation.

Further opportunity for mental confusions and for misinterpretation of Japan exists in the Japanese passion for what Dr. Gulick terms indirectness and nominality, and which he attributes to feudal practices (4). The Westerner is puzzled, for example, when the Diet is described by Japanese as illustrating how public opinion sways the national policy, although the Throne, the Genro, and the Privy Council are, in reality, the source of all authority and of administration of the law.<sup>6</sup> The virtual independence from Parliamentary control, and indeed from each other, of the Genro, Privy Council, War Office, and the General Staff confuses Western comprehension of

<sup>5</sup> The necessity for this is easily apparent to any Occidental who has heard political orations both by Anglo-Saxons and by Latins. Japanese emotional oratory is quite comparable to that found in Provence or in Italy, or even in Greece.

<sup>6</sup> Discussion of the peculiar status of the Genro holds no place in this study. It is well outlined by McGovern, King-Hall, and others. It is important to note, however, that this small junta of able and efficient men, knowing their own minds and quite free from Parliamentary control, could pursue undeviatingly a line of policy, especially in foreign affairs, despite diametrically opposing commitments made in the name of the Empire by ambassadors, foreign ministers, prime ministers, and the Diet itself.

Japan's foreign policy, whence most international misunderstandings are likely to arise.

Western correspondents stationed in Japan are prone to accept statements made by Japanese officials as possessing precisely the same authority that would be possessed by similar remarks made by corresponding officials in the West. When official spokesmen said in 1922 that militaristic influences in Japan were obsolete and that army control had passed away, the correspondents in Japan, and readers in the West, assumed that Japanese political conditions had been revolutionized and that civilians were controlling Japanese affairs. Yet, almost simultaneously, the General Staff was acting independently to set up a buffer state in Eastern Asia (5). Few Japanese saw any inconsistency involved between the action and the assurances of spokesmen. Such unfortunate coincidences cause foreigners to look on Japanese as sly, treacherous, and unreliable, though estimates by foreigners who live among the Japanese and know their character run diametrically counter to such harshness (6). The space limitations of the periodicals and the cost of cable tolls preclude a proper clarifying of the misconceptions spread by such discrepancies.

Misunderstandings also are produced by a not uncommon practice by leading Japanese officials of professing opinions at home quite out of harmony with those expressed by them in foreign lands. Patriotic pride, tradition, and the supposed safety of the state

impels the publicist to profess dual opinions on contested matters, blowing hot in Japan and cold in foreign lands. At home he finds no difficulty in indorsing as truth the myths that pass as history in all the schools, nor in decrying democracy as dangerous; whereas at his foreign post the same man will unhesitatingly declare that Japan is eager to accept the Westerner's conception of equality and freedom. Shunkichi Akimoto, for example, told Honolulu diners that Japan is "intensely democratic because governed by the power of public opinion," yet in Tokyo he confessed that if he were to advance his free opinions on Japan's rule in Korea he would probably incur the charge of treason (7)."

It is, however, seldom that direct contradictions are detected; more often the discrepancies are cloaked by delicate jocosities, discreet suppressions, or by a clever repartee. Deft emphasis upon some phrase which is a shibboleth to other peoples is artistically employed, and the implication is conveyed that, to Japanese as well as foreigners, the same emotional

<sup>7</sup> Count Michimasu Soyejima, publisher of the official vernacular organ of the Korea government general, solemnly assured New Yorkers that "happily only a few jingoes in Japan say that America is selfish, worse than pre-war Germany, seeking world hegemony." But on arrival in Japan he told reporters that "Americans are crafty, underhanded, selfishly inhuman, and seek the hegemony of East and West." Yet again, at a banquet of the Tokyo English-Speaking Society, he remarked that "America's aspirations, however they may appear to other nations, are fundamentally peaceful" (8).

content exists in all its potency. The same Prince Tokugawa to whom the Eta outcasts vainly called for aid in winning for them social, as well as theoretical, equality found no incongruity, before a banquet of Americans, in praising Lincoln as the man whom all Japan reveres. No opportunity is wasted for stressing the essential similarity of the ideals and practices held in common by both East and West.

Dr. Inazo Nitobe, the Iapanese Ouaker who was under-secretary of the League of Nations, was an especial target for the Chronicle. "We cannot remember Dr. Nitobe having ever been prominent in the peace movement in Japan. As the author of Bushido he extolled the military ideals of the Bushi. He has justified all Japan's wars, approved the annexation of Korea and Formosa, was silent over the Twenty-One Demands, and advocates peace only when some thousands of miles away from Tokyo." The Chronicle is not alone in making charges of duplicity. The usually friendly Japan Advertiser accuses Japanese officials of holding dual sets of opinions and of speaking primarily for foreign ears. The Japan Times, always meticulous in turning the best light possible upon Japan, accused officials, in a front-page headline, of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> It is only fair to point out that in the final chapter of *Bushido*, Dr. Nitobe challenged the basic righteousness of military ideals, and that on at least one occasion he has attacked the administrative methods followed by Japanese officials in Korea. By and large, however, the *Chronicle's* summary is not unjustified.

untruthfulness and of prevention of interracial understandings (9).

Patriotic pride adds to the prevalence of international uneasiness. That the Japanese are a proud race has grown into a catchword, whether the pride be due. as Dr. Gulick thinks, to overgrown ambition, selfsufficiency, and conceit, all linked together and conditioned by the consciousness of rapid high achievement, or whether it be traceable to "compensation." Its manifestations, often, as Dr. Gulick says, vociferous, impracticable, and chauvinistic, create a sense of uncompromising disdain for the foreigner and an exaggerated loyalty to the emperor which leads the Japanese to resent the slightest hint or indirect suggestion of defect or limitation either in themselves or in the government which the emperor has granted to his people. The superiority of both the nation and of its citizens is coolly assumed, and the relative inferiority of other peoples is just as readily suggested (10).

Coupled with excessive self-esteem is a repugnance to the frank criticism common to the Anglo-Saxon peoples. A sensitive self-consciousness which, in the West, would be dismissed as morbid (perhaps even an inferiority complex), impels the Japanese to group their commentators either as pro- or anti-Japanese. The middle ground is seldom taken. The type of Englishman who casts unfavorable reflections upon the British rule in India, or of the American who finds fault with Philippine administration, is rarely

matched by Japanese who comment publicly in adverse tones upon the governmental trend in Formosa or Korea. Objection to Japan's foreign policy as "cowardly" and "slavish" is allowable: indeed, its prevalence has given rise to most "proofs" that Japanese newspapers are fearless in their opposition; but there is little public rebuke for undue truculence. In the early days of Japan's intercourse with the Western peoples Sir Rutherford Alcock noted, in the preface to his Capital of the Tycoon, "an incorrigible tendency of the Japanese to withhold from foreigners, or disguise, the truth on all matters, great and small." Thirty years later Dr. Gulick could report, "A librarian refused to lend me a book, saying that foreigners might be freely informed of the good, the true, and beautiful of Japanese history, customs, and character, but nothing else" (11).

That these discrepancies and these reluctances to speak the full truth weaken international confidence is inevitable. Those readers who follow critically and carefully the actions and the speeches of the Japanese are led to feel that Japan's government is insincere and that no trust can be placed in anything her spokesmen say. The conclusions are, of course, glaringly unjustified; nor would any implication be well warranted that Western diplomats are always wedded to complete and exact veracity in all their utterances. Yet by such practices, whether in the Occi-

dent or in Japan, suspicion and loss of confidence can scarcely be avoided.

The correction of these misconceptions and the mutual interpretation between the East and West provides an opportunity for the press, both foreign language and vernacular, to mediate between the Japanese and the Occidental residents in the solution of the interracial and the international conflicts which necessarily arise between dissimilar cultures living in a close proximity. As an intermediary for the introduction of the western mode of life the press was early recognized as a valuable and a necessary engine.

The shogunate isolation did not prevent Japan from gaining knowledge of the West, in fact, the Shogun's government, the Baku-fu, took every possible precaution to assure its being given information on the more important Western trends. One of the yearly duties imposed upon the Dutch merchants of Deshi-

Pin Tokyo some 1,200 American and British citizens dwell, while perhaps 3,000 English-speaking foreigners live in the Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto section (12). The recognition of the need for foreign-language papers to supplement the native papers is the explanation why Japan, almost alone among the nations of the world, has foreign language papers owned and edited by native citizens of the land to which the foreigners have come. It is the explanation, also, why among the Japanese the foreign-language press has been developed to a high degree. A single page in Excelsior or El Universal is deemed sufficient for the English readers in Mexico, and only puny sheets serve the tourist in Paris and Berlin. Buenos Aires prints a better and a larger English paper; but in Japan the English-language press comprises journals which would grace a large-sized city in America.

ma, near Nagasaki, was to supply the Baku-fu with current European news and with translations of the information contained in Occidental publications. A few-score copies of these reports were printed by the Baku-fu from carved wooden types, and were distributed for the information of the higher government officials (13).

In studying press history in the Island Empire these bulletins sometimes breed confusion, for Japanese historians are prone to register as a "newspaper" any official broadside thus prepared. The confusion is increased through the customary failure to point out that but one issue only of any particular title was ever published, through the tendency to attribute the issue to independent initiative rather than to Baku-fu promotion, and through the duplication involved in crediting the issue both to the government official superintending the publication and to the collaborator who might be consulted concerning the relative importance of the news. These defects in method create a false impression of active rivalry in issuing news journals, cause some historians to multiply unintentionally the instances of free journalism, and exaggerate the part played by the press in Japan's social and political development.

The most pretentious of the official bulletins was the *Batavia Shimbun*, printed for the Baku-fu in the latter weeks of 1861 by Heishiro Yorozuya. Like the other broadsides, this was not an original newspaper

in the modern sense, but was merely a translation into Japanese of the contents of the September issue of the Dutch Batavia News. Since the Japanese translation made no pretense at an independent search for news, the importance of the Batavia Shimbun lies in its historical value as being a first attempt to regularize the collection of the news. Hitherto, except for the Dutch reports, information had reached the Baku-fu somewhat irregularly, according to the chance receipt of new reports. The Batavia Shimbun introduced the practice of translating the contents of any important foreign newspaper arriving in Japan (14).

The titles given to succeeding issues varied, in order to indicate the sources from which the news was drawn or the subject matters upon which the bulletins gave information. Later broadsides therefore bore such titles as Rikaigo Sodan (Universal Round-Table), Hong Kong Shimbun, or Kaigai Shimbun (Overseas News). Like the Batavia Shimbun, all these were Baku-fu reprints of foreign papers. None possessed editorials, local news, or special articles written independently for the Japanese. Nor, of course, were regular publication dates observed, since the dates of issue depended upon the arrival of sufficiently important news.

Joseph Heco, "editor" or news-adviser for the Baku-fu, deserves to be regarded as the real father of Japanese journalism. He was an adventurous sailor, originally named Hikozo Hamada, who had been ship-

wrecked, in 1850, while sailing from Harima to Yedo. He had been picked up by an American ship and had been carried by his rescuers to America. There he attracted the attention of philanthropists who changed his name, gave him an elementary education, saw to his naturalization as an American citizen, and interested him in American life. After returning to Japan—with the Perry Expedition, according to his later associate, Ginko Kishida—he served as interpreter to the American consulate in Yokohama. Under the sobriquet "America" Heco, he was well-known as the best Japanese authority on American life, and for that reason had been appointed as the compiler of the Kaigai Shimbun (15).10

<sup>10</sup> Kaigai Shimbun seems to have been issued in 1862, although Heco gives 1864 as the date for its establishment. The confusion in dates indicates one of the tasks confronting the student of Tapanese gazettes. Even those authorities who should be best acquainted differ widely in chronology. Heco's error of two years is a case in point. Another is the date of the Batavia Shimbun. Nakagawa gives the date 1863; Kawabe and Courant say 1864; and Martin, acting probably on information received from Iichiro Tokutomi, says 1863. The actual date, 1861, is fixed by the fact that the paper contains an account of the eighty-fifth anniversary celebration of Independence Day in the United States. The news reached Batavia in time for publication on August 31, 1861, but could scarcely have reached Japan before October. The case of the oldest newspaper now existing is even more complicated. This is the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, said by Hanazono to have been founded March, 1868. Yet on another page he gives February 21, 1872, as the date of establishment, and photographs the inaugural issue in proof. The Nichi Nichi itself published a twenty-eighth anniversary issue in 1902, which would put the date as 1874, but, in the same

Heco's next step was to republish, in Japanese and for his own profit, additional items which had appeared in the American press and which were not selected for the Baku-fu news bulletins. With the aid of Senzo Homma and Ginko Kishida, a twelve-page paper, called *Shimbunshi* (News) was issued March 1, 1864. Like the earlier official broadsides, it was primarily a medium for translations, but it also had the broader scope of including local items and reports of market prices. Kishida supplied the latter information, and thus should rank as the pioneer reporter of Japan (17).

According to Heco's own story, Shimbunshi had probably the smallest circulation list on record, consisting of but two subscribers. "It was a strange fact," writes Heco, "that although the native people were anxious to read the paper, they were afraid, I believe on account of the government and the law at that time, to subscribe for it or to buy it, so I had to give it away." At no time did the circulation exceed a hundred copies, and after the tenth issue, in 1864, it ceased to appear. Difficulties with the government, as Heco hints, may have contributed to the

issue, declared that it was founded October, 1871. In 1904 a thirty-seventh anniversary issue was distributed, implying that the date should be 1867, in which Courant agrees. Takahashi estimated 1871; while Sawada, speaking to the Japan Society of London, said the *Nichi Nichi* was begun in 1867, although ten pages later he reports the origin as 1873 (16).

suspension, for immediately after *Shimbunshi* expired, both Kishida and Heco embarked upon hurried trips abroad, Heco going to the United States while Kishida fled to China (18).

The next important vernacular paper, Bankoku Shimbunshi (News of the World) appeared under foreign editorship, although, unfortunately for the paper, not under the aegis of extrality. It was owned and edited by Rev. Buckworth Bailey, the British consular chaplain, and Ajiki Zendo, a Buddhist priest. In reality, Bankoku, a high-grade journal printed upon foreign newsprint, marks the birth of the religious press, since Bailey's chief interest was in culling such news as might advance the progress of religion in Japan. Its first issue came in October, 1867, but, like its predecessors, Bankoku had no regular publication dates. Its technical importance rests upon the fact that it was the first native paper in Japan to print advertisements, and in its consequent reduction of subscription price from the customary one momme charge (about 15 cents) to two sen (approximately one cent) a copy. The paper proved popular and its circulation rose to upwards of 2,000 copies. But, from causes which will soon appear, Bankoku's life was rather brief, ending in June of 1868 (10).

A better paper, also foreign-edited, was the Ka-koku Shimbun (World News), founded by John Hartley, an Osaka merchant, in April, 1868. With this begins the long experimentation of the Japanese gov-

ernment in the manipulation of a controlled press. ostensibly free and independent in its ownership, but in reality directed from behind the scenes for propaganda purposes. Kakoku was accorded official support from the Imperialist faction during the civil wars pursuant to the Meiji Restoration, and the paper was expected to print news items favorable to the Imperial cause. Since Hartley, by his commercial contacts, had a wider range of information than Bailey could procure, Kakoku ranked the older paper both in local and in business news. Economies in printing were possible for Kakoku because, through official suggestion, it was lent a copious font of metal types cast by Shozo Motogi of the Nagasaki Steel Works. All newspapers in Japan had hitherto been printed from wood blocks hand carved into the proper characters. But with the triumph of the Imperialistic cause Kakoku was no longer thought to be essential. The type was withdrawn and in 1869 the paper was abandoned (20).

A second propaganda paper, Chugai Shimbun (Home and Foreign News) was published every five or six days by Shunzo "Shunsan" Yanagawa from February, 1868, until Yanagawa's death some two years later. Since it was more frankly designed as a medium for publicity, Chugai Shimbun was permitted to print editorials, and thus it introduced this feature for the first time into any vernacular gazette. Usually the paper contained ten pages, stitched in pam-

phlet form and printed from wood blocks, and the price remained one momme. Because of its official patronage, however, the *Chugai Shimbun* prospered and its circulation rose to 1,500 copies. The success appears to have caused embarrassment, as an editorial was inserted in which Yanagawa confessed his inability to solve the distribution problem. He therefore asked his gracious subscribers to spare him trouble by themselves sending for their own copies (21).

Yet another paper, the Koko Shimbun, was inaugurated in April, 1868, to serve Imperialistic interests. Appearing every three or four days, this paper, edited by Genichiro Fukichi, advocated forceful resistance to all enemies of Imperialist control. But, unlike Chugai Shimbun and Kakoku, Fukichi's paper opposed not only the Tokugawa shogunate, but also waged fierce war upon the little group of Satsuma-Choshu clansmen who succeeded the Tokugawa as powers behind the throne. "We cannot be satisfied," it said, "unless the Ministerialists are overthrown, and the sovereign rights are restored to the Emperor in fact as well as in name" (22).

Fukichi was at once imprisoned by the "Sat-Cho" oligarchy on the charge of inciting revolution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Fukichi, another of the brilliant geniuses in which early Japanese journalism abounds, was a dramatist and diplomat. As a high official of the Shogunate, he had been four times sent abroad on missions and he was conversant with foreign ideas.

To silence Koko Shimbun, Bankoku Shimbun, Moshiogusa (Sea-Weeds), 12 and other papers believed to be unfriendly to the "Sat-Cho" rule, a special press ordinance was issued. This document, circulated in June, 1868, declared that no newspaper could be issued except by previous permission of the government. As no journal, except the official government protagonists, had been notified of this requirement, anti-administration papers had to be abandoned. This marks the first infringement by the government upon press freedom, and closes the preliminary period of Japan's press history (23).

No crime, it may be noted, is alleged against the anti-Ministry newspapers save that of printing, as Noguchi says, "certain delightful exaggerations" concerning "Sat-Cho" defeats in battle. It is noteworthy also that even vet commentators feel obliged to glide smoothly over any narration of the rude suppression methods used. In Marquis Okuma's semi-official history. Moshiogusa is described as having been abandoned because the editor "found the transportation business more profitable than journalism," and the Koko Shimbun is described as having a "peculiar political color." Hanazono remarks naïvely that "some people expressed surprise that Bankoku discontinued, since if so many copies were sold it must have earned a handsome profit." Martin, who seems to have received his information from the editor of Kokumin,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Established April, 1868, by Kishida on his return to Japan.

explains that *Bankoku* ceased because of "lack of readers and of other difficulties." *Koko Shimbun's* attitude is completely twisted by Kawabe, who says the editorials "glorified rebellion," and by Sawada, who implies that it earned Imperial disfavor. Both latter writers ignore the justice of the opposition to "Sat-Cho"; and Sawada, in fact, excludes the Choshu clan entirely from his discussion of the matter (24).

Soon after order was restored and the Imperialists, following Satsuma-Choshu leadership, came into undisputed administrative powers, the second period of journalism was enabled to begin. Beginning with the issue, on December 12, 1870, of the Yokohama Mainichi (Daily News) daily publication of newspapers replaced the somewhat intermittant issues of the past. Official aid continued, for not only was the Yokohama Mainichi openly assisted by the Yokohama district governor, Iseki, but it was also allotted the use of the Motogi steel type once lent to Hartley's short-lived paper (25).

But Yokohama, the foreign settlement, was not deemed the best site for a vernacular paper, and in 1879 the *Mainichi* was transferred to Tokyo. Subsequent political changes deprived it of official favor, and, together with the competition of more strongly financed newspapers, caused the *Mainichi* to decay in circulation and in influence. At one time it was sold to *Hochi*, a competitor, but it did not lose its identity, and in 1914 the *Mainichi* again became an

official organ when *Hochi* sold it to Sanehiko Yamamoto, a member of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly. Since 1918 the *Mainichi*, now owned by H. Chiba, has been an evening paper of comparatively slight importance (26).

Within a year after the establishment of the Yo-kohama Mainichi, thirty other journals, encouraged by the Mainichi's early prosperity, sprang up in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Most of these appear to have been founded either as administration organs or as mouthpieces for the views of prominent politicians allied to the Administration. Little attempt was made by any of these journals to discuss political affairs in a manner hostile to the ministerial policies, and the contents were almost always composed of official information or of items favorable to the ruling cliques. Opposition papers or journals which did not enjoy a subsidy could not compete with favored periodicals controlled by ambitious politicians who, to quote Toyabe, edited them as "diversions" (27).<sup>13</sup>

None of these papers equals in importance the *Nisshin Shinjishi* (*China-Japan News*), which appeared in Tokyo in 1872 under the editorship of John Reddie Black, an Englishman. This was undoubtedly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The Shimbun Zasshi (News Magazine), a weekly begun in June, 1871, is typical. It was "inspired" by Jiunichiro "Koin" Kido, and like the Mainichi, sought to enhance "Sat-Cho" hegemony. Kido, however, concealed his connection with the paper, and the editorship was nominally held by two of his retainers (28).

the first true modern-style newspaper in the Japanese language, for although it was anticipated by both the Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, neither of the latter journals covered the news field with anything like the thoroughness of the Nisshin. Black's paper. too, was free from the excessive filth which rendered older papers obnoxious to the foreign residents, and he took especial pride in carrying on "crusades" against the prevalence of indecent and objectionable street exhibitions. Local news was stressed, for Black, as an expert newspaperman—he owned and edited two English-language papers and a monthly magazine—realized the circulation value of the local items. Praise was freely accorded to the municipality, partly because of an official connection between Black's paper and the government, and, more probably, because of the recognition that an official whose name is flatteringly mentioned becomes a news source of future value (29).

Black himself believed that the *Nisshin Shinjishi* was founded at the instigation of the government, for his partner, F. da Roza, was in close alliance with the high officials, and through da Roza's influence special favors were made available. An open connection with the Sa-In, one of the three chief government departments, was soon established, and official monetary support was freely given (30).

In spite of these advantages the *Nisshin* suffered difficulties. The type question rose to vex the editors.

Black and da Roza had believed that a font of some two or three hundred boxwood characters would be sufficient; but in practice a need was felt for more than 1,200 wooden types, and eventually ten times that number were required. Black employed several men to carve out characters as they might be needed, but the expense was heavy. Eventually this drain was relieved when metal foundries began to "turn out type, one, two, or any number at a time, at a cost of one cent each" (31).

Nor were many Japanese, outside official circles, aware of the proper purpose of a paper. It was even necessary to convince prospective purchasers that daily issues really implied fresh news each day and not reprinting of stale news of yesterday. Black was reduced to canvassing from house to house for more subscribers. By 1874 the financial tide was turning for the *Nisshin*, but then occurred a series of events, reflecting no particular glory on any of the participants, whereby the paper was extinguished.

According to Black's own story he was approached by officials of the Sa-In and was asked to accept the secretaryship of a new bureau to be called the "popular representative deliberative assembly," or house of representatives. The purpose evidently was to use Black's influence and that of the Nisshin to work up sentiment for a more democratic government. Black consented, and he was appointed to this non-existent body for a two-year term. Since the ar-

rangement was in contravention of a Japanese decree forbidding government officials from engaging in a private enterprise, Black was advised "for form's sake" to withdraw his name from the Nisshin masthead and to cancel its registration in his name. As soon as this was done, announcement was made officially that the proprietorship and editorship of Japanese language papers was henceforth closed to foreigners. Black was also given notice that his secretaryship was terminated. On his attempting to rejoin the Nisshin he found the Press Law operating to prevent him. Thus a newspaper was allowed to die, which, in the opinion of Motosada Zumoto, was "the best and most strongly edited of Japanese newspapers" (32).

The real motives for this action are still disputed. Probably a general tone of criticism which had developed in the *Nisshin* had antagonized the government. Marquis Okuma's narration points out that articles by Eiichi Shibusawa (now Viscount) and Kaoru Inouye, later vice-minister of finance, had exposed political secrets. Others assume that either an editorial by Fukichi advocating extrality continuance, or appeals by Counts Goto and Itagaki for a national assembly, were responsible (33).

Black, dissatisfied by his exclusion, then attempted to establish a second *Bankoku Shimbun* as a vernacular paper under extrality protection. The Japanese authorities complained that such a precedent

might incite disgruntled Japanese to attack the government by hiring a complaisant foreigner as an editor; and Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister, forbade all British subjects from publishing or editing native papers. The precedent was later used to "kill" a British paper in Korea.

#### NOTES\*

- 1. Gulick, p. 19; Bryan, p. 17.
- Rev. B. F. Shively, Christian Movement (1918), p. 215;
   Professor Kunitake Kime, in Okuma, I, 96; Ito, in Okuma, I, 127; articles on Shinto, Okuma, II, 40.
- 3. Okuma, p. 40.
- 4. Gulick, p. 146.
- 5. Chronicle, October 19, 1922.
- Gulick, p. 121; Chamberlain (for a collection of opinions), p. 8.
- 7. Akimoto, Advertiser, January 22, 1919; in Tokyo, Advertiser, October 23, 1925; see also Chronicle, November 15, 1917, July 27, 1922.
- 8. "War in Twenty Years," New York Times, May 21, 1925; "Few Jingoes," ibid., July 16, 1925; see also "Taiyo," January, 1926; Advertiser, January 31, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, December 27, 1925.
- 9. Nitobe, in *Chronicle*, October 5, 1922; *Advertiser*, November 27, 1924, December 30, 1924; *Japan Times*, March 9, 1925.
- 10. Gulick, pp. 49, 146.
- 11. Gulick, pp. 125, 139, 140; Chamberlain, pp. 253, 264.
- \*All citations in this chapter referring to Okuma, Heco, or Young Japan are, unless otherwise noted, in Volume II of each of these works.

#### THE CULTURE CLASH

- 12. Japan Times, December 11, 1924; Tokyo Statistical Bureau, Twentieth Annual Report, 1924, p. 148; Chronicle, January 14, 1926.
- Mail, January 16, 1909; Okuma, pp. 393-94; Hanazono, p. 5.
- Hanazono, pp. 4, 5; Sawada, p. 369; Noguchi, p. 141;
   Kawabe, pp. 38 f.
- 15. See Heco's Autobiography; Byas (1916), p. 42.
- Heco, p. 253; London Times, September 2, 1916; Nichi Nichi, March 9, 1902, November 10, 1902, November 10, 1904; Sawada, pp. 189 f., 200; Hanazono, p. 8; Japan Yearbook (1924-25), pp. 276 f.; Martin, p. 5; Kawabe, pp. 38 f.; Courant, 507 f.
- Kishida, in Kobe Chronicle, May 24, 1899; Nakamura, p. 290; Courant, p. 507; Sawada, p. 189; Hanazono, p. 4; Okuma, p. 394; Mail, January 16, 1909.
- Heco, p. 253; Yomiuri, July 12, 1902; Kawabe, pp. 40 f.;
   Courant, p. 507; Hanazono, p. 5; Noguchi.
- 19. Young Japan, p. 60; Yomiuri, July 12, 1902; Okuma, p. 306; Hanazono, p. 7; Martin, p. 6; Kawabe, p. 41.
- 20. Young Japan, p. 275; Hanazono, p. 10.
- 21. Nakagawa, p. 373; Martin, p. 6; Zumoto, p. 113; Kawabe, p. 42; Hanazono, pp. 11-13.
- 22. Mail, January 13, 1906; Sawada, p. 190; Kawabe, p. 61; Taiyo, February, 1906; Kuroda; Nakamura, p. 299; Hanazono, pp. 10, 34.
- 23. See "Press Freedom in Japan," American Journal of Sociology, January, 1927.
- 24. London Times, September 2, 1916; Okuma, pp. 393-95; Sawada, p. 190; Kawabe, pp. 61 f.; Kuroda; Higashi; Nakagawa, p. 373; Yomiuri, July 12, 1902; Mail, August 30, 1902; Martin, p. 6; Hanazono, p. 7.
- 25. Longford, p. 176; Zumoto, p. 114; Kawabe, p. 42; Rivetta; Rai; Okuma, p. 306; Mail, January 16, 1900.

- Mail, November 26, 1887, September 1, 1900, November 3, 1900, February 7, 1903, December 15, 1906; "Tsch"; Higashi; Myojo, August, 1900; Byas.
- 27. Toyabe, in Okuma, p. 395; *Taikan*, October, 1918; Kawabe, pp. 81 f.
- 28. Longford, Asiatic Society, XI, 205; Von Brandt; Sawada, p. 191; Hanazono, p. 23; Okuma, p. 396; Young Japan, p. 309.
- 29. Young Japan, pp. 364-70.
- 30. Ibid., p. 336.
- 31. Ibid., pp. 366-68.
- 32. Ibid., p. 372; Longford, p. 30.
- 33. Longford, p. 177; Okuma, p. 398; Kawabe, p. 61.

#### CHAPTER II

## THE PRESS SEEKS FREEDOM

Prior to 1872 the blight of Administration propaganda and the restrictions imposed upon independent gathering of news prevented the appearance of truly first-rank journalists, with the exception of Heco, the founder of the press, and of Black, the British pioneer of Japanese gazettes. None of the figures later to be commemorated as the giants of the Japanese newspaper world had as yet appeared; nor, with the exception of the Nisshin Shinjishi and the Tokyo Mainichi had powerful newspapers been established.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Each year the Tokyo Nichi Nichi and the Osaka Mainichi commemorate the work of ten noted journalists whom these papers rank as worthy of membership in Japan's newspaper "Hall of Fame." It is a matter for regret that Heco is not included in the number, but J. R. Black is admitted, as the only foreigner. Black, however, was overlooked by the Japanese government when, in the spring of 1925, a long list of "foreigners who have served Japan" was honored by a memorial service at the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo. The ten newspapermen who are remembered by the Nichi Nichi and the Mainichi are: Shunzo Yanagawa, founder of Seiyo Zasshi and Chugai Shimbun; Ginko Kishida, of Shimbunshi, Moshiogusa and the Nichi Nichi; Joun Kurimoto and Mokichi Fujita of Hochi; Yukichi Fukuzawa of Jiji; Ryuhoku Narushima, of Choya; Tetsuo Suyehiro, of Shimbun Zasshi, who was imprisoned for insistance on free speech; Shuichi Numa, a government official who resigned in

In the decade from 1872 to 1882, however, the period when the stirrings of reform began to be observed, a number of new journals came to be begun. As in the previous years, the administration was responsible for founding most of these, for government officials wished to use newspapers as mouthpieces for publicity; but the rise of opposition papers is a notable phenomenon.

By far the most successful of the government-inspired organs, and one of the few still flourishing, was the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, established in February, 1872. In reality this paper was the *Koko Shimbun*, revived after a four-year suspension to support the same "Sat-Cho" oligarchy which it had formerly denounced. Ginko Kishida, the editor, was now fully restored to official confidence and he made no secret of his desire to use the *Nichi Nichi* as an administration organ. Indeed, the paper boasted, in 1875, that it was "under the special protection of the Council of State." Fukichi also, having changed his views, was added to the staff to represent the views of Prince Ito, Okuma, Okubo, and Kido (1).

Fukichi's journalistic cleverness marks him as a pioneer. To him is credited the introduction of signed editorials, the use of the margin of the paper as a preferred place for printing advertisements, and the is-

indignation at being prohibited from making public speeches and joined the *Yokohama Mainichi*; and Genichiro Fukichi, of the *Nichi Nichi*.

suing of gogai (extras). He cleansed the Nichi Nichi of the filthy items which, by all accounts, appear to have been found in all the native papers and against which Black had registered complaints. But his abilities could not secure his post, and when his influential friends fell into internecine strife, and Ito was defeated, the Nichi Nichi lost its administration subsidies. A final blow was dealt when, in 1882, Fukichi's own patrons, Ito and Okuma, transferred their favor to the Tokyo Jiji.<sup>2</sup> The Nichi Nichi could not meet expenses, and in 1887 Fukichi was forced to resign. With his withdrawal the Nichi Nichi was restored to Ito's favor and was the official mouthpiece whenever Ito was in power (2).

In November, 1904, Count Takaaki Kato, former ambassador to Great Britain and later Premier, bought the *Nichi Nichi* from the Ito interest. Kato wished to build the paper into a replica of the *London Times*. Although he was assisted by the wealthy Mitsubishi corporation, headed by his father-in-law, the *Nichi Nichi* failed to meet expenses. Six years later it

<sup>a</sup> Ito's displeasure against Fukichi was aroused by the latter's publishing an exposé of Ito's plan to sell government land in the Hokkaido to a private individual at much less than market value. A later editor, Chisen Asaina, also braved the Ito wrath by attacking that statesman's "despotism" while in office. When Ito refused to mend his ways, Asaina resigned. Hanazono's book, while frankly devoted to the interests of the Nichi Nichi, fails to mention Asaina, though Asaina is regarded by Yone Noguchi as one of the three greatest editors Japan has ever had (4).

was transferred, through an intermediary, to the Osaka Mainichi, and became the Tokyo "sister" of the latter paper (3).

The not uncommon Japanese custom whereby government departments or institutions may be represented by a journalistic spokesman appears to have originated with the establishment, in the spring of 1872, of Yubin Hochi (Postal News) by the then postmaster-general Hisoka Mayejima. This official was motivated by a double purpose, for he wished not only to possess a friendly newspaper, but also to carry news to the less literate portion of the population. His paper, therefore, was designed to be written in the easy kana syllabary that would avoid the use of the more classical Chinese characters.

Almost from the first, however, *Hochi*, as it came to be known, outgrew the original design and entered into active competition with the other "major" papers. The educational purpose of the journal was thereupon transferred to a new gazette, established in February, 1873, and called the *Hiragana Shimbun* (*Kana Paper*). The latter paper died soon thereafter, but its influence and that of Mayejima is still to be seen in the customary practice, followed by virtually all the press, of attaching tiny kana symbols at the side of the Chinese characters which make up the body of all papers (5).

Ten years after its establishment, *Hochi* also abandoned its peculiarly departmental mission and

was incorporated in the larger stream of political interpreters. In 1882 it was bought by Fumio Yano, formerly a secretary in the treasury and a close friend of Marquis Okuma. For over forty years the paper was regarded as the especial spokesman of that statesman, and it was the administration mouthpiece whenever Okuma, or his supporters, was in power. Yano sold the paper about the time of the Sino-Japanese War to other friends of Okuma, but the journal has never quite won independence from official circles. In 1910 its president was Katsundo Minoura, a veteran politician and a former Cabinet minister. Minoura was succeeded by Dr. Juichi Soyeda, the first president of the Bank of Formosa and of the Japan Industrial Bank, former head of the Imperial Railways, and a vice-minister. When Soyeda retired, in 1923, when Hochi passed out from Okuma influence, Chuji Machida, formerly of the Bank of Japan and an under-secretary of the Department of Communications, became the president (6).

To Japanese journalists *Hochi* has always been an object of great professional curiosity, for its various managements have been resourceful in their devices for creating circulation. In order to continue to appeal to its lower and middle-class clientèle which Mayejima had courted, Yano cut the subscription rate to 25 sen a month, or to about 12½ cents. As a means for attracting a steady group of readers he introduced the plan of printing serials. Hiroshi "Gen-

sai" Murai and Zempichi Miki, to whom Yano sold the paper, sought to build up "a clean family paper of a liberal type," and to that end endeavored once again to print a vernacular newspaper free from salacity. They made an especial appeal for women readers, and, as early as a quarter-century ago, employed women as staff writers, but did not dare at first to announce this publicly. "If it were known," they said, "that women were the authors of the paragraphs read by the general readers, silly prejudice would destroy the effect of the writings" (7).

One of Miki's more daring and by no means unsuccessful efforts to build circulation consisted of splitting the paper into a morning and an evening edition, the former printing foreign news, editorials, and a modern serial; the latter containing late cables, local news, and a novel of old Japan. *Hochi* is also credited with having begun the first news bureau in Japan (8).

A recent service for which *Hochi* deserves the highest credit was its exposure of the hidden influences governing the inner political circles of the Empire. Its disclosures, in January, 1925, of the wide ramifications of power held by the so-called "God of Onden" did much to purify Japanese social and political conditions, even though it failed in its attempt to punish the "God" himself.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For a full account of this crusade, see the writer's article in the World Tomorrow, June, 1925.

That the press might serve a social mission distinct from governmental propaganda seems to have been first discerned by Seiko Motono, who, with two others, established *Yomiuri* (the *Town Crier*) in 1873. Like Mayejima, Motono's avowed purpose was to reform society, and, like *Hochi*, *Yomiuri* resorted to the semicolloquial and easy style of writing in order to appeal to the masses of the people (9).

Because Motono's paper did not champion, at first, any of the government departments, and did not represent the views of influential politicians, it did not dare to touch on matters of political importance. Yomiuri was confined to literary and to cultural affairs, and partook rather of the nature of a daily news-magazine than of the usual newspaper. For such a paper, devoid of official backing, the press laws were too restraining to allow a full and impartial treatment of the news, and so, as was frequently remarked, the Yomiuri treated its news items in an incidental, and often in a casual, style (10).

Motono's detachment from the openly propagandist press and his retention of Yukio Ozaki (formerly of *Hochi*, and a famous liberal) on his staff gave to *Yomiuri* a reputation for radicalism and for "yellowness" which was wholly undeserved. Motono's son was high in the diplomatic service, and, indeed, was envoy both to France and Russia, and Motono's sympathies were enlisted on the side of the Conservatives. But the general reputation of the paper and the strong

competition by the better-financed *Hochi* prevented *Yomiuri* from becoming a highly paying property for some years after its foundation (11).

To such financial straits was *Yomiuri* reduced that at one time, in 1908, it seriously considered converting itself into a private detective agency, using its reporters as special espionage agents to report the intrigues, dissipations, and extravagances of those suspected of leading irregular lives. This *bikoki*, or "talebearing department," was announced, but seems never to have been actually operative (12).

Motono's control over Yomiuri continued nearly half a century, but the paper passed, at length, to Chujiro Matsuyama, formerly of the Tokyo Asahi. Matsuyama was fortunate in his financial backers, for he was able to secure a group of twenty millionaires, headed by Viscount Shibusawa, long president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, and founder of numerous semi-official enterprises, Baron Kihachiro Okura, president of a vast chain of contracting enterprises, and Baron Seinosuke Go, steel and colliery executive, to finance the undertaking. They lent him a million yen without imposing restrictive conditions. Yomiuri immediately jumped to the forefront as an organ of liberalism, stood firm against the censorship, attacked bureaucracy and militarism, denounced bribery in politics, and even ventured to demand home rule for Formosa. It undertook a new "campaign" to rid the press of the slanderous personal comment

which Black, Fukichi, and the *Hochi* editors had also tried in vain to banish. Its woman's page, like that of its rival, *Hochi*, attained a special excellence, and its circulation leaped from 50,000 copies to approximately three times that number (13).

But the earthquake dealt a heavy blow to Yomiuri. Matsuvama's policy had antagonized a number of his underwriters, one of whom he had accused of complicity in a railway scandal. New funds were refused the paper so long as Matsuyama should remain the editor. On his resignation in February, 1924. Matsutaro Shoriki, a former chief of detectives, and the son-in-law of the metropolitan police chief, was chosen to succeed him. Mr. Shoriki, according to the general rumor in newspaper circles, was financed by Baron Go, the successor to Viscount Shibusawa in the Chamber of Commerce leadership. Fearing that the policy of the paper would swing immediately to the "right," the entire staff of Yomiuri, with one exception, promptly resigned their posts (14).

So far as circulation is concerned, the two greatest papers of Japan are the *Osaka Mainichi* and the *Osaka Asahi*, each of which claims more than a million circulation daily, but neither of which is willing to submit its claim to independent audit. These papers dominate the industrial center of the Empire, and each of them maintains an extensive independent organization for securing special and exclusive news.

Many editions of each are printed—the Asahi stating that it issues thirty editions daily—printing plants are maintained in centers remote from Osaka, and local supplements are inserted to create a local appeal, not only in the suburbs of Osaka, but also in more remote regions such as Korea and Formosa.

The older paper is the Osaka Mainichi (Daily), the direct descendent of the Osaka Nippo, established in 1875 but immediately suspended for its anti-administration attitude. In the summer of the following vear the Nippo was revived with an attitude more favorable to the ruling group, and, in 1883, changed its name to Mainichi. Five years later Hikoichi Motoyama, general manager of the Fujita Gumi, a very large mining, contracting, and farming corporation with close official connections, bought the paper. A new program of independence from politics and of devotion to commercial interests was adopted, and with the Fujita backing, the Mainichi proved itself enormously successful. Its rivals, with the exception of the Asahi, were soon driven off, and the vast Kwansai —the Kobe-Kyoto-Osaka area—became the monopoly of the Asahi and the Mainichi (15).

Expansion under the Motoyama direction has been rapid. As early as 1892 staff correspondents were stationed permanently in Europe and Australia, and special attention has been paid to foreign news. In order to procure speedier and more reliable news from Tokyo, special telephone connection has been

maintained by direct wires between the capital and Osaka since 1898. As a further advancement of the Tokyo service two Tokyo papers, the Mainichi Dempo<sup>4</sup> and the Nichi Nichi, have been purchased, the former in 1906 and the Nichi Nichi in 1910, and have been consolidated as the Tokyo "sisters" of the Osaka Mainichi. Special editions are regularly published in Nagoya (Chukyo Mainichi) for Central Japan, and in Moji (Seibu Mainichi) for the southern island of Kyushu. An "Economic Supplement" is a noteworthy feature of the paper. A Braille type Mainichi and an English edition (established 1922) supply other fields.

Both the *Mainichi* and the *Asahi* are assiduous in promoting enterprises deemed likely to bring advertisement to the paper. Sporting events, concerts, lectures, exhibitions, and other occasions of public interests are conducted under the "auspices" of one or the other journal, with the distinct understanding that news of the event will be "featured" only in the paper chosen as the patron. In addition to these numerous occurrences the *Mainichi* has dispatched a scientific expedition to investigate the coast-wise ocean currents, and to explore Northern Saghalien for oil. A meteorological observatory has been set up on the roof of the publishing house, a music hall has been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This paper should not be confused with the *Tokyo Mainichi*. The *Mainichi Dempo (Daily Telegraph)* was a conservative commercial paper.

donated to Osaka, and traveling hospitals have been sent into the slum wards of Osaka. A *Mainichi* baseball team, long well-known in Japan, toured the United States in 1925.

Although the Osaka Asahi (Rising Sun) was founded three years later than the Mainichi, in January, 1879, it leaped more rapidly into the forefront. When it was four years old Ryuhei Murayama acquired a control which he has since maintained. Five years later, in July, 1888, he set up the Tokyo Asahi as his agent in the capital (16).

Mr. Murayama has spared no expense in pushing his papers forward. Free extras have been lavishly distributed, especially on such occasions as the promulgation of the constitution in 1880. Verbatim reports were printed of the first Diet sessions. The Osaka edition was the first commercial paper to employ rotary presses. His staffs have consistently been brilliant and expensive, and correspondents have been distributed abroad more widely than have the writers for any other paper in Japan. Asahi's foreign news has been always excellent and usually of a high degree of trustworthiness, although on some occasions, as in 1917-18, grave doubts have been cast on the authenticity of some dispatches. Close relations have been maintained with the London Times and with the leading papers of other lands.

In addition to the newspapers the Asahi company publishes a number of allied publications. A Weekly

Asahi, a semi-monthly Sports Asahi, and a weekly rotogravure Asahigraph represent its more important interests, but in addition there is also a series of monthly issues of Stage and Screen, Kodomo Asahi (Children's Asahi), and Fujin (Women), the organ of the Western Japan Federation of Women's Clubs. Asahi also patronizes the Kwansai Film Society, the Imperial Aviation Society, and other groups. It has maintained a radio broadcasting station and has rendered noteworthy service in the field of aviation. The first flights ever seen in Japan were given by Asahi in 1911, and the first regular intercity service, begun in 1923, was also an Asahi enterprise. In 1925 Asahi airplanes successfully completed a flight from Tokyo to London.

In its policy the Asahi has been commendably independent, and, like the Mainichi, has stood consistently for liberalism and for freedom from the censorship. Unlike its rival, however, Asahi has not customarily been addicted to jingoistic utterances, nor has it been as strongly antiforeign as has the Mainichi. In consequence, Asahi has at times been seriously punished by the government authorities. It gave the first news of Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China, but, after being suppressed, was made to deny its own reports. Nevertheless it repeated the item some time later, and was again suppressed. For giving too much information on the rice riots of 1918 it was suppressed for over twenty days. Moreover, it

has bitterly attacked the militaristic influence in the government and it opposed the Japanese incursion and occupation of Siberia (17).

Asahi, therefore, earned the opposition of the bureaucrats and of those favoring "strong" governmental action. Mr. Murayama was brutally assaulted by political ruffians, but, instead of punishing the culprits, the police arrested Mr. Murayama and threatened to prosecute the paper for defending revolutionary principles. To save the paper from annihilation, Teruo "Sosen" Torii and Chujiro Matsuyama (later of Yomiuri) were dismissed as the responsible writers, Mr. Murayama temporarily retired, and the two Asahi's were obliged to apologize and to promise to support the government (18).

Mr. Torii induced two noblemen to finance him in establishing a new paper, the Taisho Nichi Nichi. The first issue appeared in November, 1919, but the two larger Osaka papers bent every effort to defeat the paper, even signing an agreement that any advertisement appearing in the Taisho should be refused admittance to their own columns. The Taisho lost \( \frac{\pmathbf{f}}{600,000} \) within six months, and was abandoned. Later it was temporarily revived by a radical religious group, and when this sect was prosecuted the Taisho passed to labor interests. It failed to continue long (19).

The Jiji Shimpo (Times), founded March, 1882, by Yukichi Fukuzawa, Japan's Great Commoner,

ranks among the very finest papers in Japan. Originally it was employed by Prince Ito, Marquis Okuma, and other Progressists as an organ for the constitutionalist idea, but it soon developed into a far greater importance than a merely propagandist journal. A. Miyamori, the biographer of Fukuzawa, ranks the Jiji better than the London Times in that he thinks the Japanese newspaper "broader-minded, more impartial, and with a keener sense of right and justice" (20).

Fukuzawa's paper brought important changes into journalistic technique. Jiji was the first paper to appear on seven days a week, omitting the usual holiday after November, 1887. It long published a remarkable Thursday literary supplement, and in May, 1906, began a miscellaneous Sunday supplement. It was the pioneer in publishing cartoons, and, with *Hochi*, one of the first to employ women on the staff. It was the first to instal Hoe presses and to extend the nightly "deadline" from the customary eighto'clock limit until one o'clock in the morning. It undertook to popularize Western science, art, and learning (21), and has been perhaps the fairest paper in Japan toward foreign nations and toward foreign residents. It was the only Japanese paper to maintain an optimistic tone during and after the immigration disputes of 1024.

When Fukuzawa died in 1901, the paper passed to Sutejiro Fukuzawa, second son of the founder and

son-in-law of Count Tadasu Hayashi, former ambas-sador to China and Great Britain. The latter connection possibly explains the *Jiji's* pre-eminence on matters connected with foreign relations, for, from 1895 until 1911, *Jiji* was the spokesman for the Hayashi views. Masanori Ito, assistant editor of *Jiji*, "scooped" the world on the news of the signing of the Four Power Pacific Treaty at the Washington Conference. *Jiji* still enjoys close friendships in official quarters, and has also accurate knowledge of trends in the commercial field through the younger Fukuzawa's relationships with business leaders (22).

Kokumin (the Nation), now the chief exponent of Japanese nationalistic ambitions, was founded in February, 1890, by Iichiro, "Soho," Tokutomi, at that time a follower of a Matthew Arnold liberalism. Kokumin was a bitter and truculent critic of the Ito ministries, and within its first six years was disciplined no less than fourteen times, one offense calling for a suspension of 138 days. Its fearlessness, its brilliance, and its aggressive policy won it friends, and from an original subscription list of about 2,000, Kokumin leaped to ten times as large a circulation by the close of the Sino-Japanese War (23).

At a time when Japan was still subject to extrality conditions, Mr. Tokutomi urged that the nation be permitted to cast deciding votes on every question which might affect the Far East and the Northern Pacific Ocean. He demanded that the Japanese navy be

supreme on the Pacific from Korea to the Philippines, and suggested that Japan either buy the latter archipelago from Spain or force its freedom by the aid of war (24).

As many of Kokumin's aims in domestic politics were identical with those expressed by Marquis Okuma, Kokumin became the organ of the latter statesman and of his Doshi-kai party. By 1905 the paper had so modified its original liberal attitude that it was defending the issuing of press laws whereby the freedom of the press was almost completely ended. Mr. Tokutomi subsequently has become the foremost advocate of the bureaucratic rule. In 1911 he was designated as Imperial nominee for membership in the House of Peers (25).

In his survey of the Japanese press, Professor Martin refers to Kokumin as having had the greatest influence of all the papers in Japan, and he designates Tokutomi as the leading native journalist. This high opinion echoes an earlier approval voiced by Captain Brinkley, congratulating Kokumin as "always enlightened and moderate in tone," and as trustworthy and judicious. The praise, in both instances, may be somewhat overdrawn, but there is no question of the Kokumin's importance. The use of many illustrations and the adoption of the Hochi-Yomiuri scheme of easy writing has popularized the paper with the less erudite masses. Timely interviews on current topics have replaced the formalism hitherto the vogue in

vernacular newspapers, and even the germs of the modern "colyum" may be discerned in the daily paragraphs, "Tea-Cups," which *Kokumin* devoted to the lighter news (26).

As its chief representative the yellow press boasts of the Yorodzu-Chuho, (10,000 Things) established in 1892 by Shuroku Kuroiwa. Yamato (1874) and Miyako (1885), the latter being the so-called "geisha paper," are other representatives, but Yorodzu is by far the most virulent in tone. So staunch a friend of Japan as Captain Frank Brinkley had frequent occasion to rebuke the paper for its intemperate falsehoods, even to the extent of urging that Yorodzu ought to be hounded out of society. The Japan Advertiser regards it as "more anti-American in its policy than any American paper, be it owned by Hearst or McCormick, is anti-Japanese" (27).

On the plea that no newspaper could be financially prosperous so long as it was honest, *Yorodzu* began, in 1911, an agency called *Nyunensha* to undertake investigations on any topic, while another department *Mambensha* offered to transact any business whatever that might be intrusted to it. Like *Yomiuri's bikoki* three years earlier, these plans proved unsuccessful and were abandoned (28).

Vorodzu's intense anti-Westernism does not, however, equal that of Nippon, established 1889 by Minoru "Katsunan" Kuga. The latter paper long vehemently opposed all European and American ideas.

Two of the leading publicists of modern Japan, Kazutomo Takahashi of the Foreign Office and of the Japan Times, and Dr. Yujiro "Setsurei" Miyake, editor of the magazine Nihon oyobi Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese) are former members of the Nippon staff. The paper was sold in 1906 and was transformed into a banking journal representing the views of the official Bank of Japan (29).

Business circles are also represented by *Chugai Shogyo* (*Journal of Commerce*), established by the Mitsui interests in 1876. Nine years later it became a daily paper. Its commercial and economic news is of the highest value, for, in addition to the usual press telegrams, it receives special dispatches from Mitsui agencies throughout the world (30).

Owing to the stringency of press laws, the socialist and labor press has been, at least for dailies, almost non-existent. The nearest approaches have been on the part of *Yorodzu*, just before the Russo-Japanese War, when Kanzo Uchimura, an independent Christian leader, Toshihiko Sakai, a socialist, and Shusei Kotoku, later executed for attempting to murder the Emperor Meiji, wrote editorials denouncing war. These men were dismissed from the *Yorodzu* staff and the paper supported the conflict with Russia. The short-lived *Taisho Nichi Nichi*, under the editorship of Bunji Suzuki and Toyohiko Kagawa, labor leaders, maintained in 1920 a weak attempt to publish labor news. *Niroku*, founded 1893, began a press

campaign in 1901 against the Mitsui financial interests, and is credited with having brought about amelioration of the Mitsui attitude toward labor and with having caused the company to make a gift of \(\frac{2}{3}\)100,000 to charity. Niroku was also opposed to the Russian War, and its editor was tried on charges of espionage. He was acquitted, but the paper abandoned its pacifist position. No other important evidences of either radicalism or of anticapitalism have been shown by dailies in Japan (31).

Undoubtedly the press is winning steadily in its war against official ownership. Following the Restoration, Japanese newspapers were almost invariably supported either by the government or by eminent officials. The Yokohama Mainichi, the oldest vernacular paper now surviving, was patronized by the governor of Kanagawa prefecture; the Tokyo Nichi Nichi announced with pride that it was under the special protection of the Cabinet; the Nisshin Shinjishi, the first modern vernacular gazette, was admitted by its founder to have government support; Hochi was begun by the Postmaster-General as an organ for his own department. Not until the founding of Yomiuri, in 1873, was a truly independent journal established under native laws, and Yomiuri dared not delve deeply into politics. As late as 1883, Meiji Shimbun was instituted by the Administration to present official views.

This frank use of journalism for bureaucratic

propaganda was quite in accordance with the Japanese tradition. The line of policy pursued by the Tokugawa shogunate remained unbroken. But, with the promise of a constitution, and the revolutionary changes in government implied by such a document, new forces were thought necessary for journalism. Direct administration ownership virtually ended, although traces still survive in the domination of the chief newspapers in Seoul by the Korean government-general, in Formosa by the officials there, in the dictation to the *Manchuria Daily News* by the South Manchuria Railway, and, in Tokyo itself, in the close alliance between the modern *Yomiuri* and the Tokyo police.

Political party domination succeeded after the waning of government dictation. The real advantage gained was the coming of an opposition press, for papers could then comment critically upon administrative policies. In all affairs of purely political concern the Tokyo press remains in opposition to this day. Conflicts were less concerned with principles than with personalities, but the opportunity was opened for discussion. The press became the mouthpiece of individual leaders. Marquis Okuma employed the Hochi and Kokumin; Count Tadasu Hayashi used the Jiji; Viscounts Kanji Tani and Goro Miura had the Nippon; Count Kato edited the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, and Prince Ito found an outlet through the Nichi Nichi and several English-language papers. Perhaps

the most successful publicist today is Viscount Shimpei Goto, whose supporters are scattered through the journalistic ranks.

With the rise of industrialism the press has come to represent the interests of private enterprises rather than of individual politicians. The path is widening toward complete press freedom, for the papers need not now be instigated by political preoccupations. A counteracting influence, of course, is that at times semi-official corporations control the policies of certain papers. Large holdings in the Osaka Mainichi are influenced by the Fujita Gumi, a firm which specializes in official contracts; the Daido Electric Company sways the Jiji, and Mitsui interests own the Chugai Shogyo. In recent years the Nippon Ginko (Bank of Japan) has dominated Nippon: the allied geisha houses expressed their views through Miyako, and Mitsubishi has controlled the Nichi Nichi. Unions of big business houses and of semi-official corporations are still interested in English-language papers, and helped to found the Japanese Associated Press.

Few papers even yet can assert themselves entirely free from official "inspiration" (although the Osaka and the Tokyo Asahi's may be classed as independent journals), yet the trend of journalism is certainly toward emancipation from government control. To this extent the progress of the press has been a healthy one, although conjectures may still arise as to whether the rate of progress has been as rapid as

might have been desired. The blight of Tokugawa prohibitions against individuality, the numbing by bureaucracy of resentment against infringement of liberty, the killing of initiative are evident in Japan's journalism to the present day.

#### NOTES\*

- Tokyo Nichi Nichi, November 10, 1902, March 29, 1909,
   April 17, 1909; Mail, June 29, 1901, January 13, 1906;
   Longford, p. 176; Okuma, p. 401.
- 2. Okuma, pp. 397 f.; Sawada, p. 191; Toyabe, in *Taiyo*, June, 1901; *Mail*, September 1, 1900, April 27, 1901, January 13, 1906, June 27, 1906.
- 3. Taiyo, November, 1904; Japan Mail, March 4, 1911; "Tsch"; Independent Review, December, 1913.
- 4. Mail, January 13, 1906, April 29, 1911; Taiyo, November, 1899; Hanazono, p. 34; Noguchi.
- Okuma, p. 401; Noguchi; Kawabe, p. 4; Hanazono, pp. 23, 30, 40.
- Mail, December 3, 1887, December 2, 1899; Okuma, pp. 402, 412; Kawabe, pp. 76, 105; Clarke; Pooley, p. 18; Japan Chronicle, March 1, 1923.
- 7. Bungei, April, 1900; Waseda, June, 1896; Myojo, August, 1900; Okuma, p. 407; Low; Mail, June 30, 1900.
- 8. Mail, June 27, 1896; Hanazono, p. 85; Byas.
- 9. Okuma, p. 399.
- 10. Taiyo, November, 1899; Bungei, April, 1911; Mail, April
  29, 1905; Hanazono, p. 48; Japan Yearbook (1924-25),
  p. 283; Noguchi.
- Waseda, June, 1896; Mail, April 8, 1905, April 29, 1905;
   Porter, p. 519.
- \*All citations from Okuma in this chapter refer to Volume II of that work.

- 12. Mail, September 5, 1908.
- Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, April, 1924; Hanazono, p. 86;
   Mail, December 2, 1899, April 29, 1905; Shunsaburo Kimura in Japan Chronicle, November 23, 1922.
- 14. Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, April, 1924; Hanazono, p. 67.
- 15. Dening (1913), pp. 94 f.; Mail, March 4, 1876; Kokumin, 4,000th issue, May, 1903; Okuma, p. 399. Hanazono (the official source for this paper), pp. 41, 67, 94, 97. These references apply also for the next two paragraphs.
- 16. Osaka Asahi, April 25, 1925. This is the official reference and will apply to the next three paragraphs. Okuma, pp. 404-06; Dening (1913), pp. 94 f.; Waseda, June, 1900; Kokumin, 4,000th issue, May, 1903.
- 17. Osaka Asahi, August 22, 1914, January 24, 1915, August 19, 20, 1918; Japan Chronicle, September 10, 1914, October 3, 1918; Advertiser, April 27, 1918.
- Osaka Asahi, March 19, 20, 1918; Hanazono, pp. 54 f., 84;
   Advertiser, September 30, 1918, November 14, 1918.
- 19. Chugai Shinron (Home and Foreign Review), July, 1920.
- 20. Life of Fukuzawa, pp. 107-10; Longford, p. 182; Okuma, pp. 399-401; Kawabe, p. 76.
- Mail, January 25, 1896, June 30, 1900, September 1, 1900,
   April 27, 1901; Nakamura, p. 300; Green; Martin, p. 27 f; Bungei, April, 1900; Waseda, June, 1896.
- 22. Jiji, June 21, 1895; Hanazono, pp. 85, 88.
- 23. Baba; Hanazono, p. 45; "Tsch"; Mail, September 26, 1896, December 2, 1899; Waseda, June, 1896; Toyabe, Taiyo, February, 1906; Nakamura, p. 300.
- 24. Manifesto, Kokumin, October 15, 1896.
- Mail, April 27, 1901; Toyabe in Taiyo, February, 1906;
   Japan Yearbook (1926), Who's Who, p. 99.
- 26. Brinkley, Kokumin, 4,000th issue; Byas; Martin, p. 38.

- 27. Mail, February 5, 1898, May 14, 1898, April 29, 1899, May 26, 1900, June 30, 1900, October 31, 1914; Advertiser, November 27, 1924; London Times, September 2, 1916.
- 28. Mail, May 6, 1911.
- Taiyo, December, 1899; Mail, December 8, 1906; Nakamura, p. 301; Hanazono, p. 45; Von Brandt; Okuma, p. 404.
- 30. Mail, November 25, 1876; Okuma, p. 402; Clarke.
- 31. Mail, April 27, 1901, September 9, 1905; Hanazono, pp. 49-50; Kawabe, p. 132; Low.

### CHAPTER III

#### PRESS TENDENCIES

In the retardation, or total absence, of other agencies for organizing public opinion and spreading information, an increased importance accrues to the vernacular newspaper in Japan. Question is doubtless legitimate concerning the correlation between the attitude of a journal on a given matter and that of its readers,1 but most authorities agree that in a relatively homogenous community there tends to be a closer correspondence between the tone sounded by a paper and the reactions of its subscribers. Japan, fairly compact and uniform in population, offers an admirable laboratory for the testing of this theory, especially as the fashion of newspaper reading is so thoroughly accepted by all people that, as nearly all the writers comment, it is exceedingly uncommon to find a man who does not read a daily periodical.

The views expressed by journals in Japan should therefore be a factor in the making of the prejudices cherished by the people, and a study of the press

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," Social Forces, IV, 709; E. C. Hayes, "Formation of Public Opinion," Journal of Applied Sociology (September, 1925), pp. 6-9; Robert E. Park, "Natural History of the Newspaper," American Journal of Sociology, XXIX, No. 3, 273-89.

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spirit might be expected to throw light upon the attitude of Japanese toward social and political relationships.

Most Japanese, interpreting their nation to the outer world, agree in stating that the press should be regarded as the influential factor working toward improvement in social and political conditions. Dr. Kisaburo Kawabe wrote a doctoral dissertation asserting that in politics, the press has been a potent factor. Foreign visitors are certain that the native journals have provided the dynamic impetus for the coming democracy, while Lajput Rai goes even further to contend that Japanese newspapers are "of greater power, perhaps, than the American or English press."

But foreigners of longer residence are skeptical that this great influence really does exist. Walter Dening, a widely read and keen observer, who for years conducted a weekly press survey for the Japan Mail, believed the press a very insignificant factor. "The public," he believed, "is not really prejudiced against anybody or anything on account of what the newspapers have written. It cannot be said that in Japan the press is a true reflection of intelligent public opinion" (1).

Mr. Dening's remarks, it is true, were made in 1913, and were based on observations made in 1899. They are therefore open to serious objection in that conditions may have changed, and that, as J. Russell Kennedy points out, the press, insignificant ten years

ago, may now be called the paramount influence in the Empire. As late as January, 1925, however, the influential *Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin*, edited by "Setsurei" Miyake, was still convinced that Japanese newspapers are weak and unimportant because they hold no principles and because they pander to the multitude. The conclusions reached by Dr. Miyake almost exactly parallel the opinions reached ten years before by Shun Akimoto, a veteran newspaperman (2).

Undeniably the press, and in particular the great Osaka papers, is far in advance of official circles in foreseeing social evolution and in clamoring for liberal ideas. Doubtless also it is true, as Kotaro Sugimura, of Tokyo Asahi, Tsunego Baba, formerly of Kokumin, and Mr. Kennedy contend, that the press is constantly increasing in its power. But it is difficult to gauge how far this power may extend. Restrictive press laws are invoked to crush too strong a criticism of the administration policy, and hence the independent editors refrain from championing measures of which the government will not approve. This limitation of the journalistic scope prevents the editors from suggesting causes doomed to failure in advance. Even in the field of domestic politics, where papers have a freer range, few Quixotic plans are seriously urged. Despite the Osaka Asahi's optimism that no government can ignore the press without courting danger to itself, the recent instances wherein the press has recently been flouted are numerous. The long and

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futile efforts to secure more liberal publication laws and to cheapen tolls on news transmission indicate the impotency of the press to gain its ends (3).

One reason for this weakness is that the editors do not pretend to voice with accuracy the public sentiment, for, as a rule, the people lack information on most public matters, and, moreover, are inarticulate. In 1924, the franchise holders failed to exceed 6 per cent of the population. Under such conditions the press is not a mirror, but a signboard for the people, though it may be said with justice that the press more nearly represents the popular desires than any other source of information.

Worry is expressed by Japanese lest the growth of press commercialism may sap newspaper influence before the journals are prepared to exert authentic pressure on officialdom. Opinion is well-nigh unanimous that the papers have deteriorated from a formerly high standard. Dr. Kazutami Ukita, an eminent historian, Iichiro Tokutomi, Captain Brinkley, Dr. Juichi Soveda, and other publicists aver that editors were once recruited from the ranks of scholars and of Samurai, but that now "no class of men is regarded with more abhorrence and contempt." Dr. Ukita once wrote that it is no more possible to find a moral journalist than to find a moral burglar. Sometaro Sheba, of the Japan Times, and Mr. Matsui, the editor of Yamato, are agreed that present-day newspapermen possess no sense of self-respect (4).

This decadence the Japan Mail attributed to meager pay, and it is still true that salaries are almost unbelievably low. Actual payments are, of course, not published, but they may be closely approximated by comparisons of results gleaned from private inquiry. Statistics gathered by investigators from 1888 to 1920 (when reduced to a common basis of ven per month) check with reasonable accuracy with the writer's findings, made in 1925, that the average reporter starts with \fo per month, and that an average "good man" may expect to draw from twice to three times that amount. "Stars" are paid perhaps \frac{\pmathbf{x}}{2} \text{50. Nor is} there much legitimate opportunity to increase the payments. Few "free-lance" men are to be found, and almost no space-workers, save the novelists and other special men. Correspondence for the country papers and writings for a "syndicate" are well-nigh unknown, for the great Tokyo and Osaka papers, circulating throughout the Empire, prevent effective competition on the part of smaller journals. Taken all in all, Mr. Sheba's statement that Japanese newspapermen are underpaid to a degree unknown in other countries may be accepted as conclusive (5).

In consequence of these low salaries, reliance upon outside incomes is quite common. As long ago as 1876 the *Japan Mail* suspected that the *Nichi Nichi* men were being carried on official pay-rolls. Forty years thereafter two editors, Kuroiwa, of *Yorodzu*, and Matsui, of *Yamato*, charged that papers "care-

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fully cooked their news" to please the influential moneyed patrons. In April, 1915, Nihonjin accused Marquis Okuma of corrupting eight Tokyo papers, while six years later investigation of a scandal in the Tokyo Gas Company disclosed that the corporation had paid out \\$88.000 for bribing journalists, including a sum of \(\frac{4}{4}\)0.000 for "influencing favorable editorials." Only Jiji and Yomiuri printed this news, although, as the facts were spread upon court records. the charges were privileged news and were free from libel. Mr. Matsui declares that it is quite a common matter for newspapermen assigned to political headquarters, government offices, large corporations, and similar news centers to receive allowances from such places. From the earliest days politicians in Japan have befriended favorable reporters and friendly papers. Even yet, says Mr. Kennedy, whose knowledge of conditions is perhaps the best to be found in Japan, most of the big firms "assist in every possible way." On few journalistic matters in Japan is there such unanimity as on the belief in political and industrial subsidization. "This is well to remember," wrote the Japan Mail, "whenever readers find items in the press relating to banks and corporations." The great majority of newspapers in Japan, it said on another occasion, "are kept alive for some purpose other than mere pecuniary profit" (6).

As a source of private revenue, blackmail is evidently not uncommon. A series of arrests in 1902 re-

lieved the evil to a great extent, but *Yorodzu* reported eight years later that the practice was revived. Mr. Kennedy believed that blackmail was still prevalent in 1925, although editors hasten to declare that offenders are promptly dismissed.

The influence of advertisers upon the presentation of the news is evidently slight, for the favor of the business man is more likely to be sought through rebates or secret discounts, according to the testimony of Dr. M. Ohta, vice-president of *Hochi* (7). It is noteworthy, however, that when the Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company, the second largest advertiser in Japan, was convicted, November, 1925, for smuggling opium, there was an almost universal silence in the native press. That the silence was not altogether attributed to fear of breaking legal taboo against reporting cases still on trial is evident by the immunity with which *Hochi* printed a fairly complete report of the proceedings. Other Japanese papers failed to mention the case.

The Japanese themselves are far from satisfied with the quality of their press. For years their criticism has been bitter. The major faults which they believe to underlie the press may be briefly summarized: (1) A lack of public spirit in seeking to correct injustice. (2) An unprincipled willingness to garble or manufacture news, or to accept reports as true without seeking to verify the rumors. (3) A reckless sensationalism, both in unimportant domestic affairs

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and in the gravest matters of international relationships. (4) A morbid preoccupation with sexual abnormalities, a love of scandal, and an inordinate readiness to exploit the most evil tastes.

These charges, first formulated by Yukio Ozaki, a prominent liberal and a former Cabinet minister, are not restricted to a small and unrepresentative section of the press, but are applied generally to the entire body of the press, from the tiny local sheet to the great Osaka journals of a million circulation. Japanese and foreigners alike concur in the appraisal, and a most remarkable phenomenon is the comparative scarcity of articles or of speeches defending the press against attack (8).

Nor are these charges merely echoes of long-distant times when the press was undeveloped. During 1924 alone at least five reports, whose completeness as to names and details would warrant, in the United States at least, legal proceedings against either the culprits guilty of the charges or against the papers for criminal libel, were printed in the native press (9). All five reports alleged corruption or embezzlement by government departments and were specific and complete, yet none of them appears to have drawn an official inquiry, nor, more curiously, a "follow-up" from the paper publishing the charges. Irrespective of the truth or falsity of these reports—and in the original they are thoroughly documented—the press appears to have lost interest in the matter. The

real dereliction in the matter, it is true, would seem to lie with the police and the judiciary in not taking action, but good journalistic practice in all countries would imperatively require a "follow-up." Public conscience and newspaper duty seem to have been satisfied when once the fact is printed that suspicions are being entertained.

Most native papers in Japan do not aim primarily at giving accurate reports, but seek rather for startling information that will win them circulation. Forty-nine times out of fifty, said the Japan Mail, the extras put out by the journals prove to contain nothing but deception and misinformation. The weakness of the press in this respect received an international notoriety when, in 1908, the British Consul-General at Seoul wrote a letter to an Englishman, accused by the pro-Japanese newspapers of appropriating funds. that the mere fact of publication of such rumors "ought not to be considered as creating any presumption that there is the slightest basis of truth." Although both the Seoul Press and the Japan Mail were bitter political opponents of the man to whom the letter was addressed, the justice of the implication was admitted (10).

Much of the sensationalism is, of course, the effect of harmless "faking" which seeks to make the paper interesting. The most remarkable stories gaily travel through the columns of the vernacular newspapers. The Osaka Asahi told of a boy who pushed a

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persimmon seed into his nostril. "The seed is now sprouting and green leaves are sticking out of his nose." Jiji narrated that a girl's tongue steadily contracted until, in despair of losing it, she submitted to a minor operation. After this the tongue began to grow again, and now it is the normal size. The Osaka Mainichi told of a Formosan aborigine who laid eggs which, when placed in the sun, hatched into serpents. "Every day," quotes the Japan Times, "there is a most interesting accident, or fire, or robbery somewhere, but the names, places, and details are tactfully omitted" (11).

So long as "faking" is confined to minor matters, comparatively little harm is wrought, other than an undermining of confidence in press reliability. But there are indications also that "faking" has been carried on in affairs which would tend to injure international friendships. The definite and specific allegation that the United States gave official aid to Marshal Wu Pei Fu in his campaign against the pro-Japanese Marshal Chang Tso-lin in China; the elaborate accounts in at least six leading papers that the chief of the Department of Far-Eastern Affairs in the United States Department of State admitted lending Marshal Wu \$1,000,000 in gold: the detailed account that an American colonel was recruiting 25,000 "refractory Koreans" for a rebellion against Japan; the reports that American spies were flooding to Manchuria are instances within the past two years of harmful

"faking." Abundant evidence of similar fabrication against missionaries, business men, and diplomatic officers of foreign nations is easily secured (12).

Nor would disclaimers be well founded that the innuendoes and open accusations of foreign belligerence, decadence, and guile have been unfairly chosen from a small section of an irresponsible press. Of those journals which may fairly be included among the major papers of Japan, either in circulation or in influence, only the Jiji fails to provide abundant evidence of antiforeign lying. And, even more important as a factor for good will, no daily paper in Japan possessing a prestige equal to that of the New York World, nor any periodical of the type of the Independent or the Outlook, attacks these falsehoods or deprecates the antiforeign sentiment as consistently as the American journals just named assail anti-Japanism here.

Pre-eminent among the charges leveled against the Japanese newspapers is that they are, for the most part, devoted to indecency. At least a page of almost every issue is given over to scurrility and to reckless libels on the character of men and women prominent in public life. Intimate details of private conduct, regardless of the truth, are freely published. This so-called "Third Page" is, in large part, devoted to the contributions of anonymous correspondents who utilize the freedom of the press to satisfy a private grievance or to extort blackmail from their victims. By a

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journalistic fiction the "Third Page" (the name is a misnomer, so far as actual position in the paper is concerned) is supposed to escape the eye of both editor and censor, so that libel suits become the sole recourse for persons injured by the personalia. But libel laws are so notoriously weak that the number of appeals for redress by law is strikingly small. In a survey covering a period of thirty years, the Japan Mail could discover no more than half a dozen actions brought for defamation of character. The Japanese, it would appear, prefer to take the stand that "Third Page" libels are beneath their notice. Yukio Ozaki, when mayor of Tokyo, declared that no amount of inducement would cause him to reply to any journalistic libel (13).

The condition of this "open sore," to use the Japan Mail's branding, has been protested since the very beginnings of vernacular journalism. J. R. Black considered that the Yokohama Mainichi and the early Nichi Nichi were "so defaced with filth as to render them worse than contemptible in the eyes of foreigners, though they appeared to be enjoyed by Japanese." The Mail, in 1876, had no higher opinion of its contemporaries, for it said: "The sooner the press of this country takes a lesson in decency the better. It is impossible to take up any one of the native journals without finding paragraphs which the vilest print in Europe would not dare to publish." That improvement was not effected is indicated by a protest, made

in 1889, that "the press is a cesspool of filthiness" (14).

Conditions grew no better. The close of the nine-teenth century saw a flood of obscenity. Yorodzu undertook a series of explicit exposés of illicit sex relationships of the most prominent Tokyo leaders, and followed this by detailed revelations of the amours of actors in the Yokohama bawdyhouses. Arthur Diosy, one of Japan's most devoted friends, told the Japan Society of London that the native papers in Japan were printing "scurrilous and obscene matter worthy of the gutter press of Paris and worse." No one in public life, he said, escapes the wholesale flinging of dirt (15).

T. J. Nakagawa, writing in the *Forum*, lauded the Japanese press and denied that its sensationalism was as dangerous as that of the American "yellow press." Captain Brinkley, Japan's journalistic advocate, replied that "if the nature of the matter published be in question, the palm of immorality belongs to Japan." Again, in 1908 and 1909 Captain Brinkley railed against the obscenity printed in the native papers. Premier Terauchi, Dr. "Setsurei" Miyake, and Yukio Ozaki also have complained that newspapers in Japan were guilty of indecency and immorality (16).

The first real defense of the press against these charges appeared in the Japanese supplement of the London Times in 1916, when Professor Kazutomo Takahashi, then editor of the Japan Times, explained

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that the native press had outgrown the days of scandalous personalities, "although minor papers are still betrayed into morbid sensationalism." Unfortunately at just the time when copies of the London paper were arriving in Japan, the two largest papers in the Empire were publishing detailed accounts of the methods used by Count Terauchi, the new premier, in seducing a Kyoto girl. Photographs and names of other Tokyo and Kyoto belles alleged to be supported by this statesman were also being printed (17).

The autumn of the same year was marked by still another revealing incident of the ease whereby editors are enabled to escape the penalties for libel. Charges that students of neighboring schools in Okayama were conducting numerous *liaisons*, and that the girls' school was permeated by perversion, were challenged by the parents of one girl student named in the reports. The editor escaped all liability by making the defense that he had not said the charge was true, but merely that the charge had been reported to him (18).

Dr. Miyake, in an article written in 1922, renewed his accusations of press immorality, and found support, in 1925, from Tsunego Baba and from J. Russell Kennedy. Motosada Zumoto, president of the International Journalists' Association, while admitting that press immorality is rife, and, on the whole, increasing, nevertheless contends that Japanese papers are no more indecent than are American or Brit-

ish journals. "It is a question of the point of view," he told the writer. "Just as life in Japan is more frank and less furtive than life in western countries, so the news printed in the papers is more frank. It must be remembered that newspapers in the past were crudely written and that material which is the same as that which is presented today seemed more indecent then, but only because of the style in which it was written. It is not true that Japanese papers are indecent" (19).

In consideration of these matters it is well to recall that by the stringent press laws of Japan any article deemed prejudicial to good morals may be forbidden publication and that the newspapers in which such matter occurs may be suppressed or even permanently ended. Such instances, however, as the publication, in the summer of 1925, of "revelations" of the sensuality of profligate sons of wastrel fathers, or the pointblank statement that certain noble youths named in the paper were driving their fathers to suicide, were not barred by the censors, although the details were such as would be classified as unprintable in any western land (20).

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- 3. Osaki Asahi, April 25, 1925; Otani, in Shinjudai, September, 1918.
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   p. 354; Green; Kawabe, p. 117 f; Japan Times, June 2,
   1924.
- Mail, May 6, 1876, May 29, 1897, December 13, 1913; Kuroiwa, Japan Mail, May 6, 1911; and also Chuo Koron, October, 1912; Masaoka, Ukita, Matsui, op. cit.; Shimada, Taikan, October, 1918; Fumio Yano, Martin, p. 10; Osaka Asahi, April 25, 1925; Rai; Von Brandt; Keigetsu Omachi, March, 1903; Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, January, 1925; Japan Herald, January 8, 1913; Japan Chronicle, April 15, 1917, September 26, 1918; Jiji and Yomiuri, quoted by Chronicle, September 8, 1921; W. E. Griffis, speech before Ethical Culture Society, Philadelphia, February 7, 1926.
- 7. Japan Advertiser, June 10, 1924.
- Ozaki, Twentieth Anniversary Number of Niroku; Nihonoyobi-Nihonjin, January, 1925; Miyake, in Nihonoyobi-Nihonjin, February, 1922; Mail, November 7, 1903; Advertiser, November 15, 1925; Tetsutaro Takita, Chuo Koron, April, 1911; Takajiro Sugimori, Chuo Koron, March, 1924; Otani, Shinjudai, September, 1918; Sheba, Japan Times, June 2, 1924; Ku Hung-min, Advertiser, October 16, 1924; Byas; Goto, Tokyo Asahi, May 17, 1918.
- Kokumin, January 11, 1925; Japan Times, May 6, 1924,
   August 20, 1924; Advertiser, November 6, 1924.

- 10. Mail, October 22, 1898; Japan Times, May 23, 1918, October 7, 1924; Letter, Cockburn to Bethell, Japan Mail, October 3, 1908; Martin, p. 24; Masaoka, Ukita, Ku Hung-min, op. cit; complaint of V. Pearson, of the Kobe and Osaka Press, and an editorial approval, Advertiser, October 11, 1926.
- 11. For a summary and a bitter protest, see Japan Times, October 7, 1924.
- 12. (a) "Savagry": Yorodzu, June 21, 1924; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, June 26, 1924. (b) Klan control of U.S.A.: Osaka Asahi, June 22, 1924, Hochi, July 29, 1924. (c) Wu Pei Fu: Chuo, October 21, 1924; Japan Times, October 23, 1924, quoting Yomiuri; Yorodzu, October 17, 1924, December 5, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, November 21, 1924; Chugai Shogyo, Osaka Jiji, Tokyo Asahi, quoted by Japan Chronicle, November 27, 1924, December 11, 1924. (d) Colonel: Japan Times, December 15, 1924. (e) Missionaries: see Reinsch, pp. 331-33; Soyejima, Taiyo, January, 1926; Japan Times, October 23, 1924; Kabayama, Japan Advertiser, April 7, 1926; Zumoto, Advertiser, December 7, 1925. (f) See also Haysmier case, Chuo, July 6, 1926; Hochi, July 18, 1926; Yamato, July 11, 1926, etc.
- Mail, December 5, 1896, January 21, 1899, November 7, 1903, December 15, 1906, February 8, 1908, January 23, 1909, November 19, 1910, December 6, 1913; Martin, p. 23; Bryan, p. 246; Williams, p. 17; Zumoto, p. 114; Byas; Shakai Zasshi, June, 1900.
- 14. Mail, June 3, 1876, December 28, 1889, December 6, 1913; Young Japan, p. 364.
- Yorodzu, in Japan Mail, February 4, 1899; Gulick, p. 279; Shakai Zasshi, June, 1900; Diosy, in Japan Society of London, IV (1900), 136.

### PRESS TENDENCIES

- 16. Mail, June 30, 1900, January 18, 1908, January 23, 1909, October 8, 1910; Miyake, Taiyo, February, 1911; Ozaki, in Niroku; Nakagawa, Forum, XXIX, 370-76; Terauchi, speech to governors, Advertiser, May 29, 1917.
- London Times, September 2, 1916, December 16, 1916;
   Japan Chronicle, November 2, 1916, April 27, 1922; Chuo Koron, October, 1922; Martin, p. 23.
- 18. Japan Chronicle, November 2, 1916; see also April 27, 1922.
- 19. Taiyo, February, 1922.
- 20. Japan Chronicle, July 2, 1925.

### CHAPTER IV

#### THE ANTI-ALIEN TIDE

Seventy years ago the Japanese, restless in the isolation of the Tokugawa shogunate, were casting eager glances toward the richer, if more material, culture of the West. Today the Japanese are gazing backward, with more or less regret, at their vanished past, convinced, it seems, that Western culture has destroyed the beauty of their handicrafts and has dispelled their ancient leisure of spiritual and intellectual preoccupation.

In consequence, the old war, fought two generations ago between the modernists and the champions of sonno-joi (loyalty to court and expulsion of the foreigner), is once more being waged by journalistic champions. The people do not fail in courtesy to foreigners; the government is helpful to the last degree in aiding tourists and residents to understand Japan; but the press relentlessly opposes Westerners and all their works. However weak and unimportant the columns of the press may be in creating social attitudes, the persistence and the unanimity of the native press can scarcely fail to modify, in time, the Japanese opinion of the West.

Great aid has been lent to the reactionaries by the

criticisms of Japan as voiced by foreigners, for Japanese are in accord that criticism of their nation springs either from envy, or from venality, or from ignorance of Japan's peculiar spirit. Psychologists might read the supersensitiveness of the Japanese and their suspicion that the world is now arrayed in conspiracy against the Empire as a symptom of a well-defined inferiority complex, or of oppression psychosis, and might understand the almost pathologic journalistic craze to cast aspersion on the foreigners.

At home the impression is sedulously fostered that the ideals of Japan should be regarded as a special thing apart, unique and perfect. An artificial history has been built to serve the propagandist cause. The nation's age is lengthened by carrying the pseudo-annals back to 660 B.C., a thousand years before the Chinese exported culture to their eastern neighbors. Facts out of harmony with this "history" have been suppressed, according to the Japan Times, lest the official version be discredited, and professors in the universities are dismissed if they are found guilty of teaching other versions. Even in the mission schools, desiring to be accredited as equal to the government institutions, this official history must be taught, and Christian teachers are compelled to have their pupils learn the divine descent of Japan's rulers (1).

Evasion and definitely false statements have been used to cloak the past events that are not deemed

creditable. Although no nation in all history, says Chamberlain, has shown less respect for its monarchs, and although in no other nation has the sovereign been so often the victim of murder, oppression, exile, and insult, Marquis Okuma, in his semi-official history, declared: "There has never been a revolution nor an attempt at assassination of the monarch, such as has been only too common in other countries" (2).

A reactionary cult has risen to defend the fundamental principles of Old Japan against the inroads of materialistic Occidental culture. Conservative nationalists, resenting Japan's rapid change, have set themselves to reawaken interest in the racial traits.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Yet Marquis Okuma himself participated in the events of 1867 and 1868, and must have known of the anti-imperialistic movements of those years, and, later still, of the Kyushu rising. An excellent example of unfair presentation occurs in an article by Hisashi Asaho, of the Japan Federation of Labor. In writing on the social movements among Japanese students, he traces the origin of radicalism to the Great War, the Russian Revolution, and to capitalistic development. Then he praises the Osaka Asaki for its attacks on militarism and bureaucracy, without mentioning either the attack on Mr. Murayama or the paper's change in policy. He refers cautiously to the murder of arrested labor leaders by remarking that some of them "fell victims to unfortunate events." He gives high praise to the student groups for the study of sociology, without mentioning that, at the time he wrote, the high-school groups had already been suppressed (3).

<sup>3</sup> Modernism has, without doubt, brought undesired phenomena. Like the Athenian of old, the modern Japanese is an enthusiastic welcomer of novelty. The long-haired, frowsy bearded artist, in velveteens and wide-brimmed hat, as portrayed in *La Bohème*, could, in 1925, be met with in the student coffeehouses. Cocktails

The combined efforts of earthquake, American exclusion law, and the British plan to build a naval base at Singapore brought westernization to a sudden stop. The eagerness with which Japan had accepted foreign customs gave way to disdain of foreigners. Hochi, Kokumin, Yorodzu, and other papers called for a revival of Japan's own national culture. "Back to the Kamakura period" became the slogan of those who pleaded for a simpler mode of life. Yomiuri, Miyako, and Yorodzu urged retention of the classic ceremonial costume as a matter for increasing national pride. Hochi stressed community festivals and athletic sports to promote the feeling of a national unity. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi warned Japan that too many students and professors were being sent abroad, and that the education thus secured was lamentable and inefficient (4).

Foreign styles of dancing were denounced as provocative of immorality. In Tokyo and Osaka all foreign dancing was prohibited after ten o'clock at night; the police of Tokyo took down the names and addresses of Japanese who attended the weekly dance of the Imperial Hotel; Osaka forbade minors and

<sup>(</sup>kokutairu) took the place of tea. The business girl appeared, and bobbed-haired flappers, dressed in "foreign clothes," tripped down the Ginza. The "blues" and other jazz were flourishing, and dance halls were filled with Japanese. Just before the Tokyo earthquake "café culture" touched its peak, and it was "high-collar" to be Western.

students to engage in foreign dancing, and required all others to register themselves before permission could be granted. With government approval, a bill to prohibit foreign dancing in all parts of Japan was introduced into the Diet in the closing hours of the session, but time was not available for passage (5).

The soshi and the ronin, Japan's organized bands of political ruffians, misinterpreting defense of old customs into a fanatic patriotism, buttressed the reaction and secured strong reinforcement in the banded young men's associations of the villages. Sworddancers rushed into the ballroom of the Imperial Hotel to urge the erring Japanese to foreswear American depravities. The government was reluctant to antagonize these bullies, and thus the period, as both the Advertiser and the Osaka Asahi now agree, developed into one of most intense reaction (6).

<sup>a</sup> The foreign papers disagree, on details, concerning the interpretation of these movements. The Advertiser believes that the anti-dancing agitation was incited by geisha guilds and brothel keepers as a means for protecting their enterprises. The Chronicle sees a general antiforeign movement marked by 100 per cent tariff imposts on all importations used by foreign residents, by restriction of the legal profession to Japanese citizens only, by a reduction of English teaching in the schools, by attempts to eliminate the foreign merchants from Japan, and by a systematic campaign to discredit the service rendered to Japan by foreigners. The Times is convinced that the ban on foreign dancing is in the interests of maintaining Japanese morality. The vernacular papers are unanimous in reproving the younger Japanese for excessive frivolity and luxury, and look upon the anti-dancing ordinances as an attempt to restore normal attitudes (7).

Reprinting of excerpts from sensational American sermons, muckraking novels, or books purporting to describe the excesses of "flaming youth" has kindled Japanese resentment against American "degeneracy." The motion picture, with its scores of social practices widely diverging from the codes accepted by Japan (the most flagrant being, of course, excised by the censor), and the running comment by interpreters, or *katsuben*, who explain the action to the audience, has added fuel to the Japanese resentment.

In a well meant zeal to correct the general impression that foreigners are of a lower moral standard than the Japanese, the anti-alien feeling has been unwittingly promoted by some Western writers. Not unnaturally, the rebukes administered to the foreign "smart set" of the seaport towns have been construed by Japanese as applicable to all the foreign residents. In Japan, as in America, the living of two races, having different social backgrounds, in a close proximity, has been conducive to belief that the strangers are addicted to immoral practice. The presence of a foreign colony<sup>4</sup> composed, to a large degree, of young,

<sup>4</sup> In Japan, unlike China, the name "foreign colony" is somewhat of a misnomer, since the passage by earthquake, and by Japanese repurchase, of the former settlements in Kobe and on the Yokohama Bluff. In Tokyo and other Japanese cities, foreigners are scattered throughout the entire city, tending, of course, to gather in certain districts, but forming no such entity as do aliens in the American cities. Foreigners foregather, therefore, in the clubs, and thus, to many Japanese, their life assumes an added secrecy and mystery.

unmarried men receiving (according to the Japanese wage-scales) a lavish salary has excited gossip and given rise to tales of "foreign orgies." Warm advocates of interracial peace, endeavoring to remove the causes of misunderstanding, have criticized some aspects of the social life which would be normal in America, and their criticisms have been misinterpreted and misunderstood by Japanese. Nor is it fantastically improbable that the austerity of missionary life, in contrast to the gayer life of business men and diplomats, has tended to accentuate the supposed excesses of the aliens.

When, therefore, a series of anonymous letters in the *Japan Mail* accused foreigners of "scrambling with thieves and blacklegs in a gamblers' den," and when other letters told of "youths swallowed in the vortex that runs riot in a place like Fair Nagasaki," the irritation of the Japanese was increased, and a conviction was established that foreigners were undesirable (9).

New proofs of foreign weaknesses were soon contributed. In 1910, Melville E. Stone, general manager

<sup>1</sup> These letters, signed "B" were attributed to Rev. J. Ingram Bryan, for several years rector of All Saints' Church, Kobe. He did not admit the authorship, but resigned from his charge. Dr. Bryan, from 1910 to 1917, was both editor of the Japan Magazine, the organ of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, and correspondent for the London Morning Post. He was, in 1924, author of Japan from Within. Another letter, signed "Dempo," appearing in the New York Evening Post, and accusing Kobe foreigners of excessive drinking, was also said to have been written by him (8).

of the Associated Press, had visited Japan, and on returning to America an article purporting to have been written by him found its way into the *National Geographic Magazine* under the title, "Race Prejudice in the Far East" (10).

"How this article was obtained I do not know," wrote Mr. Stone. "I have never, at any time, written for the magazine. I did make a private talk to perhaps fifty friends, and a portion of this talk was reproduced, with amendments, as though written by me." Nevertheless Mr. Stone admitted that the article represented his views, and he made no attempt to disown responsibility for sentences which accused white residents of injustice toward the natives of India, China, and Japan (11).

Briefly summarized, these utterances accused the foreigners of refusing to admit to their social or athletic clubs any native, "whatever his culture or refinement." In Yokohama a particular injustice was alleged. "Land was freely given by the Japanese upon the sea-front at Yokohama for a foreign social club, and no taxes were asked upon the land by the Japanese authorities. But foreigners refused to pay taxes upon the buildings, and when, to allow for the growth of the city, the municipal authorities required the land, the club refused to evacuate unless an equally good plot was given them, with buildings and improvements erected, equivalent to the old, and compensation given them in addition." Finally, Mr. Stone

declares that Asians had been corrupted by the whites. "Even now there are Japanese cities of from 100,000 to 1,000,000 population where there is no semblance of police control and where crime is scarcely known."

The reprinting of this article in the Mail stirred protests from the entire foreign community. Columns were devoted daily by the foreign press to attacks upon Mr. Stone. A special meeting of the American Peace Society adopted a memorial pointing out that every foreign club in Japan possessed Japanese members of equal standing with the white members; that the Yokohama United Club, the only one "on the seafront," had purchased its land outright, and that, when the Club was moved, the municipal government had not paid for improvements; that bribery and corruption had been prevalent in Japanese cities not yet penetrated by the whites; and that no Japanese cities free from police and free from crime existed. The Asiatic Society of Japan also protested against the stigma cast by Mr. Stone upon the white residents, and called upon Mr. Stone to retract his remarks (12).

Opinions differ as to the reception granted to these complaints by Mr. Stone. J. Russell Kennedy, then the correspondent for the Associated Press, assured the writer that Mr. Stone had retracted. "Mr. Stone sent me a letter of retraction, but the newspapers refused to print it," said Mr. Kennedy. "I inserted it as a paid advertisement in the Japan Chron-

icle, Japan Advertiser, Mail, and Times. The letters published by the Advertiser were full of abuse directed not only against Mr. Stone but also against me, for, although I was at the time serving on twenty-nine different international committees, I had many enemies among the foreign residents." Searches among the files of old newspapers fail, however, to reveal the advertisement. On the other hand, Mr. Stone declares: "There was a demand on the part of Europeans resident in Japan that I retract my statements. I not only declined to do so, but had more to say on the subject, and there the debate came to an end" (13).6

The origin of slurs against the foreigners residing on perpetual leaseholds in Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki is due, according to Professor MacLaren, to the widespread Japanese belief that these residents are evading taxes. In consequence, he thinks, these cities have been held in more or less contempt by Japanese officialdom, and distinguished visitors are taught by the officials "to regard their respectable

<sup>6</sup> In May, 1911, a pamphlet, privately printed by Mr. Stone and distributed to the Associated Press, declared that in his original speech Mr. Stone had expressly excluded the Yokohama United Club from his remarks concerning social clubs which refused to accept Japanese members. The National Geographic Magazine made no such exclusion, but embraced in its strictures every social club "from Bombay to Yokohama." As authority for his comments on the corrupting influences of white residents, Mr. Stone cited passages in The West in the Far East, by Rev. S. L. Gulick (15).

fellow-countrymen in Yokohama and Kobe as a crew of tax-dodging, carousing, dishonest merchants." Mr. Stone's explanation of the sources of his information corroborates the view, for Mr. Stone declared that his information had been procured from "a Harvard graduate, now a minister of the Japanese crown." Various other writers, the latest of them being T. J. MacMahon in *The Orient I Found*, continue to cast calumny upon the seaport foreigners (14).

A year following the appearance of the *National Geographic* article, conditions in Korea gave rise to new accusations against foreign residents. Missionary workers were accused of instigating revolution, and of conspiracy to murder Governor-General Count

<sup>7</sup> The only "Harvard graduate, now a minister of the Japanese crown" was Viscount Kentaro Kaneko, now a member of the Privy Council. The reactions of the Japanese to the non-taxable perpetual lease lands are peculiar. Mr. Kawakami, in Japan and World Peace, remarks that "The Japanese are grieved that their first experience with an international court to which they had looked up with profound respect was disappointing. [The leaseholds had been taken before the Hague tribunal and the Japanese contention was denied.] They wonder whether an equitable judgment can ever be meted out to an Asiatic nation by a tribunal in which a majority of the judges are men identified with Occidental Governments." Yet in the contemporary reports of the decision there is no such wonder. The Mail wrote: "Japanese journals accept the House Tax decision with equanimity and in excellent spirit." The arbitrators, incidentally, were Louis Renault, professor of law at the University of Paris, and Iichiro Motono, Japanese ambassador at Paris. The umpire was Gregors Gram, formerly a Norwegian Cabinet Minister (16).

Terauchi. Eighty Koreans, sixty of whom were Christian, were arrested. At their first court hearing, A. Bolljahn, a Japanese government employee, was assigned by the Associated Press to send dispatches to Mr. Kennedy in Tokyo, by whom they were relayed to the American newspapers (17).

When none of the accusations made in court against the American missionaries appeared in the reports sent to American newspapers, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions furnished copies of its private cablegrams to the *New York Herald*, giving full details of the murder and sedition charges. The Board then asked Mr. Stone why news of these accusations had not been cabled to America by the Associated Press, and was informed that the reports of the political conventions at Chicago and Baltimore had left no space for Korean news. The conventions, however, had adjourned ten days before the Board telegrams were published in the *Herald* (18).8

<sup>8</sup> The Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions now refuses either to deny or to confirm these statements. The writer twice applied to the secretary, Rev. Arthur J. Brown, giving the substance of the above paragraphs and inquiring whether the records of the Board would substantiate the files of the Herald. Dr. Brown replied by referring the writer to his Mastery of the Far East and to a pamphlet, The Korean Conspiracy Case, neither of which touched on the matter in question. In a subsequent letter Dr. Brown wrote: "The questions regarding the press reports involved embarrassments at the time, which, at this late date, thirteen years afterward, with a better understanding, a different personnel, and changed conditions, I do not feel like reviving" (20).

Still a third charge directly leveled against Mr. Stone's policy in the treatment of Far Eastern news is made by the late minister to China, Dr. Paul Reinsch, who asserts that the Associated Press, through Mr. Stone, held up the publication of news that Japan had made "Twenty-One Demands" on China, and that, at the end of two weeks, when the report was categorically denied by the Japanese Embassy at Washington, Mr. Stone "killed" the news and rebuked his Peking representative, F. F. Moore, for not sending "facts, instead of rumors" (19)."

It seems well-nigh incredible that relief workers in the time of earthquake stress should have been the butt of antiforeign slander, yet various newspapers did malign the foreigners who helped the refugees. Protests by the British consul and by the ambassador himself brought neither punishment, retraction, nor apology. Charges against foreigners may evidently be printed with comparative impunity. No Japanese

<sup>9</sup> Since the Washington Conference of 1921, Mr. Moore has been an American adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, serving, in alternation with Dallas L. McGrew, at both Tokyo and Washington. In the Chinese Civil War of 1927 he was the Shanghai correspondent for the *New York Times*.

<sup>10</sup> The papers stated openly that crews of foreign steamers deliberately drowned men seeking refuge, and that the women were taken on board ship, and, after having been raped, were flung back into the sea to drown. The Japan-American Commercial Weekly gave the number of women thus violated and murdered as fifty. A Formosan paper even went so far as to name a British ship on which, it said, the outrages had occurred.

newspaper seems to raise a word of protest against the grossest libels, nor is official rebuke administered to the offending papers (21).

Constant reiteration, both by foreigners and Japanese, of the wickedness of alien residents seems to have resulted in the past two years in an unusually large number of interracial disputes. Each misunderstanding, doubtless, is of itself unimportant, but in the aggregate they bulk large and they give a far from reassuring portent for the future.

The foreign community has been besmirched as a "hotbed of vice and licentiousness" on the authority of "a high police official," who, in the columns of the Advertiser, denied that he had ever issued such a statement. Kokumin, the leader in this drive, reported that a list of more than thirty "depraved foreigners" had been compiled by the metropolitan police, and that vigilant surveillance would be kept upon their movements. An old canard, accusing two members of the British Embassy of having beaten a policeman into unconsciousness, was revived by this newspaper, which added that when one of its reporters visited the Embassy, he had ascertained that the entire staff was in the habit of going home drunk every night. Exactly the same tale had been published four years before by Kokumin (22).

Another version of the "unprovoked assault upon a gendarme" was told eight months before by the entire Tokyo press in connection with the Brazilian

ambassador, who inadvertently attempted to cross a road to his home while the Prince Regent's motor car was approaching sixty yards away. During four days the press blazed with abuse of the diplomat on the ground that he had wantonly insulted the Divine Imperial Family. The police authorities eventually exonorated the ambassador, but not the slightest steps were taken to withdraw the sharp rebukes administered to him by the press, nor to grant him an apology. A month later the Brazilian diplomats, together with the Italian and Mexican attachés, were specifically named in court as guilty of habitually immoral practices. The *Advertiser* gave as its opinion that the native press was by no means loath to manufacture evidence against either foreigners or Japanese (23).

These attacks are all the more deplorable as indicating a marked change in the tone of the Japanese press. In October, 1917, Dr. Toyokichi Iyenaga, managing editor of the semi-official East and West News Bureau, in deploring "the insane attacks of American yellow journals on Japan," praised the restraint of the Japanese gazettes. From some papers, he admitted, the attacks had evoked response, but "the respectable and influential papers remained undisturbed and simply ignored the extravagances of American yellow journalism" (24).

The Advertiser is somewhat less convinced, but feels that from 1922 until the early weeks of 1924 a better relationship was becoming apparent. "It was

not uncommon up to about two years ago," the Advertiser said, "for the Japanese daily journals to rant bitterly against the 'criminal motives' of the United States. Many of them seized upon the most trifling and insignificant incidents to magnify them into grave indictments of American espionage activities. Some even openly advocated a resort to arms. There is no such outburst now of virulent denunciation" (25).

The constant printing of provocative remarks in Japanese newspapers seems to confirm neither the tribute paid by Dr. Iyenaga to Japanese editorial restraint nor the *Advertiser*'s optimism. The general tone adopted by the press can scarcely fail to prejudice Japan's relationships with Western peoples. The constant impact of suggestion from authorities possessing such prestige as newspapers and public men must eventually be registered in Japan's consciousness.

<sup>11</sup> It is quite true that the whole of the anti-exclusion law agitation in Japan was carried on in complete peacefulness. Only one instance of disorder seems to have occurred, an attack upon the Peruvian consul at Kobe by a Japanese who mistook him for a North American. But it is also true that the only general press restriction was against the publication by the foreign press of this particular news item. No ban was laid upon violent denunciation of the United States, nor upon the *Yorodzu's* open clamorings for war, nor upon the reactionary leaders, Mitsuru Toyama and Ryohei Uchida, who demanded the chastisement of "America the peace-breaker." Reports, moreover, from widely scattered regions of Japan bore testimony, at Christmas time in 1924, that placards advertising a government loan bore legends warning against a coming war with a "Trans-Pacific neighbor" (26).

Strong opposition to the United States is, naturally enough, the predominant note during 1924. Under the provocation of the Immigration Bill, scarcely a newspaper, regardless of its political affiliation, failed to characterize the United States as "insincere," "unjust," "arrogant," "inhuman," or "bellicose." Nor could it be expected that these slurs would cease immediately upon the signing of the law. These accusations by excited Japanese may readily be pardoned as the outbursts of an inflamed public mind (27).

Official publicists did strive to mollify the irritation against the United States, but simultaneously, and probably unintentionally, they also rubbed salt into the hurts inflicted by America. Two prominent editors, sent to the United States to discuss the Far-Eastern situation, returned to Japan with assurances that anti-Japanism was rampant in America. Although at least one of his lectures at the University of Chicago had won the approbation of the New York Times, Count Michimasu Soyejima told reporters that he had been unwelcome. "Every lecture that I made was attacked and held up to ridicule. This so greatly disappointed me that I declined many invitations on the pretext of illness." Motosada Zumoto reported that the American press desired to convince its readers that Japan was preparing for war. The propaganda, he declared, emanated from naval circles, and, in particular, from Secretary Wilbur (28).

It is difficult also to understand why, in recent

months, the missionaries have been especially singled out for criticism. Foreign missionaries have been the warmest friends of Japan; none has supported exclusion; and all have consistently upheld the Japanese contentions; yet publicists have constantly assailed their character. Those in Korea were accused of instigating murder and sedition. Count Sovejima reports that mission schools are planned especially for anti-Japanese propaganda purposes. Mr. Zumoto told the Tokyo Rotarians that the very presence of the missionaries was "an implied insult to the great moral and religious forces which have built up our noble civilization," and that "Christianity, a religion of the masterful, exclusive, and imperialistic type." had come to Asia "in a spirit of arrogant superiority." Count Aisuke Kabayama gave an interview in which he stated that the missionaries were men "mediocre in mental caliber," unable to make a living in any other way. A missionary in Korea, who had marked a thief with silver nitrate, was misrepresented in the press as having lynched the culprit and as having branded him for life. A powerful demand was raised for laws to keep the missionaries under strict surveillance (29).

So long as reasonable doubts could still be entertained as to the passage, the signing, or the date of enforcement of the exclusion act, there were sporadic bursts of confidence, particularly by *Jiji* and the *Nichi Nichi*, that all was well between Japan and the United

States. Appeals were written to the Japanese to preserve their Samurai tradition of calmness, courtesy, and magnanimity in the face of persecution. *Hochi* was a brilliant leader in the fight against an economic boycott of American commodities. Yet the undercurrent of opposition steadily grew stronger. *Yorodzu* told its readers, "Mr. Borah insisted that Japan must be crushed because she wanted to join the League of Nations. Many other insane fire-eaters in the American Congress unanimously advocated the punishment of Japan." *Yorodzu* also wrote that the United States was endeavoring to "tyrannize over the world as an insane despot" (30).

War, however, as a solution for the American-Japanese imbroglios was seldom urged. Ten years before, Shigeo Suyehiro, Kozui Otani, and a portion of the Japanese press advocated that Japan fight the United States in reprisal for the immigration insults, but, with the exception of the always belligerent *Yorodzu*, the press seems more content with innuendo than with pleas for overt acts.<sup>12</sup> The late spring of

<sup>12</sup> Chugai Shogyo in 1917, and the Toryo Nichi Nichi and the Osaka Mainichi in 1926, saw no immediate prospect of a war against the United States. As in the Western nations, much of the war talk is stirred up by the appearance of sensational books and magazine articles. Chauvinist literature, aiming at the students of preparatory schools, was on the increase in 1916, probably as a reflection of the Great War. Magazines like Yamato Damashii, Nippon Ronin, Nippon Seinin (Young Japan), Dai Nippon, Bukyo Sekai (Military Chivalry), and others were common. Chuo ran a serial, "Sulin Emi" ("War by Air and Submarine"), evidently pre-

1926, however, saw a recrudescence of war talk, when Vice-Admiral Reijiro Kawashima and Teisuke Akiyama, former editor of *Niroku* and "the power behind Japanese politics," both issued calls to arms (31).

"The United States is an evil spirit menacing the existence of Japan," Admiral Kawashima wrote. "A war with the United States is an absolute necessity. A Japanese-American conflict is decreed by Heaven." Mr. Akiyama told "Santaro," of the Advertiser, that although war cannot solve international problems, and while a full understanding of Buddhism is the only way to peace, a war with America would be a moral tonic for Japan. "I wish to stir up the revengeful feelings of the Japanese against the United States," he said. "I could almost wish that every Japanese up his mind to go to war. It would be a had mad scourgewhip up somnolent Japan into a spiritual awaken " Japan, according to Mr. Akiyama, has been gal vnhill since the Russian war, with a decadent tend cy, a dying sense of Bushido, and a "sinking to the depths of moral and spiritual degradation" "The American peril calls up the dying soul of Japan from premature death."

dicting a war with a "Pacific power," but its completion was forbidden by the censor. "Nichinan" Fukumoto urged that Japan annex the Philippines, and Reiyo Higuchi wrote a volume entitled Japan's Subjugation of the World. Iichiro Tokutomi's Young Men of Taisho and the Empire's Future, General Sakurai's Human Buliets, and General Tsunematsu Sato's prediction of a war with the United States were other chauvinist productions (32).

Simultaneously with the anti-American outbursts, an increasing truculence was manifested toward Great Britain. Rumblings of dissatisfaction with the former Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been heard even during the continuance of the Great War, when publicists and papers in Japan criticized their ally's actions and its attitudes. Yamato ran a series of strong editorials condemning the British for selfishness. disloyalty, lack of high ideals, and cowardice. "The French are holding 543 miles of line," the Osaka Mainichi wrote in 1916, "the Belgians 18, and our Ally, Great Britain, only 31. When will the war begin?" Such men as Professor Tatebe, of Tokyo Imperial University, Saburo Shimada, speaker of the House of Representatives, and K. Kodera, a member of Parliament, condemned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as harmful to Japan, dead in spirit and dangerous in operation. "Setsurei" Miyake described it as a robber compact whereby the further the British should aggress in India the more aggression should be permitted to the Japanese in China. Ryosuke Shimatani, writing in Premier Okuma's own magazine, declared that Great Britain, in reality, hated the Japanese and was intending to form an alliance with the United States against Japan. Three years later the Osaka Asahi repeated the accusation that the British were antagonistic to Japan (33).

The prolonged discussion concerning the establishment of a British naval base at Singapore evoked

new warnings that the British were preparing to make war on Japanese. For more than two years a new anti-British propaganda raged. Masanori Ito, associate editor of Jiji, struck a favorite note by writing: "Britain lacks the vision of international peace and has sadly forfeited her prestige as a lover of peace." Tatsue Moriyama, in January, 1925, declared: "It is the way of British diplomacy to exploit a rising nation, and having taken from it all that she can get, to proceed to bring pressure upon it by chicanery and artfulness. Artfulness marks everything she does." The conservative Jiji dug from its files an essay of Yukichi Fukuzawa: "British people in Asia are of a different race from those at home. They are like lions or tigers toward Indians, whom they appear to regard as no better than beasts. They are exceptionally cruel, wayward, and warlike. That is why I hate them. My intention is to overrule such tyranny and injustice with such vigor that they may be completely eliminated from this world" (34).

Additional impetus to anti-Britonism was provided by the Chinese riots, in the late spring of 1925, against European privilege and extrality. Although Marquis Okuma, nine years before, had written that the Chinese were immoral and were too degenerate for Japanese to consider them as equals, and although not long before the press references to the Chinese Minister had been accompanied by the title, "His Excellency Damn Fool," the anti-European riots were

approved by the Japanese, and the government of the Empire gave promises of conformity to Chinese wishes for economic independence. The responsibility for the Chinese anger was thrown by nearly all the Japanese newspapers upon the British. Minoru Maida. formerly Asahi correspondent in London, wrote that "of all the powers the avarice of Great Britain has been most boldly pronounced." In an article which the Advertiser termed a "futile smoke-screen," Hochi said, "All the reports connected with the Shanghai riots which come from British sources appear to lay the blame upon Japan. The British news agencies distorted facts so as to turn the troubles to their own account. They do so only to excite the resentful feelings of the Chinese against the Japanese. They have been accustomed to such Machiavellian strategy" (35).

Orders from the censor forbade newspaper mention that the Chinese were incensed against the Japanese, but no embargo has been laid against the printing of anti-British paragraphs. Dr. Honda's explanation, in the *Spectator*, insinuates that the authorities are not averse to stirring up dangerous popular impression. "Official elements," he said, "do not deny what the popular press asserts, that the Singapore proposal aims unequivocally at Japan as the next prospective enemy.<sup>18</sup> Thus they seem to fasten on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Singapore is as far from Japan as Gibraltar is from New York, but Japan feared that the new naval base was constructed for strategic purposes as a base for an attack upon Japan. A deci-

Britain the grave responsibility of provoking the next disastrous war" (36).

More probably the anti-alienism of Japan is now displayed in hopes of bringing to Japan the headship of an Asiatic federation against white aggression. "The whites," says Kokumin, "are robbers. They have long been brutally and cruelly unjust." The influence of Japan, the Nichi Nichi thinks, will, in the future, control the fate of Asia. The time will come, Yamato said in 1925, when Japan will wage herculean struggle against the Anglo-Saxon races on the plains of China, and the Mainichi warned the world what fate befell those nations who purposely and unnecessarily insulted Dai Nippon (37).

Pan-Asianism as a means of escape from Western domination seems not to have attained pronounced development, however, prior to the consideration of the 1924 Exclusion Act. The fleeting press references prior to 1924 were, for the most part, hostile to the plan.<sup>14</sup> Pan-Asianism was so weak in 1917 that the

sion, made in 1926, to strengthen the Indian fleet and to build a subsidiary naval base in Ceylon was also made a signal for renewed attacks upon the British policy of aggression.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Dr. Masataro Sawayanagi, imperial nominee to the House of Peers, president of the Imperial Educational Society, and president of the Japan Peace Society, was an early advocate. Writing in *Kokumin* he approved of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, under Japanese control, tolerating no interference. It would result, he said, in isolating Japan, but the isolation would be honorable. Japan should therefore set herself to such further development of her military, in-

Osaka Asahi felt itself correct in stating that no Japanese approved of such a scheme, and Yomiuri commended Midori Komatsu for writing that the movement was chimerical. Even as late as June, 1924, the Fabian leader, Hatsunosuke Hirabayashi, warned Japan that scheming for an Asiatic league was cowardly and selfish (38).<sup>16</sup>

Undoubtedly, since 1924, the Pan-Asiatic League has been advancing, partly as an outcome of the exclusion law, and, less certainly, by reactions to the writings of the Nordicists. Among the converts to the movement are the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, which now warns Asia against the white peril, and the *Osaka Mainichi* which warns the Chinese against American propagandists. Only an Asiatic federation, under Japanese direction, says the *Mainichi*, can save the Orient from Western rule (39).

The latter pronouncement marked the real beginning of a prolonged press campaign assuring the Chi-

dustrial, and other arts as would compare favorably with the status of European nations and America. Kozui Otani believed that Japan was suffering from ills which could be remedied only by war with the United States and China and by Pan-Asianism (40).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Dr. Isoo Abe, veteran Socialist and head of the Fabians, called the plan "sheer folly," a description indorsed by Juko Shiga, a well-known geographer, who added that Pan-Asianism was a dream of the mentally blind. Genzo Ichikawa, president of the Tokyo First Girls Higher School, condemned Pan-Asianism as "aggression prompted by passionate excitement which would prove calamitous" (41).

nese that Japan had neither territorial nor political designs upon Chinese integrity; and that, if Japan had ever been unfair toward China, the injustice was completely ended, never to be revived (42).

Additional impetus toward Pan-Asianism was provided by approving editorial comment in Yomiuri, Hochi, and Yorodzu, followed by the public adherence to the cause of Hiromi Chiba, editor of the Tokyo Mainichi, Asakichi Tanaka, vice-president of Yamato, Chozaburo Kotaka, president of the Jiyu News Agency, Masajiro Kimura, M.P., president of Maiyu, Hoshio Mitsunaga, president of Nippon Dempo, Ko Shimomura, editor-in-chief of the Asahis, Hikoichi Motoyama, president of the Mainichi Company, Masataka Ohta, vice-president of Hochi, Matsuo Kaname, managing director of Yorodzu, Tetsuya Nakajima, president of Tokyo Yukan Shimbun, and Kiroku Hayashi, president of Keio University (43).

Varied arguments were marshaled to prove the need for federation. Originally the basis was the self-defense of Asia against white domination. This was elaborated into a thesis that, since the whites detest all colored peoples, Asiatic unity was essential for the preservation of peace. Other advocates, headed by the *Mainichi*, upheld the federation as a barrier to

<sup>16</sup> This argument was criticized by thoughtful writers, notably President Hayashi and Choko Ikuta, the translator of Ibsen, on the ground that the federation itself might be considered as aggression. They continued, nevertheless, to expound the cause as a defense against race prejudice (45).

Anglo-Saxon tyranny, whose destruction was the most pressing need and duty for Japan, while still other supporters argued that Oriental culture and Asiatic unity were needed both for Asia's own reconstruction and for the rejuvenation of the world (44).<sup>17</sup>

Although the press is now enthusiastic for Pan-Asianism, the government is not prepared to risk the

<sup>17</sup> The last-named coterie was well represented in a symposium published by Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin. Mitsukawa Iwada wrote: "The function intrusted to the yellow race is to create a universal civilization common to all the world. It would be necessary, however, for the vellow race to hold a world-wide sway in order to make all civilization its own. It will be more natural and more steady a progress to make every continent a unit of an international federation. Asiatics are, therefore, recommended to follow a principle of Asia for the Asiatics as a step toward the realization of internationalism." Keikichi Ichida said: "The Japanese are under the very great responsibility of guiding other Oriental nations toward recovery of their independence. The recovery of Asia from the grasp of Europe appears only a remote possibility, but indomitable and indefatigable energy will steadily draw such an opportunity nearer." Takuo Kamiya held out the hope, "Japan's radiant brilliance will bring all Asia under it to restore Asiatic vitality and also to save the white nations from ruin." Support was granted to Pan-Asianism by Hindu residents of Japan. Rash Behari Bose wrote, in Kaizo, that "Pan-Asia was the cry of an awakened people at the nightmare of the worship of white civilization." A. S. Bamral, in an impassioned speech, delivered the peroration to the Hyogo Commercial School: "Gentlemen of Asia awake, arise and agitate. Let all the oriental nations unite, and with the united wisdom, culture, and wealth of the East, make America realize her worst folly. Let prayers to the god of battles float upward. May the numberless gods of Hinduism. Buddhism, and Shintoism annihilate and destroy the pride of arrogant America. May the Asiatic banner float over the whole world" (46).

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Western opposition by giving public approbation to the movement. A Conference of Asiatic Peoples, held at Nagaski in August, 1926, met hindrances in the refusal of the government to grant facilities. The Afghan delegate was refused admission to Japan, the police harassed the meeting, and the Japanese delegates announced their fear of speaking frankly. Viscount Shimpei Goto, Baron Giichi Tanaka, and Major-General Yasunosuke Sato, who had been announced as sponsors for the meeting, repudiated their connection with the group (47).

The clashing aspiration of Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Hindu delegates also interfered with unity. Because of the geographical features of the continent, and of the consequent long isolation of the Asiatic peoples, diversities were found in race, language, culture, and religion. No common interests were discovered save opposition to the West, and the Nagasaki conference could therefore find agreement only on such material needs as a railway to connect the Orient with Turkey, a Pan-Asiatic bank, and an Asiatic development company. Despite the plea of Rash Behari Bose for an Asiatic renaissance and for a hearty and sincere co-operation between all Asiatic peoples, little was achieved for revival of the Asiatic culture. In Japan, however, the hope that Pan-Asianism may eventually prove effective has called forth a wholesome appeal for self-purification in order that the Em-

pire may be better fit to exercise its duty of acting like an elder brother towards its fellow-Orientals.

Yet, while the unity among the Eastern peoples is being strongly stressed by nearly all the Japanese newspapers, the reading masses are being taught to look upon the Westerners as heartless monsters seeking to devour Eastern independence. More and more, Japan, whether through ignorance or fear or through political ambition to control her neighbors, seems willing to cast aside the West in order to link herself with Orientals. The press, which might have served as leader and interpreter toward interracial understanding, has fallen victim to insularity, to distorted vision, and to unwarranted and contemptible prejudice. Its present tactics imperil the friendships of the world, without materially aiding in promoting Eastern unity.

#### NOTES

- Japan Times, March 10, 1924, May 9, 1925, December 1, 5, 12, 18, 19, 1926; Advertiser, October 7, 1926, January 19, 1927.
- 2. Pooley, Japan at the Cross-Roads, p. 41.
- 3. Kaizo, September, 1925.
- (a) Customs: Hochi, April 18, 1926; Kokumin, April 6, 1926; Yorodzu, January 8 and 27, 1926, March 19, 1926.
   (b) Students: Nichi Nichi, March 19, 1926. (c) Costume: Yomiuri, January 21, 1926; Miyako, May 9, 1926; Yorodzu, August 10, 1926.
- 5. Hochi, March 5, 1926; Advertiser, March 6, 8, 10, 19, 1926.

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- 6. Advertiser, October 8, 1925, January 2, 1926; Osaka Asahi, December 31, 1925.
- Advertiser, March 10, 1926; Chronicle, April 22, 1926, May 13, 1926; May 20, 1926. For article on the elimination of the foreign middleman, see W. M. Kirkpatrick, of Messrs. Samuel Samuel & Company, Advertiser, April 7, 1926.
- 8. New York Evening Post, May 22, 1911; Mail, February 24, 1912; Japan Magazine, June, 1913.
- Mail, July 1, 8, 15, 22, 1911; Chronicle, July 27, 1911, November 28, 1912.
- National Geographic Magazine, December, 1910, pp. 977– 83.
- 11. Mail, August 12, 10, 1011.
- 12. Mail, April 29, 1911, August 12, 19, 1911.
- 13. Fifty Years a Journalist, M. E. Stone, p. 308.
- 14. MacLaren, Japanese Government Documents, p. 298.
- 15. Circular, dated May 16, 1911.
- MacLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pp. 57-59;
   Mail, May 27, 1905, June 3, 1905.
- 17. Mail, April 24, 1912; S. Yoshino, Chuo Koron, June, 1916.
- 18. New York Herald, July 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 26, 1912, December 14, 1912.
- 19. Mail, April 1, 1915; Reinsch, pp. 132, 141; Pooley, p. 148.
- 20. Letters dated October 30, November 14, 1925.
- 21. Japan-American Commercial weekly, October 27, 1923; letters, R. E. Kozhevar, agent for the Peninsular & Oriental Steamship Company, to R. G. Forster, British consul at Kobe, dated November 15, 1923; reply, Forster to Kozhevar, dated December 31, 1923; Chronicle, September, 1923-January, 1924; see also letter from Forster in Osaka Mainichi, January 23, 25, 30, 1923.

- 22. Kokumin, August 29, 1922, September 13, 1926.
- 23. Kokumin, Tokyo Asahi, Yamato, Hochi, January 9, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, January 10, 1926; Hochi, January 12, 1926; Advertiser, January 9, 13, 1926; October 11, 1926; Chronicle, February 4, 1926.
- 24. New York Times, October 16, 1917.
- 25. Advertiser, March 13, 1924; K. Horiye, Chuo Koron, August, 1926. But, for earlier inexactitudes, see the Mail, August 15, 1914, rebuking Osaka Mainichi and Kobe Yushin Nippo for alleging an imminent attack by the United States on Japan; Mukden Daily News, August 9, 1914, criticized, with other papers, for similar offense by the London Morning Post, April 4, 1915; The Tokyo Asahi, June 7, 11, 12, 1917, deliberately garbled a note of President Wilson, and was followed by Kokumin, and by Yamato, June 12. See also attacks upon American motives for entering the war, made by "Koson" Asada and Michitaka Sugawara, former minister of finance, Taiyo, September, 1917, and by Marquis Okuma, Shin-Nihon, September, 1917.
- Chronicle, May 8, 1924, January 1, 1925; placards, Chronicle, December 25, 1924; interview with Mrs. Gurney Binford, missionary of Society of Friends at Shimotsuma.
- 27. (a) Insincere: Osaka Asahi, February 22, 1924, March 14, 1924, June 30, 1925; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 15, 1924; August 3, 1926; Soyejima, Taiyo, January, 1926; Yamato, November 23, 1925. (b) Unjust: Nichi Nichi, May 28, 1924; Chugai Shogyo, June 14, 1924; Yorodzu, June 21, 1924. (c) Arrogant: Yomiuri, March 21, 1924, April 30, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, May 30, 1924, November 29, 1924; Chugai Shogyo, December 2, 1924, August 21, 1926; Yamato, December 7, 1924; May 21, 1926; Nichi Nichi, August 1, 1926, November 21, 1926; Taiyo, January, 1926;

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- Yorodzu, July 7, 1919. (d) Inhuman: Nichi Nichi, February 19, 1924, August 1, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, May 30, 1924; Yamato, November 23, 1925.
- 28. Soyejima, New York Times, July 17, 1925; Yamato, November 23, 1925; Zumoto, Advertiser, October 3, 7, 1925, November 13, 17, 1925, December 17, 1926.
- 29. Osaka Asahi, June 4, 1924; Uchimura, Chronicle, June 12, 1924; Kagawa, Advertiser, April 29, 1925; Kokumin, October 14, 1926; Soyejima, Taiyo, January, 1926; Kabayama, Advertiser, April 7, 1926; Zumoto, Advertiser, December 7, 1925, March 1, 9, 1926; Shibusawa, Japan Times, December 26, 1926.
- 30. See the following for specified dates in 1924: Nichi Nichi, April 10, June 24, 26; Jiji, May 27; Mainichi, June 19; Osaka Asahi, July 1; Chuo, June 17; Miyako, May 28; Yomiuri, June 10; Yorodzu, September 22, October 3; Hochi, June 17-30.
- 31. (a) Pro-war: Suyehiro, Chuo Koron, October, 1916; Otani, Chuo Koron, February, 1917; Kawashima, Naikwan, May, 1926; Akiyama, Advertiser, May 26, 27, 1926; Yorodzu, April 15, 1924; Mainichi, May 30, 1924; Chuo, December 29, 1925; Chugai Shogyo, August 21, 1926; Yamato, December 6, 1924, May 21, 1926; Mainichi, December 29, 1925; "Nijuroppo Gwaisho," Gaikan, January, 1925; Osaka Asahi, April 17, 1924: Yomiuri, December 19, 1924; Yorodzu, June 19, 20, 1924. (b) Anti-war: Yomiuri, February 9, 1924, July 12, 1924; Advertiser, July 1, 1916, August 20, 24, 27, 1916.
- 32. Chugai Shogyo, August 3, 1917; Osaka Mainichi, April 1, 1926; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, August 19, 1926; Chuo, August 19, 1916; Fukumoto, Kwaigai (Overseas), September, 1916.

- 33. Far East, February 19, 1916; Pooley, p. 27; Miyake, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, February, 1916; Shimatani, Shin Nihon, August, 1916; Osaka Mainichi, March 11, 1916.
- 34. Ito, Gaikwan, January, 1924; Moriyama, Chronicle, January 15, 1925; Hochi, June 11, 1925; November 19, 1926; Jiji, January 10, 1925; Chuo, November 19, 1926; Chugai Shogyo, November 20, 1926; Yamato, March 12, 1927.
- 35. (a) Okuma, Shin Nihon, July, 1916; Maida, Kaizo, August, 1926; Hochi, June 11, 1925; Kokumin, June 18, 1925; Advertiser, June 12, 1925; Chronicle, July 2, 1925; "Bababaku shu" (H. E. Damn Fool), Chugai Shogyo, April 6, 1924; Obata, ex-minister to China, Gaiko-Jiho, April, 1924. (b) Anti-Chinese slurs disclaimed by Chuo, April 29, 1924; Kokumin, May 21, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, November 19, 1924; Yorodzu, April 3, 1924; Juko Shiga, Nihonoyobi-Nihonjin, November, 1924; Tsuneo Yonechiyama, Shina, May, 1925.
- 36. Spectator, May 2, 1925.
- 37. Kokumin, June 18, 1925; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 23, 1924; Yamato, December 1, 1924, December 29, 1925; Osaka Mainichi, May 30, 1924; Hochi, June 11, 1925; Advertiser, October 3, 1925.
- 38. Kaizo, June, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, January 5, 1917; Yomiuri, in Chronicle, April 12, 1917.
- 39. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 27, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, May 2, 1924.
- 40. Otani, Chuo Koron, February, 1917; Sawayanagi, Chronicle, December 7, 1916.
- Abe, Kaizo, June, 1924; Shigo, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, November, 1924; Ichikawa, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, December, 1924.
- 42. See 35 b, above.
- 43. Kaizo, June, 1924; Advertiser, July 27, 1926.

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- 44. (a) Defense: Yomiuri, July 12, 1924; Hochi, July 1, 1924; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 22, 1924, July 15, 1924, October 6, 1924; Y. Kasuya, Speaker of House, Jiji, November 26, 1924; Hochi, September 12, 1924; Kokumin, June 18, 1925. (b) Unity: Tokyo Nichi Nichi, July 15, 1924, October 6, 1924; Chuo, February 12, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, May 19, 1924; Hayashi, Chronicle, May 1, 1924; Ikuta, Kaizo, June, 1924. (c) Tyranny: Tokyo Nichi Nichi, August 6, 1926; Hochi, July 14, 1926; Yamato, August 15, 1926; Tokyo Asahi, August 8, 10, 1926. (d) Reconstruction. Takanobu Murobushi, Kaizo, May, 1926; Mainichi, December 2, 16, 1924; Yorodzu, June 17, 1924.
- 45. Hayashi, Chronicle, May 1, 1924; Ikuta, Kaizo, June, 1024.
- 46. Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, December, 1924; Kaizo, June, 1924; see also United States of India, Vol. III, No. 4 (December, 1925); Bamral, Chronicle, June 26, 1924.
- 47. Advertiser, August 3-7, 1926.

#### CHAPTER V

# CENSORSHIP AND EXTRA-LEGAL SUPERVISION

Effective machinery for checking libel and salacity, and even for impressing on the editors the need for closer scrutiny, is, indeed, available. Failure to invoke the laws at hand may fairly be regarded as conferring at least a tacit government approval both to the careless and indecent writings of "Page 3" and to the more serious press challenges to international peace. The selective character of censorship administration in punishing a few press blemishes commits the government to the charge of tolerating all the others which it permits to go unchallenged.

From its earliest beginnings the press has undergone a constant and a rigid supervision, and the freedom of the press has at all times been carefully curtailed. Not only has the government controlled the press by subsidizing editors and by establishing official journals, but by successive press laws it has prohibited the publication of certain categories of the news. The need for this was felt to be pronounced when the clash of cultures, following Japan's awakening, portended danger to the Empire unless the gov-

ernment could guide press programs with exceeding care.

The bureaucrats of New Japan feared the disruptive effects of a complex Occidental culture upon a nation regimented by the shogunate. The promulgation of opinion, the revelation of "political secrets" and comment upon "anything, however trifling, connected with our foreign intercourse" was categorically prohibited.1 In seeking to evade the government's restriction, the press resorted to ironic praise of the administration, to allegories and to veiled allusions to the despotism practiced by the ministries of Persia and of Turkey. Wholesale suppressions of newspapers and imprisonment of editors resulted, and additional restrictions, couched purposely in vague language, were imposed upon the press. The constitution of the Empire, granted in 1800, did accord press freedom, "within the limits of the law," but by imperial ordinances during the Sino-Japanese and after the Russo-Japanese wars the grant was nullified. Slight improvements have, of course, been visible, but in 1925 a ban was laid against discussing any matter "undermining the existing governmental and economic system."

The older methods of suppression are no longer needed. The more recalcitrant newspapers, such as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For a complete discussion of the press laws, see the writer's "Press Freedom in Japan," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1927.

Choya and Akebono, have been cut off by past press laws, or persecuted into uniformity, or acquired by interests more friendly to the ruling cliques. By interpretation of embargo power the whole press of Japan has been reduced, so far as foreign relations or Home-Office matters are concerned, to a virtually semi-official status.

When similar views have been expressed by previous observers, the customary response from Japanese has been that such conclusions were drawn from obsolete experience, and that conditions are now so changed that past incidents are no longer typical. There seems, however, to have been no visible relaxing of the system. As late as February, 1926, the Tokyo police "grilled" officials of Phi Beta Kappa on suspicion that the society was radical. Much suspicion was occasioned, said the Advertiser on February 2, because the group adopted a Greek title, although no Greeks were members. The International Rotary. Tokyo branch, has also been obliged to prove its disassociation from the Moscow International. Continued watchfulness by censors and police induces a tendency to overcaution in the editor. Given a definite censorship provision in the laws, the necessity for striking out offending items will progressively diminish. The writer constitutes himself the censor, for the peril of the censorship lurks less menacingly in actual mutilation of the news than in the disinclination to publish news that may, by chance, be banned as radi-

cal or unpatriotic. An air, however false, of optimism and content will permeate the paper.

The operations of the censorship, when flat prohibitions are necessary, are quite direct and quite devoid of explanation. The classic method, now no longer used, is that of sending the formal note which Brownell records as having been dispatched under the press law of 1887: "Deign honorably to cease honorably publishing august paper. Honorable editor, honorable publisher, honorable chief printer, deign honorably to enter august jail" (1).

This form is obsolete, but the notice received by the *Japan Times* in 1923 is parallel in briefness, if not in courtesy:

To the Japan Times and Mail, No. 8136. Date, December, 27, Twelfth year of Taisho. Publisher Sometaro Sheba. You are hereby notified that the above issue is considered against peace and order and in conformity with 23d clause of newspaper law its sale and distribution are under this date prohibited. The Ministry of the Department of the Interior also ordered the same to be confiscated. Dated December 27, Twelfth year of Taisho. (Signed) Kurahei Yuasa, Chief of Metropolitan Police.

Warnings against publication are equally vague. In June, 1925, the press received a notice reading: "The press is warned against publishing such news regarding the riots in China as may tend to disturb diplomatic relations or seriously prejudice Japan's in-

terests from the point of view of maintaining peace in Korea, Manchuria, and other colonies."<sup>2</sup>

Much of the traditional vagueness, and perhaps some of the inaccuracy, of the Japanese press may spring from the failure of officials to define exactly the kind of news that will be censored.<sup>8</sup> Circumlocutory writing is fostered by the editors, since it is necessary to protect the paper by printing as much news as possible for the sake of forestalling a "scoop" by other journals, while evading every possible objection from the censor.

Hochi offers an almost classic illustration. Mention was forbidden of the murder of Bin Gen Shoku, a Korean. Hochi, in telling of the return of Bin's body, wrote:

Bin Gen Shoku suddenly decided to return to Korea. There was nothing lacking at the station. The Premier, Home Minister, Minister of Communications, and the Minister of Railways said goodby to Mr. Bin. Escorted by the station-master, Mr. Bin entered a second-class compartment especially reserved for him, and decorated with wreaths. When the train was about to start, Dr. Midzuno, chief of the civil service of Korea, advanced

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> The status of Manchuria is inaccurately given.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Japan Chronicle was fined and suspended for printing the following: "A crime was committed concerning which extras have been issued by the Japanese papers and at whose scene a huge crowd collected." No names, locations, nor details of the crime were given, nor was the nature of the crime specified. Papers published outside Kobe were circulating unmolested in the city with full reports of the affair (3).

a few steps toward the compartment where the Korean gentleman was, and greeted him without a word. He was evidently considerably moved, and tears were in his eyes.

It is typical of the lack of unity of the censorship that full details of this murder were printed in Korea, the one place, it would seem, where publication would wreak the gravest danger (2).

A careful study of Japan's successive press laws will disclose a steady trend toward granting freedom, within specific limitations, for the press, and thus may justify the statement that newspapers in Japan "enjoy as large a measure of political liberty as does the press of England or America" (4).

But there are limitations to be noticed. By specific legislation, certain kinds of news may not be printed. Reports of preliminary examinations of suspected criminals, reprints of confidential documents, disclosures of proceedings of executive sessions of governmental bureaus, news believed to be subversive of public morality or to be provocative of disorder, and matters which reflect upon the dignity of the imperial house are all forbidden publication. These are definite, and, for the most part, understandable, although the last three categories are susceptible of an elasticity of interpretation that arouses caution in the editor.

A recital of topics under the official ban in 1922 will indicate the scope covered by these six restrictions. Prohibitions were issued against printing labor

songs, comparisons between the Prince Regent and the Prince of Wales, the reasons for the suicide of a prominent politician, the contents of letters dropped by a murderer, the search for an American spy reported by Kokumin to be in Japan, bulletins upon the Emperor's disease, reports of a Japanese expedition sent to investigate American mines and forestry, an explosion at the Foreign Office, undue sensationalism in reporting the financial and economic crisis, Korean bandits in Manchuria, Korean unrest, the meeting of the Diplomatic Advisory Council concerning the policy to be adopted toward Russia, desertion of Japanese to the Bolshevist ranks in Siberia, the disinheriting of the rightful heir to the Korean throne, renunciation of titles by certain Korean peers, strike of Korean policemen, exaggerated strike news, closing of a Korean school (5).

The steady rise of an indefinite, and sometimes unofficial, elasticity permits the written law to grow more liberal without yielding in the slightest practical degree to the persistent clamor for press freedom. Well-wishers of Japan are free to boast of her journalistic independence and to assure their audiences that there is no censorship imposed save on troop movements during war time, on crime news where publication will aid the criminal, or on impairing the imperial dignity. "Newspapers," as Mr. Hugh Byas says, "can say pretty nearly all they want to say" (6).

It is, of course, well known that radical utterances will certainly be barred; in fact, as K. Mochizuki, a prominent Diet leader, said in 1909, the "Press law almost gags a speaker or a writer possessing radical inclinations" (7). Matters bordering on radicalism are not, however, so readily classified. For many years the Osaka Asahi, and its sister paper, the Tokyo Asahi, were consistent upholders of liberal ideas. In pursuance of their policy they opposed bureaucracy and aggressive militarism, and, in 1918, resolutely objected to Japanese intervention in Siberia. These attitudes offended the Administration, and when the Osaka paper protested against suppressing the news of the 1018 rice riots, an indictment was laid against the paper for disturbing public peace. The court, in secret session, ordered the Asahi to disclaim its liberal views, to print a public apology for its opposition to the bureaucrats, and to dismiss nine members of its staff who were suspected of favoring republicanism for Japan (8).4

<sup>4</sup> While the trial was in progress, Ryuhei Murayama, a man of seventy years, was set upon, bound, and attacked by seven young Ronin, or political ruffians. Their motive, they announced, was to avenge Japan upon the Asahi for articles which they described as contrary to the traditional policy of the Empire. They were arrested, convicted at a secret trial, and were sentenced to imprisonment, but the execution of their sentence was postponed, and they virtually escaped all punishment. Murayama was obliged to retire temporarily from the presidency of the Asahi as a means of showing his contriteness for the liberalness of his paper (9).

The Osaka Asahi's public apology was most distasteful to its Tokyo staff. The latter published a manifesto of protest against "the craven attitude" of Osaka, the attempt to impose "new principles which manifestly embody the belated ideas of militarists and bureaucrats upon the Tokyo Asahi," and the "despicable actions of the Tokyo colleagues who seek to curry favor by truckling to the wishes of the bureaucrats." Needless to say, the men responsible for this outburst, twenty-four in number and representing the entire political and economics staff of the Tokyo Asahi, resigned en masse.

Suspicion was prevalent, and was even voiced in the Diet, that one of the writers complained about was himself a secret agent of the Cabinet who had deliberately penned the offending articles as a means for compelling the *Asahi* to recant under penalty of final suppression.

It is quite true that, to a certain degree, there is freedom of discussion for the press, but it is also quite as true that in the administration of the law restrictions exist which go far beyond the actual letter of the statute. No one can foretell how far, in actual operation, the censor may extend his power. Cabinet ministers, responsible, under the Japanese constitutional system, neither to the Diet nor the people, may, at their pleasure, enjoin the publication of articles believed by them connected even remotely with any tendency thought likely to modify the political, the

economic, or the social system, or with military or naval matters. No argument is allowable, nor, in case of error, is redress available.

The methods utilized possess all the greater danger because they may be indirectly exercised under cover of a "warning," a "suggestion," or "advice." The traditional vagueness, both of the Japanese language<sup>5</sup> and of Japanese legislation, afford ample additional opportunity for extra-statutory regulation whose extent is not always readily acknowledged.

The "advice" tendered a conference of Tokyo editors by Police Director Hideyoshi Arimatsu, now a privy councilor, soon after the passage of the 1909 Press Law is a case in point. As his construing of the prohibition in the law against disturbing morals, or public peace, he gave the editors warnings against publishing news likely to disturb financial and economic conditions, and against resorting to the use of lotteries or voting contests as circulation builders. He also insisted upon "special care in publishing matters likely to affect diplomacy" (10).

"Advice" has become a vital factor in the exten-

<sup>5</sup> The Peace Preservation Law of 1926 prohibits any society likely to destroy the national constitution (kokutai). Premier Wakatsuki was called upon in the Diet to explain this term. At first he described it as "national polity under an unbroken line of emperors," but this was challenged because no one could possibly change the past. Then he took refuge in negatives, and said "kokutai means not depriving the Emperor of his sovereign rights." Finally he told the Diet, "It is anarchy to attempt to alter kokutai," without attempting to explain further what kokutai might be (12).

sion of press restrictions, particularly when it can be exercised by such methods as will not definitely commit the government to any specific embargo on the news. A favorite device is to send a policeman, or other attaché, in plain clothes to the editors to warn against publishing items whose general knowledge is not convenient to officials. These men do not always proffer their credentials, nor give their orders in written form, but often, in the case of foreign publications, command a Japanese employe to tell the editor that certain news must not be printed (11).

Although officially these verbal messages are not regarded as embargoes, but as purely cautionary notices, editors hesitate to disregard the warning thus conveyed. The journalists are quite aware that the very warning indicates the readiness of the authorities to stop the distribution of any journal which offends, and the desired co-operation of the papers is thus readily attained. The censorship has not actually come into play, nor is there record kept in administrative headquarters of any action by officials; yet virtually all the pressure has been brought to bear that could legally be invoked. The verbal warning, therefore, is a favorite device, for no one may be held responsible for its abuse, no appeal against it may be taken to a higher quarter, and no signed orders are required, yet the recipients dare not disobev.

Thus evils are facilitated. No protection is afforded against impostors who may seek to censor news, nor

are warnings uniform throughout the Empire, or the Main Island, or even throughout the same city. Local policemen announce restrictions according to their fancy and without incurring censure. No real guaranty is offered that rival papers may not avail themselves of the device of plain-clothes "officers" to assure for themselves exclusive publication of important news. Nor is redress available if the officials, through overanxiety or undue officiousness, mistakingly suppress news that later is discovered to have been legally printable.

Evidence exists that verbal warnings have been used to discriminate in favor of the vernacular gazettes against the English-language press. The Japan Chronicle complained that news of the stealing of the American flag from the American Embassy was embargoed for the Chronicle on three different occasions, but was permitted to be published in the Yushin Nippo, the Osaka papers and the English edition of the Osaka Mainichi. Other instances have also been recorded tending to show a similar discrimination (13).

The decision as to the publication of particular news items seems to be drifting into the hands of local police officials. Provinces vary in the degree of se-

<sup>6</sup> This is partially due to journalistic technique. For the most part there is little independent search for news by the foreign-language press, but translations are made from the vernacular organs. News which first appears in the latter may later be embargoed. Thus a seeming discrimination may be suspected. The above case and others cannot, however, be so explained.

verity and of frequency concerning these prohibitions and suggestions. The authorities are cognizant that the situation is unsatisfactory, and at one time the former vice-minister of Home Affairs, Chuji Shimooka, announced a plan for centralized control. But the plan was never carried into operation.

In fact, the problem has grown more complex, for instances within recent years indicate that official departments are censoring each other. In June, 1916, Tokitoshi Taketomi, minister of finance, gave out an interview concerning an Inter-Allied Conference at Paris. Several papers printed his remarks and were suspended. When Kokumin and the Osaka Mainichi protested, they were informed by the premier, Marquis Okuma, that the newspapers were at fault "for having published the news without thinking of the effect that the statement would have on Japanese diplomacy." Dr. Ichiki, the Home Minister, added the remarkable explanation: "Mr. Taketomi's statement. so long as it remains a statement, is not injurious to public peace, but it becomes injurious when it is published" (14).

In the same month the provincial edition of Jiji was suspended for reprinting the arguments used by lawyers in a bomb-explosion case. The next morning other papers, printing precisely the same news, were not interfered with. When Jiji protested and called attention to the fact that similar arguments made in a bomb-explosion case in 1883 had been allowed to pass

the censor, Okuma replied that the suspension was due to the insincere arguments made by lawyers for the mitigation of penalty for their clients. "The primary duty of a lawyer," Marquis Okuma declared, "is to make clear the right according to law, so that the people may know how to behave themselves. Otherwise the lawyers are dangerous." Sixty lawyers and thirty-six newspapers protested against the Jiji punishment, only the pro-administration Tokyo Mainichi defending the action of the government (15).

Twice, at least, have papers been suppressed by underofficials of the censorship for printing news officially released for publication by the Foreign Office, and twice the navy department has been overruled by the local police of Kobe. On one occasion newspapers were suspended for quoting Premier Okuma's own remarks concerning China (16).

In theory, only the Emperor is immune from criticism, but in practice the sanctity extends toward princes of the blood, and, indeed, toward all objects used by the imperial family. The press worked itself into a fury in 1925 because a trophy donated by the Prince Regent had been "defiled" by exhibition in a Manila shoestore window. All matters affecting the entire imperial household are subjected to especially close scrutiny, for it is the entire family, not merely the Emperor himself, which is regarded as of superhuman ancestry. All stem from the goddess Amaterasu-omikami, who herself sprang from the left eye of

Izanagi, the sun god's father. Intrusions upon the dignity of the imperial blood partake, therefore, not only of lèse majesté, but may readily be regarded as assaults upon the very foundation of the state, or even as sacrilege itself. This is the basis for that "inner loyalty," which, as Mr. Sawada and Mr. Clarke agree, governs even the inner thinking of the Japanese (17).

No real reform is possible in inner Japanese government while this belief still lingers of imperial inviolability. Unscrupulous politicians are by no means reluctant to avail themselves of this mighty engine to crush down hostile critics. A charge of forgery raised against Prince Ito and Count Hijikata, minister of the imperial household, was countered by the arrest of the accusers for daring to assert that the imperial seal had been wrongfully used. The Twenty-sixth Century, an Osaka publication, was annihilated, and the newspaper Nippon was suspended for publishing the charge. Ito and Hijikata remained totally unscathed, and no investigation appears to have been made into the justice of the charge. Similarly, Daikichiro Tagawa, former mayor of Tokyo and a former department of justice secretary, was imprisoned for five months for having stated that the choice of Count Terauchi as premier in 1916 had been made by the Elder Statesmen and not by the untrammeled decision of the Emperor. Hochi had already been suspended for a simi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Dr. Kawabe is careful in reporting this affair, merely stating that "dark secrets were disclosed" (20).

lar offense. The Kobe Herald was suspended, and its editor imprisoned, for suggesting that the Emperor's "inexperience" as a ruler might have been a contributory factor for the rice riots of 1918 (18).

Twice during the imprisonment and trial of Daisuke Namba, who attempted to shoot the Prince Regent, was the Japan Times suspended for disrespect toward the imperial house. On the first occasion the stupidity, perhaps induced by panic, of the metropolitan police appears to have been responsible. The official police version of the attempted shooting was printed by the Times under a seven-column streamer headline, "Shoot at Prince Regent." In conformity with police injunctions the Times purposely blurred its type wherever the words "Prince Regent" appeared. Nevertheless the issue was suppressed for disrespect toward the imperial house. Again, in attempting to show the remorse of Namba for his crime, the Times remarked on his changed attitude in jail. "It is even said that he most reverently partook of a piece of cake granted to the prisoners in commemoration of the imperial wedding." The paper was again suspended as "injurious to public peace" (19).8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Evidently the *Times* learned its lesson. When Namba was executed it hinted of "an extraordinary outburst on the part of Namba, the details of which have been prohibited by the police censor from publication." Again, on the following day, it reported: "The doomed man hurled one last defiance, the particulars of which have been barred by the police." A curious incident was the embargo on

Isolated complaints against censorship administration appear sporadically when particularly flagrant instances of news suppression appear, but no persistent campaign of opposition against the censorship appears to have been conducted by the vernacular gazettes. It is noteworthy also that in no case has a protest proved effective when registered by an individual paper, and but slight successes have been recorded when journalists have united to oppose the censor's methods.

Twice, in 1918, the combined newspapers thought it necessary to protest against restrictions. The first instance was in May, when Viscount Shimpei Goto, the foreign minister, warned a conference of governors to use especial care in "leading and instructing" the press. This declaration was resented by some of the newspapers, particularly as feeling was already running high against Viscount Goto for his alleged partiality in giving news to foreign correspondents

the news of the imperial portraits lost from a public school. The news was embargoed, for fear of admitting that carelessness had occurred toward the Emperor, for almost exactly eight years (21).

O Among the more important protests may be noted Jiji's protest, in 1913, against the ban on publishing excerpts from the Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi; Osaka Asahi's opposition, in 1914, to the embargo on printing a song from Tolstoy's Resurrection; Kokumin's fight, 1914, against the Foreign Office policy; Osaka Mainichi's protest against the embargo on reprinting excerpts from a book published by Premier Okuma's own firm; Osaka Shimpo's objection, 1921, to the suppression of a feminist article written by the principal of a girls' school, etc. (23).

that was not being released to the Japanese. "We are entirely ignored by the authorities," wrote "Koson" Asada in *Taiyo*. "At times we have been given treatment similar to that accorded to the most dangerous German spies." The *Tokyo Asahi*, *Yorodzu*, and *Sekai Koron* agreed with Asada (22).

Reporters assigned to the Foreign Office demanded that Viscount Goto define his meaning of "lead and instruct," but received the curt reply that the meaning might be left to their own good judgment. The reporters, acting individually and not as agents for their papers, passed a resolution calling Viscount Goto "arrogant," and the minister retorted that the press was irresponsible. He demanded an apology from the reporters, and announced that no news would be given out by the Foreign Office until the retraction should be secured. 10 Yomiuri, Chugai Shogyo, and Kokumin supported him, while Jiji, the Tokyo Asahi. and others renewed their criticisms. The matter ended when the Minister agreed to issue an announcement that "leading and instructing" was to be construed "in a good sense," and that news was not to be suppressed.

The "leading and guiding" controversy was, however, a mere matter of definition of the Japanese word

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Dr. Kawabe describes this as a boycott of the Foreign Office by the reporters, stating that the Foreign Office was compelled "to telephone each newspaper whenever it wished to give out news, whereupon an office boy was sent to receive the printed reports" (24).

shido, and had become complicated as a result of wounded pride on both sides. It could be settled, therefore, by a compromise between other government officials and the proprietors of the papers. But in August a more serious dispute arose. Rice riots appeared in the larger cities, and, ostensibly for the purpose of localizing the disturbances, news of the disorder was embargoed. Since the rioting was widespread, some notice of the matter had to be taken by the press, and on the morning of the fifteenth the Tokyo papers appeared with large-type, leaded apologies for their lack of news. The Shunjukai, an organization of newspaper men, met and demanded a withdrawal of the embargo order by the next afternoon.11 The government's answer was to issue an official version of the riots and to compel the press to print no other information on the disturbances. A sop was thrown to the Shunjukai, a day after the expiration of their "ultimatum," by permitting the press to publish "reports of actual facts, if they are reliable and accurate, without exaggeration or coloring intended to instigate further rioting." The official bulletins were,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The government's immediate answer was the suspension of the Weekly Chronicle for publishing matter which had already appeared in the daily issues of the paper without having been censored. "It looks as though the authorities wished to prevent news from going abroad," said the Chronicle, "since the Weekly circulates largely overseas." Kawabe says merely: "The Shunjukai requested a loosening of the censorship by 3:30 in the afternoon of the sixteenth, and secured it" (27).

however, continued as a guide, and few papers ventured to print additional information. As late as September 2, newspapers in Kobe, Osaka, Tokyo, and elsewhere were still protesting at the continuance of news suppression. No relief was secured until late in September, when the Cabinet fell as an aftermath of armed conflicts between the troops and rioters (25).

Fear of the passage of a peace preservation bill reawakened the press to a consideration, in 1925, of the limitations on its freedom. The Osaka Asahi, Yomiuri, Chugai Shogyo, and Jiji took the lead in fighting the whole thought-guidance program of which this bill appeared a harbinger, but the Chugai Shogyo soon veered to a support of the reactionary measure. Yomiuri was emphatic that "the government is digging its own grave." Even the Japan Times, fearful as it was of radical propaganda, protested against the bill, with the argument that such oppressive measures were the best aid for communism and anarchy. The protests were of no avail. The Diet passed the peace preservation bill, and, by the wording of the law, all adverse comment or protests were precluded (26).

Protests have been averted through the perfection by the government of a technique of voluntary censorship, akin, in essence, to verbal warnings, but salving the pride of journalists by allowing them to participate in conferences on news control. An early instance occurred four months before the Russo-Japanese War began, when twenty-eight Tokyo editors

were called into the war office to be reminded that caution was desirable in printing news concerning Japanese maneuvers. The war office, according to a friendly paper, assured the press that all proper news would be furnished to the editors, and suggested that no news secured from any other source be published in Japan. The continuance, at least at scattered intervals, of the voluntary conference is revealed in editorials printed by such periodicals as Kokumin, Yamato, and the Japan Times. That these conferences readily degenerate into meetings wherein the government dictation as to news may be handed to the press. in the absolute certainty that disregard of the suggestion will bring suppression, is evident from *Hochi* and Yamato. Editors like Kotaro Sugimura, of the Tokyo Asahi, and Tsunego Baba, of Kokumin, agree that when such conferences are assembled, "we meet to receive our orders as to what we may not print" (28).

So far as international affairs are concerned, the voluntary censorship derives an added sanction from that "inner loyalty" which impels the Japanese to put the nation's case before the world in the best light. A firm conviction that favorable publicity is more desirable than unpleasant fact finds ample reflection in the opinions of the press. Captain Brinkley, of the Mail, Motosada Zumoto, and the editors of Yamato, Jiji, and the Tokyo Asahi have all subscribed assent to some such thought as that which Yukio Ozaki, Japan's most prominent Liberal, once voiced in the Diet

(29): "If this is a true statement, the incident was a national disgrace, and it is the duty of every responsible statesman to himself and to his Emperor to keep such matters from the public knowledge." The attitude of Japanese may, perhaps, be best epitomized in the laconic words of the Japan Mail: "A patriotic press should agree to withhold whatever may be easily misunderstood to the detriment of Japan" (31).

Diplomatic affairs are held especially subject to restraint on publication. As early as 1899, when extra-territorial privileges were being abolished, the Foreign Office told the *Nippon* that the lack of tact among the newspapers of the Empire was the greatest handicap to the successful conduct of a foreign policy. Dr. Kazutami Ukita is reluctant to place confidence in the opinions of the public. "Who knows," he says, "but that there may be an irretrievable mistake on the

<sup>12</sup> Viscount (then Baron) Shimpei Goto had issued a pamphlet disclosing alleged facts concerning Japanese activities in Shantung, Manchuria, and Mongolia. The pamphlet alleged breaches of international law by Japanese consuls and military men, related that Japan had seized Chinese warships, manned them with Japanese sailors, and sent the ships to aid the rebels against the Chinese government, and charged that Baron Kihachiro Okura had donated ₹1,000,000 as a war fund for this purpose, with the connivance of the Japanese general staff. Viscount Goto was accused, in the Diet, of publishing this pamphlet, and narrowly escaped from censure from that body. The *Tokyo Asahi* complained that the "pamphlets might easily have been reproduced in the foreign press" (30).

<sup>18</sup> Is this a commentary on what may be meant by the demand made by the *Mail*, that Japanese subjects must each and all assist in making the true spirit of Japan better known to the world?

part of the government if it follows popular sentiment with regard to foreign relations?" His remarks have found indorsement from such men as Setsuzo Sawada, Tsuneo Matsudaira, ambassador to the United States, Masanao Hanihara, former ambassador to this country, Count Tadasu Hayashi, projector of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and by Baron Iichiro Motono, formerly ambassador to Russia. Baron Motono's words are unmistakable. "Our newspapermen lack systematic knowledge of what is going on abroad. They only know how to censure their diplomats for incapacity. The Japanese press has the singularly bad habit of trying to expose certain matters which, from the very nature of the case, had better be kept secret. Careless exposure would only tend to complicate relations and to hamper the otherwise smooth processes of diplomacy. The people ought to rest assured that their national honor and interests are well guarded" (32).

It is only in the event of failure of the general embargoes, advice, press conferences, and "inner loyalty" to prevent publication of news items that the direct action of the censorship must be employed. Japanese apologists are therefore quite correct in their assertions that the enforcement of the police power and of the censorship is growing less severe, and that the days of wholesale suppressions are gone forever. Foreign observers also give assent to this, Rivetta, in 1904, stating that seizures of newspapers

are extremely rare, while Lajput Rai agreed that censorship is invoked only in extremities.

The ascertainment of the trend of suppression is hampered by the discontinuance of publishing statistics giving the number of issues confiscated. In former years, when the numbers were furnished, at least a thousand issues yearly were suppressed. The lowest number was in 1904, when 216 papers lost an issue. Riots in 1905 swelled the total to 1,653, while in 1906, 1,809 issues were forbidden. The last pre-war year, 1913, saw 1,110 suppressions (33).

Reasonable doubts may therefore be entertained as to whether the government employs the censorship in an efficient manner. Offenses against public morality are not always prevented, nor are penalties invariably imposed upon editors who offend against either morality or the public order. Only slight evidence exists to justify contentions that the worst phases of censorship administration are now past, and that press liberties are advancing with rapidity. Decline in the actual number of suppressions as shown by statistical tables is no clear indication, because no measure is available to gauge the caution of editors on other than political affairs. The very fact that censorship control is passing to the civil authorities rather than remaining in the hands of military leaders is an ominous portent, for the former seem more prone to utilize suppression either in an active or a passive manner. There is comparatively slight demand for

military and naval intelligence, and the laws regarding treason are too strong for editors to risk publishing such news. On matters relating to diplomacy, a well-developed patriotism and an "inner loyalty" restrain the press from printing harmful information. It is chiefly in the field of news affecting the Home Office that unwise publicity is now most feared. Data on the proletarian unrest is vital news that editors, despite the hazards of press publication laws, will rush to seek. The authorities are far more fearful of the radicals at home than they are of any foreign spies. In the number of embargoes issued, the Home Office far exceeds the other three departments privileged to censor news.

Similarly, there is danger in the transfer of the censor's function to the local police officials, for the central bureau is more tolerant in permitting news. Without knowledge of the Tokyo attitude on any given matter, the provincial administrator dares not run the risk of angering his superior. He embargoes news that seems in any way to smack of danger. He will not be so severely reprimanded for his overcaution as for permitting one dangerous thought to be disseminated.

The tragic incidents<sup>14</sup> pursuant to the Tokyo earthquake afford a glaring instance of the failure of

<sup>&</sup>quot;For details of the riots and murders at this time, see the writer's "Japan's Struggle for Democracy," in World Tomorrow (June, 1925).

embargoes to protect the public safety. If any time might be selected to justify the operation of a censorship, the public apprehension that malcontent Koreans were about to murder helpless Japanese would seem to warrant the suppression of rumors of Korean "plots." Yet while the government—as Mr. Sheba, of the Japan Times, publicly declared—was wirelessing its warnings against forthcoming Korean insurrection, the publication of reassuring items in the press was consistently embargoed. Failure to check the spread of frenzied rumor served only to heighten the terrors felt by victims of the earthquake and the fire, and hundreds of Koreans were massacred by excited Japanese (34).

Two weeks after the earthquake, when the panic had subsided, the most prominent Japanese radical, Sakae Usugi, together with a woman and a nine-year-old boy, were murdered by Captain Masahiko Amakasu while the prisoners were confined in jail. The corpses were hidden in a well, and mention of the murder was suppressed. When publication was permitted, some weeks later, official bulletins announced that Usugi and "two other dangerous anarchists" had been executed. The *Tokyo Asahi* protested, three years later, at the issuance by the government of misleading "facts" on this affair (35). 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Captain Amakasu, after confessing his guilt, was punished by light imprisonment for two years and a half.

The present censorship, by its always vague and sometimes drastic nature and by the uncertainty of its administration, supplemented by the extra-legal resort to conferences, advice, and verbal warnings, too severely curbs the Japanese editor. Ambiguity and loosely-worded items are his chief recourse, and these, in turn, too often offer opportunity for harmful innuendo, and perhaps for blackmail. In the existing state of journalism, with libel laws so weak as to provide little real redress for injured persons, and with an undeveloped sense of editorial responsibility, some form of censorship may be desirable, but in any case it is at least questionable if the weapon should be intrusted to unchecked bureaucrats.

In a government described by Ambassador Matsudaria and by Count Soyejima as tending toward democracy, machinery might rather be provided for inculcating upon the editor some measure of responsibility for his own writings. In Japan today, by virtue of the semi-official nature which the censor's office thrusts upon the press, the burden of editorial functioning is lifted from the editor, without imposing upon the censor any penalty for inefficiency or error. As conducted in Japan, the censorship leads only to fears of secret plotting, exaggerates the force of whispered rumor, gives semi-official sanction to all news not barred by administrative action, and fails, in practice, to prevent the most mischievous falsehoods (36).

Domestic news, thus closely supervised, is thor-

oughly untrustworthy, because no perfect picture is presented of conditions in Japan. Neither the Japanese themselves nor foreigners can learn the truth about the Island Empire from the press. Those mutual understandings which underlie the maintenance of peace between the nations are stunted by the Japanese bureaucracy. Within Japan itself the national solidarity is weakened by the failure of the press to give a full appreciation of existing situations. Official interference breeds a rising discontent against the government, and this, in turn, provokes a more relentless bureaucratic pressure. The vicious circle creates a need for yet more impregnable defense against the spread of dangerous ideas.

#### NOTES

- 1. Heart of Japan, p. 129.
- 2. Seoul Press, February 24, 1921; Chronicle, February 24, 1921.
- 3. Chronicle, August 25, 1922, September 28, 1922.
- 4. (a) Japanese press is free. Rai, p. 142; Longford, p. 183; Zumoto, p. 117; Low; Courant, p. 510; Clarke, p. 248; Sawada, p. 196; Japan Mail, January 21, 1888; January 2, 1904; MacMahon, The Orient I Found; Tokyo Mainichi, June 26, 1916. (b) Strictly censored. Northcliffe, London Times, April 19, 1922; Sheba, Japan Times, June 2, 1924; Brownell, p. 129; Martin, p. 22; Osaka Mainichi, June 7, 1925; Yomiuri, November 27, 1924; Yorodzu, December 6, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, August 8, 1917, July 5, 1919, November 9, 1919; Osaka Asahi, July 31, 1917; Chugai Shogyo, June 26, 1916; Lawton, Empires, pp. 796-97. In 1926

several papers condemned the censorship, e.g., Tokyo Asahi, March 20, July 16, July 30, August 6, September 19; Miyako, March 10, August 7; Kokumin, July 29; Yamato, August 1; Advertiser, August 11; Hochi, August 12. The Chronicle and the Advertiser (to a less extent) have fought the censorship for years. See Manchester Guardian, June 9, 1921; Miyako, March 16, 1927.

- 5. Chronicle, April 20, 1922. See also Tokyo Asahi, April 1, 1920.
- 6. (a) "Old Arbitrariness Is Gone," Brinkley, New Japan, p. 649; Byas, p. 27; Lloyd, p. 177; Rai, p. 142; Williams, p. 37; Japan Mail, January 2, 1904. (b) "Only for Troop Movements," Zumoto, p. 117; Hanihara, p. 671; Low; Rai, p. 142. (c) "Only for Crime," Zumoto, p. 117; Clarke, p. 248. (d) "Only for Emperor," d'Autremer, p. 125; Low. (e) "Press is Independent," Byas, p. 47; Zumoto, in interview.
- 7. Mochizuki, Chronicle, July 15, 1909.
- 8. For the Asahi case see Osaka Asahi, August 19, 20, 1918, December 1, 1918; Hanazono, p. 45; Saito, in Diet, January 22, 1919; Chronicle, October, 1918-February, 1919.
- 9. Advertiser, September 30, 1918, November 14, 1918.
- 10. Chronicle, June 3, 1909.
- 11. For this and the next two paragraphs the writer is indebted to interviews with prominent newspapermen, both Japanese and foreign, who prefer anonymity.
- 12. New York Nation, April 15, 1925.
- 13. Chronicle, March 23, 1922, June 28, 1923, July 20, 1924; Advertiser, May 25, 1918.
- 14. Chronicle, June 18, 1914; Taketomi, Osaka Mainichi, June 28, 1916; Kokumin, June 25, 1916, June 30, 1916.
- 15. All in June, 1916. Jiji, June 21, Yamato, Jiji, Mainichi, June 23, Okuma and China: Advertiser, June 24.

### CENSORSHIP AND SUPERVISION

- 16. Osaka Jiji, April 14, 1920; Advertiser, May 25, 1918, December 19, 1925, January 14, 1926.
- 17. Constitution, chap. i, Art. 3; Sawada, p. 196; Clarke, p. 249; d'Autremer, p. 125. From the Kojiki, or record of ancient events, quoted by Official Guide to Eastern Asia (published 1914 by Imperial Japanese Government Railways), p. lvii. For the Manila affair, see Advertiser, June, 1925.
- 18. (a) Hijikata case, Japan Mail, October-December, 1896.
  (b) Tagawa. Brown, p. 302; Advertiser, March 15, 1917.
  (c) See another "anti-clan" case, in November, 1905, Jimmin, November 13, Yomiuri, November 15, Teikoku Bungaku, November 10. (d) For a fourth case, Kobe Herald, January 8, 20, 1919.
- Japan Times, December 27, 28, 1923, September 15, 16, 1924.
- 20. Kawabe, p. 123.
- 21. Japan Times, November 13, 14, 1924. Portrait case, Chronicle, April 16, 1925.
- 22. For the Goto incident, see the following for specific dates in May, 1918. Kokumin, 16th, Yomiuri, Tokyo Asahi, Yorodzu, May 17, Yorodzu, May 23, Advertiser, May 16-23; Taiyo, June, 1918; Seikai Koron, June, 1918; for a revival of the case, Japan Times, March 8, 1924.
- 23. Osaka Jiji, June 20, 1916; Kokumin, September 19, 1914; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 29, 1920; Osaka Shimpo, July 3, 1921; Hayashi, Introduction, pp. 31-32; Osaka Mainichi, June 28, 1916; Osaka Asahi, June 24, 1914; Jiji, September 17, 1913.
- 24. Kawabe, pp. 153-58.
- 25. See the following for specific dates, August, 1918. Jiji, Yorodzu, August 12; Kokumin, Nichi Nichi, Tokyo Asahi, August 15; Yomiuri, August 16; Chuo, August 15, Adver-

- tiser, August 18; also Chronicle, September 2, 1918; King-Hall, pp. 140, 151.
- 26. New York Nation, April 15, 1925. But see Miyako, March 16, 1927; Advertiser, March 11, 1927.
- 27. Kawabe, p. 162; Chronicle, August 22, 1918.
- 28. Japan Mail, October 3, 1903; Kokumin, September 19. 1914; Yamato, June 15, 1919; Japan Times, October 3, 1924.
- 29. Advertiser, June 28, 1917. In July, 1917, see Tokyo Asahi, July 13; Chugai Shogyo, July 2; Osaka Asahi, July 9.
- 30. See above. Also Official Gazette, June 30, 1917.
- 31. Japan Mail, November 8, 1913.
- 32. Ukita, in Okuma, I, 190; Hayashi, pp. 290, 292; Sawada, pp. 196-97; Motono, in *Yomiuri* (Fortieth Anniversary issue) November, 1913, repeated by *Sekai*, July 1, 1916; Matsudaira, *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, December 6, 1925.
- 33. Japan Yearbook, 1911; Chronicle, July 19, 1917.
- 34. Japan Times, October 23, 24, 1923, December 19, 21, 1923, March 8, May 1, June 2, 1924. For the official view see Japan Yearbook (1924-25), pp. 241-42, Manchester Guardiian, October 11, 1923, New York Times Current History, October, 1923; for conflicting views by Roderick O. Matheson, see McClures, Vol. LVI, No. 1 (January, 1924); Current History, May, 1927.
- 35. Japan Yearbook (1924-25), pp. 243-44; Chronicle, February 14, 1925, May 28, 1925; Tokyo Asahi, August 6, 1926; Current History, May, 1927.
- Matsudaira, Philadelphia Public Ledger, December 6, 1925; Soyejima, New York Times, July 8, 1925.

#### CHAPTER VI

### SAFEGUARDS AGAINST RADICALISM

Whether through positive enactment or through interpretation of the law, through "inner loyalty" or fear of punishment, the censorship within Japan is absolute. The press dares not offend. Officialdom cannot, of course, effectively caulk every tiny seepage of undesirable news items, but means exist for limiting the greater volume of illicit news.

To the rulers of a society based, as is Japan's, upon a faulty economic system, administered by what even the Japanese admit to be a scandalously corrupt political cabal, where restive tenant farmers, an underpaid urban proletariat, and an unemployed intelligentsia are suffering depression, too close a scrutiny of the foundations is disquieting. The danger of an overturn becomes pronounced with the increasing realization that the cost of maintaining such a social system is greater than its worth.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Japan's gains since the war with Russia have by no means been impressive. In medicine and in some fields of science alone has Japan kept herself abreast of the world, while in literature, music, and sculpture her recent efforts have been barren. In her art, her architecture, and her drama, the mingling of Oriental with Occidental forms has stifled her old excellence without materially aiding her new efforts. By her diplomacy, Japan has been plunged into a sea of militarism by incursions into Asia which, like Plantagenet Eng-

Among the masses, it is thought by Japanese officials, "dangerous thoughts" are rife. Perhaps the Communists are not as influential in the instigation of their revolutionary theories as might be indicated by the published opinions of bankers, politicians, and newspaper men, but that unrest exists in several strata of Japanese society is clearly evident. But no leaders are available to guide the masses in their blind struggle for more liberty. The older liberals are ageing men, and few new prophets are arising to replace them. Yukio Ozaki, the radical of forty years ago, is still the only leading figure now. Peace preservation laws and press restrictions stifle free expression, and hireling ruffians, in the guise of super-patriots, terrorize the minor publicists. Nor will any independent movement be accorded hearty welcome in a land where every group must submit itself to searching supervision by police, and where, until the summer of 1926, labor unions were officially illegal.2

land's into France, have enormously increased the military budget without yielding any great advantages which might not have been won more cheaply in peaceful ways. Although herself poor and lacking in such essential raw materials as iron, oil, cotton, wool, and rubber—even lacking sufficient food itself—she has followed the mercantilist ideas of wealthy nations rich in natural resources. The almost inevitable result has been a decline in her prosperity and a rise in unemployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To reduce the possibilities that undesirables may reach the impressionable masses, the mails, telephones, and telegraphs are stunted. High fees and shortage of equipment confine the telephone to less than 1 per cent of the population in Japan proper and to a

Perhaps the scarcity of well-trained leaders for the commoners may be a product of the educational policy long followed by the Japanese, who have sought to guarantee constructive progress by the choice of safe and well-tried leaders for the democratic cause, and by the careful inculcation of acceptable attitudes in the minds of scholars. Secondary education is confined to comparatively small numbers of selected students, and, before entrance into universities, these small numbers are scaled still further downward.<sup>8</sup>

Once enrolled in college, the students are protected against too revolutionary doctrine. The oldest and one of the most influential universities does not permit its students to draw books from the well-

much less percentage in Korea and the dependencies. Mail deliveries are frequent and efficient, but the rates are high. Until 1926 a fee of 20 sen (equivalent at the contemporary exchange to 8 cents) was charged for foreign postage, a rate 60 per cent higher than that charged by the United States on letters to Japan. Domestic postage rates were 3 sen, which is lower than the corresponding American rate, but which, at the Japanese wage scale of  $\frac{\pi}{3}$ 0 a month for postal clerks,  $\frac{\pi}{4}$ 48 for railway men, etc., is proportionately far higher.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In March, 1923, 6,630 boys sought entrance into the six public middle schools of Tokyo, but only 881 were accepted. For the twenty-three private schools 21,970 applications were received, of which 5,832 were enrolled. The Imperial University and its allied schools had 9,489 applications, but admitted only 2,447. Fourteen other Tokyo universities had 28,244 applications and admitted 18,640. Of 17,047 girl applicants for entrance into middle schools, 5,074 were accepted. Out of 1,282 applications for the two women's universities, 671 were granted (1).

stocked library until their senior year, and then only in connection with the subjects of their graduation theses. Associations for the study of social problems are forbidden by the Ministry of Education to consider certain "dangerous" topics, such as socialism. Sociology as a pursuit for college groups is frowned upon, and the study is forbidden to all high schools. Since success in Japanese communities depends to an unparalleled degree upon the possession of a university diploma, the students are extremely careful to repress whatever recalcitrance they may feel toward the authorities. The future leaders of Japan are thus painstakingly selected and are carefully directed in their proper thought.

Nevertheless, despite the hand-picked student body, the schools were active in the encouragement of democratic thought. The notice boards of all the universities were filled with bulletins of new societies to study "sociology." Many of them, no doubt, such as the New Man movement led by Professor Sakuzo Yoshino of Tokyo Imperial, or the Fabian Society which followed Professor Isoo Abe, of Waseda, were merely coverts to conceal socialists and other "dangerous thinkers," but all were viewed with grave suspicion. An official order from the Minister of Education, Ryohei Okada, issued in April, 1926, prohibited the formation or the meeting of any such societies, forbade even the private reading or discussion of "studies concerning dangerous thoughts," and refused

permission for the holding of any interuniversity conferences on the social studies (2).4

Thirty students of the Doshisha and the Kyoto Imperial universities were arrested, and, six weeks later, fifteen more, from other universities, were apprehended. All were members of the Kenkyu-kai (Society for Studying Sociology) and all were accused of either possessing, translating, or distributing books by Stalin, Marx, Engels, and Edward Bellamy. They were also opposed to military training and had endeavored to assist the outcast Eta and the labor unions to unite. An embargo on the news of these arrests was laid in January, 1926, and was not removed for eight months (3). Eight months more elapsed before the case was brought to trial. Then, on the second day of the hearings, the case was still further postponed because the students protested at the alleged biased attitude of their judge.

From the students, attention was next turned to professors. Chugai-Shogyo took the lead in this campaign. "We think students are involuntarily captivated by radicalism because of the influence of their lecturers. Not a few professors advocate radical principles. Let the fountain head be purified and the stream will become pure." The idea proved immedi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For a full account of this movement for student control and for the text of the edict issued by the *Mombusho*, or Ministry of Education, see the writer's "Japan Returns to Feudalism," in the *Nation* (October 27, 1926).

ately popular, especially as two professors in the Hokkaido Imperial University had recently been arrested for helping to instigate a street-railway workers' strike. The Tokyo Asahi, in a curious editorial, announced that "students who receive financial aid of any kind should in no way be free to take part in social movements," though it believed the question debatable concerning self-supporting students. Jiii believed that "conceited students were merely showing off. Their vainglorious professors should be reminded that their duty is research and thinking and not participation in social movements." Yomiuri indorsed the Okada plan and asked for a thorough survey into the soundness of the social thoughts held by the instructors. Upon the news that forty-five students had been arrested for disseminating radical writings, members of the Privy Council expressed opinions that not only should the teachers of these men be dismissed, but that the presidents of the Tokyo and the Kyoto Imperial universities ought to offer resignations (4).5 Dr. Araki, of Kyoto, it is understood, did contemplate such action, but his retirement was not required.

<sup>8</sup> A similar campaign for the control of teachers' opinions was projected in 1920. At that time *Jiji* assured its readers that "there is no freedom of study in official schools. Scholars should confine themselves to their desks and not try to put their ideas into practice." The *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* opposed this as tending to make Japan "mentally slack," but although the police were reported by *Chuo* to be considering a survey of professorial thought, no action

As a bulwark against the disruption introduced by foreign thought and against the influence of unsound lecturers, the numerous patriotic societies were centralized under the common bond of an intensified nationalism. Ostensibly the object was to celebrate February 11, the national holiday, by promoting a stronger national unity, but practically, according to Yamato, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Osaka Mainichi, and the Asahi's, the plan was really to create a stronger defense against labor movements, radical ideas, and modernist reformations. The Nichi Nichi and Yamato discerned an antiforeign trend and warned against bringing such an immense fund of organized patriotic feeling under government control, Kokumin, Yorodzu, Miyako, Hochi, and Chugai Shogyo all approved the merger as a means of winning back once more to the fundamental principles upon which Japan was founded, and which, they said, had made her great. Chugai Shogyo went even further to suggest that the department of education be commissioned to prepare a textbook on national history which would dispel radical ideas and give a proper basis for inculcation of the national spirit. Hochi suggested the establishment of a government daily newspaper to fulfil the same function (5).

was taken at the time. The distribution of a translation of William Morris' News from Nowhere, which was suppressed by the police, seems to have given the initial impetus for the 1920 agitation (6).

With the press efficiently controlled through the operation of the peace preservation law, the police were free to concentrate upon the prevention of perhaps more revolutionary movements among the proletariat. Great anxiety existed lest Russian influence might lead to outbursts in Japan. As a preventative, not only was the Russian Embassy carefully guarded, but when, in September, 1925, four Russian tradeunion delegates visited Japan on their way home from a conference in China, hundreds of police were detailed to prevent unauthorized Japanese from communicating with the visitors. Railway platforms along the line from Shimonoseki to Tokyo were heavily guarded with uniformed and plain-clothes gendarmes, a special police watch was set over the approach to the Tokyo apartments of the delegates, and a police anteroom was established in order that all prospective callers might be closely examined as to their motives for seeking interviews. As an additional precaution, hundreds of labor leaders were arrested the night before the arrival of the Bolsheviks and were not released until after the unionists had left the city (7).

Nevertheless, G. Matsumura, director of the police bureau, felt his precautions against radicalism to be incomplete because socialism was still believed to be spreading. A Farmer-Labor party, warned that "no approach to Sovietism would be tolerated," rejected radical suggestions from its platform only to find itself dissolved by the police because its projec-

tors "lacked sincerity of purpose, were of unsavory character, had hidden motives, and were associated with labor unions." Dr. Washio and the Japan Times both protested at the decision, the latter pointing out that "no allowance seems to have been made for the purging of radicalism from the party," and intimating that the police had misunderstood the wording of the party platform. The Osaka Mainichi thought the reasons for suppression to be "vague, mysterious, and unconvincing," while the Osaka Asahi dubbed the government's undue nervousness as not only cowardly but comical (8).

Two weeks later the tiny Fabian Society, organized in April, 1924, was disbanded by the authorities, the singing of the Soviet anthem was forbidden, a Russian novelist visiting Japan was subjected to the same experiences as his labor-leader predecessors, much to the dislike of *Jiji*, and even *Kokumin*, and in May, 1926, a special section was set up within the metropolitan police for watching over the radical and labor movements (9).

A final step was taken with the drafting of a bill intended to control religious and moral teachings. The status of such teachings has long been held in low repute by certain sections of super-patriotic Japanese, partly because of the rising influence of the missionary teachers from America and Europe and partly because of the waning moral influence exerted by the Shinto and the Buddhist priests. In March, 1926,

therefore, following two editorials by Miyako and Yorodzu, the Minister of Education drew up a bill for the control of Christianity and all other creeds. Article 3 of the suggested bill reads (10): "When the religious doctrines propagated or the religious rites and ceremonies performed are regarded as subversive of public peace and order and public morals, or as contrary to the obligations of Japanese subjects, the controlling government office can change, cancel, or amend them."

Men like Motosada Zumoto, Count Aisuke Kabayama, "Kanzo" Uchimura, a leading "independent" Christian publicist, and Tovohiko Kagawa, the foremost Christian social worker, have all, within recent months, given testimony to show that Christianity falls under the criticism of such a law. Hochi. Kokumin, and Tokyo Nichi Nichi all agree that control over religious doctrine is essential if pernicious doctrines are to be controlled. Representatives of virtually all religions except Shinto, which is expressly excluded by the bill, united in opposition to the measure. Bishop Kogoro Uzaki, president of the Federation of Christian Churches in Japan, believed it a glaring discrimination against the Christians, and denied that Christianity was given equal treatment with the Buddhists. E. Kubokawa, secretary of the Zojo Buddhist Temple, protested against the measure as destructive of religion because of undue surveillance,

A similar bill was beaten by the Peers in 1900.

supervision, and interference with religious rites. Several months were devoted to a study of methods whereby a religion control bill might be safely drawn, but the bill failed to come to a vote. The Ministry of Education announced, however, that a similar proposal would be officially renewed in the Diet of 1928 (11).

Government control of religion, schools, meetings, and communications did not, however, afford sufficient guaranty against the importation of disturbing news from overseas. The problem which devolved upon the government was difficult, for all past history had shown that bureaucrats are impotent in efforts to prevent the infiltration of undesired ideas, but, by analogy to the development bonuses freely granted to essential enterprises, a preferential treatment for the entrance of approved information could be readily accorded.

The isolation of Japan from the important sources whence instigations toward either democracy or radicalism might flow renders her particularly reliant for her news upon smooth operations of the cable and the radio. By controlling these instruments, the government might thus assure itself a supervision over the form in which world-news would be received. If, at a later time, discrepant information found entrance to Japan through mails or word of mouth, the impact, already stamped by government approval, would be extremely difficult to eradicate. Innumerable minor

items, unimportant in themselves but tending, in the mass, toward inculcation of a satisfactory impression, would never be discussed following their initial presentation.

Thus, while in constant public speeches Japanese deplore that foreigners, knowing little of Japan, misinterpret the little that they know, and while they point out that Japanese know more about the West than Occidentals know about Japan, it is not really doubtful on whom the onus for this lack of common understanding should be laid. To foreigners residing in the East, the remedy seems rather in the hands of Japanese officials than in those of Western peoples. Bureaucracy, of course, prefers few channels of publicity, and, by uniform and rigid supervision over cables, mails, and radios, the Empire of Japan has barred the free exchange of news.

From early Meiji days, exclusive monopoly over cable lines has been the Oriental rule, taught, like so many other Oriental methods, by the Russians and the British. Through pressure by the Tsarist diplomats, exclusive cable-landing rights were granted, in 1870, to the Great Northern China and Japan Extension Telegraph Company (a Danish firm in which the Russian Crown was financially involved (12).

The Japanese, however, managed to evade their treaty obligations. As early as 1883, the government, by skillful bargaining, was enabled to lay down a cable from Nagasaki to Vladivostock, and eight years

later it bought up the Northern line from Moji to Tsushima in the Straits of Korea. The latter line was built originally as an emergency alternative to the Nagasaki-Vladivostock cable. The Moji-Tsushima section was supplemented by a link from Tsushima to Fusan in Korea, where it was intended to meet the Korean land lines, and thus connect with the Russian system in Siberia (13).

Japan's purchase of the Moji-Tsushima cable and its construction of a Vladivostock span was in pursuit of a policy, since carried out unfailingly, to control the entry of all wire communication into Japanese territory. The international situation was of such a nature in 1902 that Japan could not withstand the Russian pressure for renewing the Northern's lease, but the extension was definitely limited to ten years, and notice was served that at the conclusion of the period the Japanese would either purchase the cables to Shanghai and Vladivostock, or would construct rival lines herself. The same ultimatum was also issued concerning the Tsushima-Fusan section of the Korean cable line (14).

Under threat of competition, therefore, and the consequent fear of disruption of its pooling arrangements, the Northern sold its Japan rights in 1912. Since the Northern's exclusive rights in China are retained until 1930, Japan is still dependent on Northern favor for her cable lines to Europe.

The breaking down of Russian diplomatic pres-

sure after the Russo-Japanese War afforded Japan, however, an opportunity to set up other cable lines entering the Empire. A naval line from Sasebo, the great naval base, to Dairen was carried on to Chefoo by an agreement made between the Chinese and the Japanese governments, and hence immune from the commercial monopoly accorded to the Northern interests. This line was opened in 1909. A war department cable from Yokohama to the Bonins could be built both as a military necessity and as internal telegraphic service, and furthermore, the Bonin Islands could be used by other cable companies on the plea that the Northern concession applied only to the territory of Japan proper. The latter line was built in 1905 (15).

In spite of these weakenings of the Northern's hold, its Chinese monopoly is still effective, and Japan, although owning and controlling telegraphs and cables linking it with China by sea or through Korea and Manchuria, cannot send a single commercial telegram directly to its neighbor without permission from the Northern

Ample cable facilities are thus afforded between Japan and Europe. Four lines link Nippon to the Asiatic mainland, and of these four, three are doubled lines. The Sasebo-Dairen-Chefoo system is probably intended more particularly for naval purposes than for commercial uses, although it is used for business in times of peace. From Asia land wires are readily

accessible to Europe. Moreover, once Shanghai has been reached, submarine cable lines afford a valuable supplement, affording quadruple cables as far as Singapore, a triple line from thence to Aden, and quadruple lines from Aden into London.

In contrast to these facilities the services to America are meager. Prior to 1903 no direct service was provided. A British cable, opened in 1902, was available from Canada to Australia, but involved too round-about a transmission (from Australia to Batavia, to Hong Kong and Nagasaki) to be desired for cheap and quick use from the Orient to the United States. In 1903, however, a cable laid by the Commercial Pacific Cable Company was opened up from San Francisco to the Philippines by way of Guam. Access to Japan was thus provided via Manila to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Nagasaki. During the Russo-Japanese War, when there was fear that Russia, by cutting cables, might be able to isolate Japan, a secret spur was laid from Yokohama into Guam to tap the transpacific cable. This was the first direct line from the Orient to the Western Hemisphere (16).

Negotiations over the building of this spur disclose the willingness of the Japanese to sacrifice efficient service for the sake of securing to themselves complete control of cables. George G. Wood, general manager of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company, relates that the original intention of the company was to build a line directly into Yokohama, staffing the

branch with experienced cable operators and utilizing modern and efficient methods. The Japanese government, however, refused permission for the Company to approach closer to Japan than the outlying Bonin Islands. From Yokohama to the Bonins the cable line was placed under the control of government officials, and the cost of building was defrayed from the secret war budget of the Empire (17).

To draw off the Chinese messages, a cable line was laid from Guam to Shanghai, landing at the latter port under the terms of an agreement whereby the Shanghai-Guam link enters the general cable pool. This line, like the Guam-Yap-Menado service to the Celebes, was set up by Dutch and German interests. By the Treaty of Versailles both cables were taken over by the Allied and Associated Powers and were by them mandated to the other members of the pool, the United States acquiring the Yap-Guam line, Japan securing the Yap-Shanghai, and Holland retaining the Yap-Menado cable (18).

No competition may therefore enter into the transpacific cable services until the expiration, in 1930, of the monopoly landing privileges conceded by Chinese authorities. Pooling arrangements avert the worst evils of unrestricted competition. Moreover, Anglo-Danish cable interests now possess at least three-quarters of the capital stock of the only "American" cable company, according to the testimony of Mr. Clarence H. Mackay, president of the Commer-

cial Pacific enterprise. This foreign ownership, it has been asserted, was responsible for the refusal of the state department in 1920 to approve the application of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company for duplication of its line from California to Midway Island, via Honolulu. Had such a duplication been secured, the plan contemplated a new spur line from Yokohama into Midway, and the sole devotion of the new cable to messages between Japan and the United States (19).

Cable congestion during the Great War and the subsequent demands for new cables as relief turned the attention of Japan to the possibility of substituting radio for wire communication. The laying of another line to Guam, according to estimates made by the foreign communications service, would entail a cost of \$8,600,000. For less than half that sum a transpacific radio equipment could be provided (20).

Experiments in the use of radio had begun as early as 1903, between Nagasaki and Formosa, but wireless had not been consistently employed. One enthusiastic writer speaks, however, of the use of radio by Togo in the Battle of Tsushima as having brought victory to the Japanese against the Russian fleet. By 1912 regular wireless was in use between Formosa and Japan, and three years later, between the Hokkaido and Kamchatka. Wireless was maintained solely as a government monopoly, civilians being forbidden to establish stations. In 1915 these restrictions

were somewhat modified, but so little latitude is still accorded private operators that only three private transmission stations of any power were operating ten years later (21).

Two new wireless stations were constructed for exchanging messages with the Radio Corporation of America. A navy department station at Iwaki, built in 1911, transmits to Bolinas, California, while a newer station, Fukuoka, opened in 1927, picks up messages originating at Marshall, California. A relay plant is available at Honolulu to assist transmission (22).

Thus the exchange of information was facilitated, but factors were still present to hinder free exchange. The old hand methods and the slow-speed circuits used did not permit the sending or dispatching of more than fifteen words a minute, while other mechanical limitations reduced the time of operation to less than nine full hours daily. Much less than 10,000 words a day, or less than 700 average messages, could thus be interchanged (23). Nor have later improvements seriously bettered this condition the only large-scale station since opened, at Osaka. 1923, being devoted to the European field. Funabashi, a former receiving station, built in 1916, was abandoned in April, 1927.

Japan's limitation in the matter of exchanging information with America is in especial contrast to the rather ample facilities provided between the United

States and China. Prior to the Great War this latter service had been meager, but after the entrance of the United States into the war, a full daily budget of news was transmitted by the Committee of Public Information in conjunction with the navy wireless station at San Diego. This service ended with the conclusion of the war, and for nearly a year the Far East was again without adequate provision of either cable or wireless communication to America (24).

In December, 1919, after energetic efforts made by Paul S. Reinsch, American minister to China, seconded by Victor S. McClatchy, of the Sacramento Bee, Lindsay Russell, president of the Japan Society of New York, and several former ambassadors, a new service of news was made available for China. The navy agreed to dispatch press messages from San Francisco to Manila at a rate of six cents a word. At Manila the news was again radiocast to the American legation at Peking and to the French station at Shanghai. Entrance into Japan is possible, however, only through the rather narrow and expensive gateways of the existing cable lines and wireless stations of the Empire (25).

In order to relieve congestion the Japanese government projected, in 1924, a comprehensive system of new construction. Under the direction of Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa and a committee of officials, the Nippon Musen Denshin (Japan Wireless Company) was organized to extend and unify the wireless sys-

tem. Little doubt exists either that Musen Denshin holds semi-official privileges or that considerable government financial support has been accorded to it. Of the total capitalization of \(\frac{\frac{4}}{2}\),000,000, one-eighth at least is subscribed by the government in the form of the Iwaki plant and of sites for other stations. On the 46,000 government shares, it is expressly stipulated that no dividends are to be paid for ten years unless the company proves exceptionally prosperous. The company itself announced that it was to enjoy semi-official rights and that it was afforded the official support of the Department of Communications (26).

Further announcements made evident the fact that Musen Denshin is intended "on behalf of the government" to exchange messages with all the leading wireless stations of the world, to manufacture and to supply radio equipment, and to undertake wireless enterprises abroad. These privileges are to constitute a monopoly right, and the government retains the right of supervision (27).

Thus the arrangements for radio extension in Japan seem designed to perpetuate the essential features characteristic of Japan's official attitude toward the exchange of news. Since competition in the field of high-power overseas transmission is forbidden, an absolute censorship may be enforced. Embargoes laid on news at home may also be exercised on outbound messages passing over cable lines or through the air. Whatever news may be transmitted may therefore be

regarded as officially tolerated, if not, indeed, approved, by government authority.

Official "inspiration" may also be suspected in the case of news arriving through the air. The methods pursued in organizing Musen Denshin closely parallel those followed at the founding of Kokusai Tsushin, the national news agency. Not only is Viscount Shibusawa the leading figure in establishing both enterprises, but the supporting committees in both cases are identical in official position, if not in personnel. Musen Denshin, however, is much more frank in operation; for while Kokusai consistently disclaimed intention of disseminating news, the Musen Denshin has begun to radiocast a daily summary of news supplied by the Department of Communications and by the Tobo News Agency, a semi-official bureau. Even the wording of the inaugural announcements made on behalf of Musen Denshin is reminiscent of the Kokusai, for S. Koshino, manager of the news agency, repeats the phrasing of the Kokusai founder: "The service is in no way connected with, nor dependent upon, any government department, but is an ordinary news service built up on a purely commercial basis. For the present the news will be distributed gratis, but it is not planned to continue to give the service free of charge" (28).

Musen Denshin's monopoly rights in the manufacture and supply of radio equipment are not looked upon with favor by those familiar with the history of

telephone development in Japan. Similar privileges under similar direction by the Department of Communications have resulted in a policy of undermanufacture. Under pre-earthquake conditions the demand for telephones was far in excess of supply, and at the close of 1922 more than 280,000 applications were outstanding. The working telephones numbered some 415,000, or an average of approximately one telephone to every 180 people, according to the report of the Director-General of Communications; while in the United States and Canada the numbers were one telephone to each 13 and each 11 people, respectively. As each applicant for telephones was required to deposit a sum ranging from \(\frac{1}{5}\) to \(\frac{1}{15}\), the sum held in trust on this account amounted to more than \(\frac{1}{2}\),000,ooo. Applicants were required to wait, at times, many vears before the service could be accorded them. Fears are freely expressed that Musen Denshin's privileges may portend a similar restriction in radio development (29).

Plans of the Musen Denshin, approved by the Communications Department, call, however, for extensions to the service. Of the twelve official wireless stations in the Empire, two only are now available for overseas transmission, the rest being devoted to shipping uses. Seven special stations, used for the army, for the navy, and for railway purposes, are not included in this list since they have not been, and probably could not be, turned into commercial channels.

To supplement the overseas facilities a new station is to be constructed near Tokyo for communication with Asia and the South Pacific; another, in the Nagoya district, will link itself with Nauen and Paris; while Iwaki is to be reconstructed and improved to afford better service with America. These new constructions are scheduled for completion in 1928 (30).

For the present, at least, these plans exist chiefly on the blueprints, and in actual practice neither Musen Denshin nor the Department of Communications are welcoming opportunities to expand news services across the sea. Undoubtedly Japan's complaints of being misinterpreted have roots in the congestion of her wire and radio equipment, and in the heavy tolls exacted for transmission. The commercial rate, by air or cable, from San Francisco to Japan is \$0.72 a word, almost identical with the British charges by the London-to-Shanghai cable which extends twice the length of the Pacific span. A "press rate" of \$0.18 a word is also offered, but is seldom used because cablegrams thus sent are subject to delays. Newspapers customarily employ the "urgent" rate, for which the charge is triple the ordinary toll (31).

Five years ago, in 1922, a committee of American newspaper publishers, including the responsible heads of the New York Tribune, Times, and World, the Chicago Tribune, the Philadelphia Public Ledger, the United Press, International News Service, and the Universal Service, organized attempts to secure

improved news service in the Pacific field. Failing to secure a promise from the Japanese government that it would erect a station in Japan to exchange news with a newspaper wireless plant to be set up in California, the newspaper publishers proposed to build stations of their own on both sides of the ocean. Since this plan would meet with opposition as being contrary to the monopolistic scheme pursued by the Japanese, the American publishers offered to subscribe a fund for building a radio in Japan which would be turned over to the Japanese government for official operation and complete control. The only condition attached to this offer of providing Japan with a complete wireless station free of charge was that the station should be used solely for transmitting news. This offer was made in June, 1026, but no reply was sent by the Communications Department to the publishers. A similar offer of a free wireless plant to be devoted to news purposes was also made by Japanese newspaper publishers of Tokyo and Osaka, but without avail (32).

Flat refusals, on the score of insufficient plant facilities, met an offer made in February, 1926, by Major-General Harbord, president of the Radio Corporation of America, to reduce the press rate from \$0.27 to \$0.10 a word. The Japanese refused co-operation, although appeals to it were registered by the Nijuichinichikai, an association of the leading editors and publishers of Japan, by the heads of the

great news agencies, Nippon Dempo and the Rengosha, by representatives of such important newspapers as Chugai Shogyo, Jiji, Hochi, Yomiuri, and several others, and by the annual convention of the Japanese Newspaper Association. Major-General Harbord's offer was publicly renewed at the Geneva Conference of the International Press Association in August, 1926, without eliciting consent. The press rate was cut, in November, to \$0.18, but the Harbord proposal for a further cut was denied (33).

Japan's government seems therefore to constitute the only real obstacle to securing lower press rates, and such misunderstanding as proceeds from lack of proper information of Japan must necessarily be laid at Japan's door. Through her artificially inflated cable rates, Japan has made herself virtually isolated from the main news currents of the world (34). A more modern version of her old seclusion policy has been created, with the concomitant result, unknown in Tokugawa days, of making her suspected and suspicious. With such a background at the outset of its life, the prospect for a liberal administration of the Musen Denshin is far from auspicious.

#### NOTES

- 1. Twentieth Annual Tokyo Statistics (1924), pp. 242 f., 272 f.
- Hochi, May 7, 1926; Advertiser, May 15, 1926; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 28, 1926, May 9, 1926.

- 3. Osaka Asahi, December 2, 1925; Advertiser, September 17-21, 1926, April 6, 1927; Chuo, September 16, 1926; Miyako, September 17, 1926; Philadelphia Public Ledger, October 11, 1926; Kokumin and Yorodzu, March 6, 1927; Tokyo Asahi, April 7, 1927.
- 4. See the following for specified dates in 1926: Chugai Shogyo, May 12, August 31; Jiji, September 17; Yomiuri and Tokyo Asahi, September 19; Advertiser, September 4; for the Privy Councilors, see Jiji, September 16; Hokkaido case, Chronicle, April 15.
- 5. See the following for specified dates in 1926: Hochi, August 12; Chugai Shogyo, August 31; for the national holiday, see the press of February 11-12.
- 6. See the following for specified dates in 1920: Chuo, March 8; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 4, 11; Jiji, March 9; Utopia, in Advertiser, March 7.
- 7. See the following for specified dates in September, 1925: Advertiser, 21-26; Osaka Asahi, 21-22; Jiji and Hochi, 23.
- 8. Japan Times, November 24, 1925, December 2, 1925; Osaka Asahi, December 6, 1925; Mainichi, December 11, 1925; Washio, in Advertiser, December 11, 1925; Matsumura, Advertiser, May 3, 1926.
- 9. See the following for specified dates in 1926. Advertiser, January 28, March 24, May 3-4; Jiji and Kokumin, March 21; see also, for Fabians, Chronicle, December 24, 1925.
- 10. Advertiser, May 30, 1926.
- See the following for specified dates in 1926: Uzaki, in Advertiser, June 2; Kubokawa, Advertiser, June 3; Jiji, July 22; For Uchimura, Kagawa, Zumoto, and Kabayama, see Notes on chapter iv, No. 29; See also New York Nation, October 27, 1926.
- See Great Northern Cable Company advertisement, London Times, July 19, 1910; Interview with Gordius Neilson, Chronicle, September 26, 1912.

- 13. Japan Yearbook (1924-25), p. 391 f.
- 14. Mail, June 22, 1912; Chronicle, November 21, 1912.
- Chronicle, January 21, 1909; O. Crewe-Read, Advertiser, March 18, 1927.
- Mail, July 28, 1906, September 2, 1906; G. G. Wood, Far Eastern Review, March, 1920.
- 17. Wood, op. cit.
- Acheson, p. 17. Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Annex VII.
- 19. Hearings, Senate subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, Senate Bill No. 4301 (1921), p. 269.
- 20. Chronicle, July 11, 1918.
- 21. Huggins, Far Eastern Review, July, 1922; Advertiser, October 23, 1925.
- Boucheron, Far Eastern Review, November, 1921; Advertiser, October 23, 1925.
- 23. Wood, op cit.
- 24. Reinsch, p. 159; Sacramento Bee, April 15-18, 1919.
- 25. Wood, op. cit.; Bee, op. cit.
- 26. Official Prospectus of Musen Denshin; Far Eastern Review, June, 1925.
- 27. Far Eastern Review, June, 1925; Chronicle, July 16, 1925, October 29, 1925.
- 28. Far Eastern Review, June, 1924; Advertiser, June 9, 1925, June 10, 1925; October 3, 1925.
- Japan Yearbook (1926), p. 346; Advertiser, March 21,
   1924; Cf. Japan Times, February 3, 1918.
- 30. Far Eastern Review, June, 1925; Chronicle, February 7, 1924, May 8, 1924, June 4, 1924, July 16, 1925, October 29, 1925, July 29, 1926.
- Advertiser, January 30, 1924, April 4, 1924, January 13, 1926, April 9, 1926, July 27, 1926, September 9, 1926; W.
   L. Rogers, Annals, American Academy, March, 1924; Martin, p. 35; Reinsch; Iwanaga in interview.

- 32. R. O. Matheson, in Advertiser, July 17, 1926; Japan Times, June 8, 1926.
- 33. Advertiser, June 2, 1926; August 22-23, 1926, September 5, 1926.
- 34. Karl A. Bickel, Advertiser, January 29, 1924, and April 2, 1927; Miles W. Vaughn, Advertiser, March 24, 1926; Felix Morley, Advertiser, December 12, 1925; Nijuichinichikai, Advertiser, July 13, 1926; Japan Newspaper Association, Advertiser, July 27, 1926, August 13, 16, 1926; editorials in Advertiser, May 16, 1924, June 1, 1924, April 16, 1926, June 2, 1926, August 27, 1926; New York Times, July 6, 1926; Editor and Publisher, July, 1926; Chronicle, February 28, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, July 6, 1926.

### CHAPTER VII

### INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES<sup>1</sup>

The policies pursued by the great international news agencies fitted accurately into Japan's pattern. For purposes of economy and efficiency and to eliminate the old wasteful competition in news-gathering, the world has been divided into geographical and political units, each served by its own particular agency. Thus the Associated Press in the United States, Reuters' in the British Empire, Havas in France, and smaller corporations in the other news fields have reciprocity agreements for exchanging news. And, as the news agencies encouraged the formation of still other branches, as a means of further cheapness and efficiency, the path was clear for Japanese to win control in their own territory.

For many years the Orient was unrepresented in this network of co-operation, but as the cables to the East were chiefly British-owned,<sup>2</sup> the Asiatic news

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Direct quotations in this chapter, unless otherwise credited, are taken from interviews which the writer had with John Russell Kennedy, June 6, 1925, or with Yukichi Iwanaga, January 26, 1925.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The trans-Siberian land wires were, of course, existing, but were more important as a threat of competition and as a potential weapon for compelling the British cable lines to continue in the pool than as an actual engine of news transmission. The items sent

field fell as a fief to Reuter. British commerce and diplomacy were thus, to some extent, advantaged, for the British point of view was always stressed in Eastern ports.

But difficulties were involved in this arrangement. Although as early as 1876 the Reuter agency supplied a service of some 350 words a day to the Japan Mail, the cost of cabling, partly because of the comparative scarcity of co-operating newspapers in Japan and partly because of the excessive cabling charges on the Nagasaki-Shanghai line, was much too burdensome to be endured. The service was, accordingly, abandoned, and from 1877 until 1882 the foreigners in Japan were forced to glean their international news from Shanghai papers sent by post (1).

To remedy this situation the Reuter correspondent in Yokohama resorted to a practice which, with slight modifications, is still followed at small wayports along the Europe-Asiatic sea route. Finding that no paper was willing to buy exclusive rights, he offered a joint news-bulletin for private subscription. This plan was continued for five years (2).

In 1882 the *Mail*, which was then enjoying an improved financial status because of its connections with the administration, arranged again for an exclusive Reuter service, with the privilege of subletting

by telegraph were much more likely to reflect political and diplomatic pressure from the Tsarist court, while the cable was the medium for sending general news and trade communications.

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concessions for the news to non-competing papers. But since the *Mail* was a morning paper, the afternoon gazettes preferred to "lift" its cables, and, by slight recasting of the wording, to republish them as "special cables" to themselves. The *Mail* was therefore left to carry on the service unassisted until, in 1888, the *Official Gazette* agreed to share expenses. Probably the contribution of this paper was in the nature of an administration subsidy. For a few months after the founding of the *Advertiser*, in 1890, this paper also bought a license; but finding that "the possession of exclusive morning publication would not make a difference of ten new subscriptions in a year," refused to continue its participation (3).

Neither the price nor the quality of Reuter news was pleasing to the Japanese. Too much minor information on petty questions of British politics was sent, while more important matter<sup>3</sup> failed to reach Japan. The cost, moreover, was still high, for Yokohama was obliged to pay two shillings a word for British news which Shanghai was getting for but sixpence. The *Mail* proposed that the government reduce the cable charges and accord a special press rate, offering in turn to pledge the papers not to use code messages. The offer was refused by the authorities (4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> E.g., news of the Jameson Raid and of the diplomatic tension between Great Britain and the United States over the Venezuela question; and of the decision of the British to grant a subvention to the Canadian Pacific steamship line for a transpacific service.

When news of the refusal was announced, the *Mail* declared that, under existing circumstances, "no paper in Yokohama not subsidized by the government can afford telegraphic service. It gave up its franchise for exclusive Reuter news (5).

The Mail's defection was replaced by a syndicate of Yokohama business men, organized under the direction of the Japan Gazette and the Japan Herald. The latter papers were thus enabled to print telegrams before they had been published in the Mail; and, since Yokohama time is in advance of Western Europe, the evening papers were able to gain a full day in reporting cable news. But once again the cost was too exorbitant, and the coalition was allowed to lapse (6).

During the greater part of 1897, Japanese papers, both those printed in English and the vernacular journals, had to be content with receiving "essential items" cabled from the Shanghai papers. Experienced "expanders" padded out the skeletonized news, but mistakes were common. The telegrams were so abbreviated as to constitute a sort of code; condensations defied the skill of even highly educated men; and misspellings, together with the total lack of punctuation, made the task of transcribing almost an impossibility. It was with some relief, accordingly, that the Japanese welcomed the signing of a new news-service contract for the Reuter news.

This time the intermediary was the newly found-

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ed Japan Times, organized by Motosada Zumoto, formerly chief translator of the Mail, with the strong support of Prince Ito, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, and the largest shipping firm. For a year and a half the Times continued its monopoly, with Mr. Zumoto's cable service supplying other papers with the news. Then, as a means of lessening expense, the Times invited Jiii to co-operate in the arrangement. This marks the first permanent effort made by Japanese newspapers to participate in a Reuter foreign news service, although the Tokyo Nichi Nichi had shared directly in such an enterprise for a brief period some vears earlier, and although the Official Gazette had for a short time carried on the burden with the Mail. A few weeks later, in June, 1899, the Mail re-entered into Reuter service by taking over an interest in the Jiji-Times arrangement. Soon other papers also ioined, and, since the opening of the century, the foreign news has been received directly from the Reuter offices by all the metropolitan newspapers of Japan (7).

But Reuter service was not wholly satisfactory to the Japanese. As a commercial enterprise, working along a great stretch of cable line, it delivered to Japan only that news for which there was a general demand by all the papers of the chain. Comparatively little effort was expended in collecting Oriental news for distribution to the West, although the more startling news, or items referring to important interna-

tional relations, would be gathered. To those active partisans of Japan who wished the best elements in native culture to be persistently made known to Europe and America, Reuter was a disappointment. In fact, suspicions of a pro-British bias were widely entertained by Japanese.

To counteract the misinterpretation which other nations were believed to hold about Japan, the supplying of abundant favorable information was seen to be important. Reuter was too loath to wire to Europe articles of sound informational content unless some vivid news appeal was inherent in the context. Nor was it reluctant to carry unpleasant messages whose publication patriotic Japanese would have preferred to hinder. By studying the press history of other lands the Japanese were satisfied that the major nations each possessed news agencies, under government control, for filtering the news. Reuter's was believed to be a British foreign-office adjunct; Havas, Wolff, and Stephani were held to be the property of French, German, and Italian bureaucrats; the Associated Press was thought to represent the views of the United States. The conviction was encouraged in Japan that the Island Empire must also own and operate her own news agency.

This view was strengthened by misinterpretation of speeches made in Tokyo by Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, and by Melville E. Stone, of the Associated Press (8). The presence of a highly skilled

news-agency official, known to be friendly to Japan, afforded an excellent opportunity for inaugurating the control of news exported from the Empire.

This man was John Russell Kennedy, the Far-Eastern representative of the Associated Press. Coming to Japan in 1907, after having been for fifteen years assistant to Mr. Stone, Mr. Kennedy had quickly won the friendship of the leading figures in Japanese political and economic life. "I soon became friendly with the leading spirits," Mr. Kennedy told the writer. "Count Tadasu Hayashi, the foreign minister, Henry W. Davidson, the American adviser to the Foreign Office, and Prince Ito were especially friendly. In his very first interview with me, Prince Ito made me his confidant, and I respected his trust. I conceived the idea that the duty of a correspondent was, not to send unpleasant news of petty quarrels, nor of trifling corruptions, but to weld together East and West. There was at the time no other correspondent in Japan, save Captain Brinkley, of the London Times."

Almost from the outset of his service with the Associated Press in Tokyo Mr. Kennedy shared offices with Henry Satoh, the Reuter agent. In fact, as Mr. Kennedy says, Satoh was the second-in-command, for the more important dispatches both to Reuter's and to the Associated Press, according to Mr. Kennedy, were written by the latter correspondent himself. Letters written by Baron Herbert de Reuter reveal the dis-

pleasure of the Reuter agency at this situation. Satoh was replaced as Reuter's correspondent, and Andrew M. Pooley was sent to Japan as his successor. Mr. Pooley was under explicit instruction from de Reuter to sever all connection with the "pushful" Mr. Kennedy, who, according to de Reuter, was actuated by "pure outflow of vanity and the desire to pose before the world as the source of news," and who would, de Reuter said, if given opportunity, "stretch it to his personal profit and aggrandizement" (9).

Nor was the foreign community in Japan entirely pleased with Mr. Kennedy's activities. Suspicions came to be held that Mr. Kennedy was currying favor with the Japanese at the expense of his own compatriots. Certain articles had been printed in the Japan Advertiser accusing foreign holders of perpetual leases with seeking to evade taxes. The manuscript was said to have been in Mr. Kennedy's handwriting, although at the time both he and the Japan Advertiser denied the statement. The Japan Chronicle and the Japan Gazette persisted in reiterating that Mr. Kennedy was the author of "tax-dodging" articles, and the Chronicle challenged Mr. Kennedy to prove his innocence. Sixteen years later, in conversing with the writer, Mr. Kennedy admitted that he had written the editorials, and added that the editor of the Advertiser had himself sent the manuscript to the Chronicle (10).

At a still earlier date Mr. Kennedy had been un-

der journalistic fire because certain dispatches sent from Korea by him were believed to have distorted news in a fashion friendly to Japan but antagonistic to a British journalist. An alleged secret ownership, or at least ability to direct management, of the Japan Advertiser was also resented. Mr. Kennedy had bought the Advertiser soon after arriving in Japan, but because of his connection with the Associated Press he resigned from the Advertiser in April, 1909. The Gazette and the Chronicle continued to insist that he retained control of the paper until after the publication of the "tax-dodger" editorials (11).

Credence was added to rumors that Mr. Kennedy was unduly friendly with Japanese officialdom when, in March, 1911, he was awarded the decoration of Third Class Order of the Sacred Treasure "in consideration of his services since 1907 in conveying accurate information regarding the Far East through the Associated Press and in materially helping to correct false statements in the yellow press. This is a very emphatic mark of favor" (12).

Rumors that Mr. Kennedy was to be withdrawn from Tokyo to become the Associated Press correspondent at St. Petersburg appear to have aroused apprehensions among the Japanese lest the activities of their country be poorly reported thereafter. Intimations had been current among the Japanese that other foreign correspondents were cabling to their

papers information tending to discredit Japan's motives and menacing her stability. Although some of the more important correspondents believed that Mr. Kennedy was responsible for the circulation of these rumors, both Mr. Kennedy and the gentleman to whom he was said to have made the damaging remarks categorically denied the accusation (13).

Mr. Pooley, on the other hand, was known to have sent to Reuter articles unsatisfactory to the Japanese. He had imputed that the Tokyo government was manipulating the gold reserve; he had published in Shanghai the secret memoirs of Count Hayashi, although these memoirs had been censored in Japan and although all copies of the manuscript had supposedly been confiscated. He had made a speech denouncing public men and newspapers for their excitable remarks, and had announced that such remarks would certainly be cabled to the West. And, finally, Mr. Pooley had complained that his dispatches had been consistently "interfered with, suppressed, mutilated, and delayed" (14).

Nor was Mr. Kennedy anxious to leave Japan. Believing that the Empire had no warmer friend and that newcomers for the Associated Press would have to go through the same feeling of race prejudice that he himself had overcome, he feared for the stability of Japanese-American relationships if he were to sever his connection with Japan. When, therefore, he was invited, as he relates, by Count Aisuke Kabaya-

ma, of the Nippon Steel Foundry, and Dr. Eijiro Ono, governor of the Industrial Bank, to organize the Kokusai Tsushin, the national news agency, he willingly accepted.

The financial backing promised for the agency was most impressive. The Nippon Ginko (Bank of Japan), Yokohama Specie Bank, and the Japan Industrial Bank, all semi-official in their status, subscribed to the capital stock. The Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the largest shipping company, and the South Manchuria Railway, both of which are also semi-official, contributed, as did the Mitsubishi and the Mitsui corporations. Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa, organizer and chairman of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, Soichiro Asano, president of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, Seihin Okeda, managing director of Mitsui Bank, and Dr. Juichi Soyeda, president of the Bank of Formosa, and later of the Japan Industrial Bank, were also active in the founding of the agency (15).

Much doubt exists concerning the part played by the government in establishing the Kokusai. The two Osaka papers stated flatly that the Foreign Office was co-operating with the semi-official banks and corporations. The *Mainichi* added that the Korea government general was also lending its official aid. The *Tokyo Jiji*, usually well-informed on matters in the Foreign Office, stated that the share contributed by the government was to be not less than \$\frac{1}{2}\$100,000 (16).

Yukichi Iwanaga, general manager of the Kokusai, and later of the Rengosha, admitted that his agency had been established with a fund contributed by the government, but added that the subsidy was now withdrawn and that the news agency in 1925 was not receiving official contributions. Mr. Kennedy, on the other hand, denies that such money has ever been contributed: "Of the original capital, not a yen came from any government agency," he told the writer. "It was all listed as coming from the pockets of men like Ono, Shibusawa, and the bankers, all of whom could well afford to subscribe the amount. Of course, I cannot guarantee that the money which they put up was entirely their own, but there has never been at any time a dollar of government money given to Kokusai on any pretext. I tell you this on my honor as a gentleman and a journalist."4

With ample capital assured, Mr. Kennedy then proceeded to London and New York, where, by holding out the threat of competition, he induced Reuter's and the Associated Press to withdraw from the Japanese news field. Motives of economy helped also, for, as Mr. Kennedy avers, the Associated Press was spending upwards of \$25,000 yearly to gather news in

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Mr. Kennedy told Baron de Reuter that the government had wished to give money, but that he, Mr. Kennedy, had dissuaded it as likely to jeopardize the Kokusai independence. The government was therefore looking with favor on the enterprise and would give its utmost support in all respects, "except hard cash from the administration, which was not acceptable" (17).

Japan, which Kokusai was willing to supply for less amounts. Baron de Reuter's report on the methods used to persuade the Reuter Agency to leave Japan is vivid and exact: "Mr. Kennedy pointed out that our position must be difficult, if not impossible, seeing that within a brief space the National Agency, by mere force of circumstances, was bound to become the center toward which everything journalistic would naturally gravitate; and, much as our service would be appreciated, it could not hold its own against a direct service from London or New York, made especially for the behoof of the Japanese people" (18).

Reports on the progress of the Reuter negotiations were, Mr. Kennedy remarks, submitted to the Japanese Embassy at London and were transmitted by it, in the diplomatic code, to Viscount Shibusawa. The latter wired back his assent to the terms, and suggested that the contract be submitted to Marquis Katsunosuke Inouye, ambassador to Great Britain, before being finally signed. When the Marquis' consent had been obtained, Mr. Kennedy, although asserting himself to have had "no more authority than

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Mr. Kennedy denies this flatly. "There was no threat of an independent service to Japan, but there was fear that Wolff, the German agency, might compete. If de Reuter wrote that any such threat had been made by me the letters are probably forged. Nor is it true that the Japanese Embassy in London supported me in my negotiations with de Reuter save by lending me the use of its diplomatic code."

a rabbit," signed the agreement for Kokusai Tsushinsha. By this and later contracts, Reuter's, Havas, the Associated Press, Stephani, the Russian agency, and others agreed to exchange news to and from Japan exclusively with the new Kokusai agency.

A curious secrecy veiled the progress of these negotiations. No official statements were given out at the time of signing; in fact, the columns of the Japan Mail, then regarded as the mouthpiece of the syndicate, contained almost no reference to the proceedings. Two days after the contract was signed, Baron de Reuter sent a message to Mr. Pooley urging him not to publish any information, "as the mercantile community and bankers who are contributing to the National Agency wish to remain in the background for the time being; for fear of their connecting therewith being misconstrued as an attempt to create an instrument for their political ends, which is, of course, not the case" (19). The same secrecy also cloaked the arrangements whereby, in April, 1926, the Kokusai was transformed into the Rengo-sha.

Originally the Kokusai agency seems to have been intended as a clearing-house for news both entering and leaving Japan (20). Viscount Shibusawa, and Y. Motono, owner of the *Yomiuri*, impressed the need for sending "truthful" news abroad, and praised the clause in the Reuter-Kokusai contract which gave to Kokusai the right to send exclusive messages to Reu-

ter and the other agencies.<sup>6</sup> The official establishment and registry of Kokusai gave as its purpose the acting as an "intermediary for exchange of news" (21).

But as general manager of the agency, Mr. Kennedy soon realized that Kokusai would certainly be open to attack as a purely propaganda agency if it were actually to export news to other countries. The Jiji. Nichi Nichi, Osaka Asahi, Advertiser, Chronicle, Herald, and Gazette were all opposed to using Kokusai for supplying correspondence to the Western nations (22). A plan was therefore substituted whereby Kokusai was to collect news within Japan, and, after "clarifying and filtering" (to use Mr. Kennedy's own explanation), to deliver the items to resident representatives of both Reuter and the Associated Press. There was to be absolute freedom for the representatives to gain whatever additional information they might desire, and no compulsion upon them to export the news which they did receive. This system relieved Kokusai of responsibility for the actual dispatch of news abroad and allowed ample opportunity for independent audit or extension of the news. It also freed Kokusai, according to both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Iwanaga, of the charge of circulating propaganda in the interests of Japan.

<sup>6</sup> This also is denied by Mr. Kennedy. The belief is common, he says, but is based on a report of the Kokusai inaugural dinner which the *Chronicle* printed, "several weeks after the dinner occurred. It did not seem worth while to deny it at the time." But the same report also appeared in the *Mail* the day after the dinner.

The distinction is, however, a somewhat academic one, since for nearly ten years Mr. Kennedy himself was both general manager of Kokusai and resident representative of Reuter. On January 30, 1914, two days before the Kokusai monopoly was to become effective. Andrew M. Pooley, the Reuter representative, was arrested and imprisoned on a charge of blackmail. Opinions differ as to his guilt or innocence for the case is inextricably bound up with a bribery case involving Japanese naval officers and an armament supply firm—but in any case Mr. Poolev was supplanted as the Reuter correspondent. The task of representing Reuter was allotted to Mr. Kennedy. As the general manager of Kokusai, Mr. Kennedy exported no dispatches, but as the Reuter agent he prepared perhaps three-quarters of the outgoing news. In his capacity as Kokusai general manager, Mr. Kennedy became indignant that "foolish and irresponsible statements persisted in making the Kokusai news agency the correspondent for Reuters. They are scarcely worth denying. Kokusai has never attempted to pose as the correspondent for Reuters. No greater mistake would be made, nor a surer way be found to create distrust and a breach of relations which are now so firmly welded" (23).

Mr. Pooley was arrested on January 30, but news of the arrest or of the so-called Naval Scandal Case in which the Pooley affair was involved was not sent out by Mr. Kennedy until February 3. Meanwhile both

the China Press and the North China Daily News had complained to Reuter's that Japanese news was being deliberately suppressed. Mr. Kennedy replied in a letter stating that no authority to transmit cables had been received by him until February 3: but in another letter, sent to the Public Procurator, Mr. Kennedy admitted that he had been appointed sole representative in Japan for Reuter's on January 31. News of the arrest of Mr. Pooley was even later in reaching London. On January 20 the London Times reported that Mr. Pooley had been named in the Japanese Diet as being implicated in the naval scandal. This was probably sent by Mr. Pooley. On February 3, after the arrest and after Mr. Kennedy had taken over the Reuter agency, a Reuter dispatch to the London Times narrated that politicians were making unsupported charges against Mr. Pooley, "Reuter's correspondent." No mention was made of the arrest, nor was any dispatch received by the *Times* to this effect during the entire month of February. Finally, after Earl Grev had referred, in the British House of Commons. March 17, to his receipt of a dispatch from the British ambassador in Tokyo announcing Mr. Pooley's detention, a Reuter dispatch reported, March 23, the release of Mr. Pooley on bail. It was the first intimation by Reuter cable that he had even been arrested. The dispatch, moreover, continued to refer to Mr. Pooley as "Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo."

Nothing of this affair appears to have been printed in the New York Times (24).

Kokusai's subsequent history indicates an increasing control over the news. Soon after its incorporation in March, 1914, it bought the Japan Times and the Japan Mail. These two papers were merged in 1917. Six years later, in November, 1923, Mr. Kennedy resigned from the managership of the agency. Nominally, he gave as his reason the desire to rest; in reality, he says, he resigned in protest against restrictions imposed upon his power as "absolute autocrat of Kokusai." Moreover, Mr. Kennedy says, he resented the demands of the founders that Kokusai be used for propaganda purposes.

"The original formers of Kokusai understood that the company was intended as a propaganda agency. Nevetheless this policy was not my intention, and so long as I was connected with Kokusai I prevented its being used for any such purpose. The founders were disappointed and would not give any more capital to the company."

On Mr. Kennedy's withdrawal, Yukichi Iwanaga, formerly an official of the South Manchuria Railway and former head of the Imperial Railway Secret Service, was made manager. His previous experience in journalistic work had been a four years' term as "proprietor and editor of a magazine to translate foreign comments both pro- and anti-Japanese." The original Kokusai-Reuter contract, drawn up by Mr. Ken-

nedy, was renewed for another ten-year term, and, as Mr. Iwanaga explained, "the bonds of co-operation between Reuter and Kokusai were drawn still tighter."

Less than thirty months thereafter Kokusai was officially abandoned as a news agency through a reorganization which, in April, 1926, merged Kokusai with the frankly official Tobo Tsushinsha<sup>7</sup> into the Nippon Shimbun Rengo-sha (Japanese Newspapers' Associated Press). The reorganization ostensibly freed the news agencies from suspicion of being dominated by either the government or by the semi-official corporations acting as intermediaries for the government. Kokusai had been headed by Count Aisuke Kabayama, whose Japan Steel Corporation had, since Kokusai was formed, held contracts to supply the navy with armor-plate. Its directors had been Messrs. M. Kuchida, of the Mitsubishi Bank, Masayasu Naruse, of the Jugo Bank, Umekichi Yoneyama, the

<sup>7</sup> Tobo (Eastern News Association) was organized by Akira Ariyoshi, now the Japanese minister to Switzerland, while he was consul-general at Shanghai during the Great War. It was purely a Foreign Office agency, according to Count Michimasu Soyejima, receiving an annual allowance of from \$\frac{2}{2}00,000 to \$\frac{2}{4}00,000\$ for the exchange of news with China and Russia. Among the special privileges which Tobo is believed to have received is the privilege of transmitting news along the Yang-tse River by aid of navy radio equipment installed on Japanese ships. Mr. McClatchy understands, from interviews in China, that Tobo has permitted Chinese papers to register themselves under its protection as Japanese subjects, and thus enjoy extrality rights (26).

president of the Mitsui Trust Company, and Y. Iwanaga. As councilors, the Kokusai retained Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa, Jonnusuke Inouye, former president of the Yokohama Specie Bank and former minister of finance, and Dr. Eijiro Ono, governor of the Industrial Bank. Nearly every man, if not, indeed, all of them, had close connections with official circles. The news of Kokusai was therefore always suspected by foreign newspaper men residing in Japan as tainted by the official points of view.

The Rengo organization dispelled much of this suspicion. Each of eight of the larger newspapers (Hochi, Chugai Shogyo, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Tokyo and Osaka Asahi's, Osaka Mainichi, Kokumin, and Jiii) contributed a representative to the Rengo directorate, together with men appointed from the former Kokusai and Tobo boards. Mr. Iwanaga was retained as managing director, and the former Kokusai staff was retained in its entirety. Rengo was announced to have become a non-profit-making news association intended to eliminate "the unnecessary existing competition between news agencies and newspapers, or between one newspaper and another," to reduce expenditures by co-operative gathering of "certain uniform physical news sent home through a common channel," and to correct the "lack of interest by Japanese in foreign news occasioned by inadequate foreign reports, high press rates, and defects in organization of foreign news agencies" (25).

To guard against misrepresentation by his foreign associates, Mr. Iwanaga has long planned the stationing of Japanese correspondents in the leading news centers. More than a year before the establishment of Rengo, Mr. Iwanaga had told the writer that ten young men were being trained in the Kokusai office for this purpose, in order that "all news which comes to Japan may be seen through the eyes of Japanese." Rengo offered an opportunity to send these men abroad, since part of the Rengo program was to unify, as far as possible, the sending to Japan of special correspondence. Although the Rengo purpose was announced as designed to "preserve the characteristics of each paper as much as possible," the special correspondents of such papers as the eight cooperating journals, it was hoped, could be pooled into the common service of the Rengo papers. The special men in training under Kokusai could then be sent abroad, co-operatively, to territory not already covered by the special correspondents of the Japanese gazettes.

The high ideals voiced by the Rengo founders were, however, somewhat discounted as a result of methods followed at the inauguration of the plan. No intimation of the merger seems to have been released to foreigners until after all the details had been formulated. Indeed, to many foreign residents, the first news of the Rengo did not come until press cablegrams began to bear the Rengo imprint in the place

of Kokusai. The Advertiser printed an announcement, on April 30, that the Rengo had been warmly welcomed by such Americans as Frank B. Noyes and Kent Cooper, of the Associated Press, Vice-President Dawes, and Postmaster-General New, Judge Gary, and Adolph Ochs of the New York Times, but no previous announcement seems to have been printed that a merger was in contemplation (27).8

Nearly a month thereafter special inaugural banquets of the Rengo, held at both Tokyo and Osaka, commemorated the establishment of the new agency. Both banquets were patronized by high officials who praised the Rengo as an "impartial and accurate news service." Premier Wakatsuki complimented the "self-sacrificing spirit of the different newspapers and newsagencies which admirably subordinated their individual interests to the consideration of the common aim (28).

An interview with Mr. Iwanaga indicated that Rengo, like Kokusai, has resolved to concentrate, in conjunction with the radio, postal, and cable admin-

<sup>8</sup> In the United States the only news published on this matter by the *New York Times* or by the *Public Ledger-Evening Post* service, was an Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo on April 27 announcing that a Japanese associated press had been formed. A somewhat more extended cable, but with few more details, was published on the following day. Neither cablegram, however, would seem sufficient to warrant the rather fulsome praise given to the Rengo by the prominent men whose indorsement was cabled to Japan.

istrations, on "clarifying and filtering" the news entering Japan. "We receive skeletonized cables from Reuter's and the Associated Press," Mr. Iwanaga explains, "then we interpret the cablegrams in order to satisfy the needs of our Japanese readers. Fourteen of the larger Tokyo and Osaka papers are directly supplied by us with a daily service, the other newspapers being cared for by the items which we give to the Teikoku agency for distribution. In this way we control 80 per cent of the news entering Japan. We alone are responsible for the selections which we make from the news that Reuter gives us, and for news which we choose to publish."

The relative cheapness of this Rengo service, coupled with the excessive tolls charged for incoming cablegrams, has exercised a restraining influence on the great Japanese newspapers that might prefer to maintain special correspondents in foreign lands. Even when a staff man has been sent abroad, the Reuter-Rengo version is, in many cases, the only information to be cabled to Japan. Under the high cost of cabling, the special representative refrains from duplicating items which the Reuter-Rengo service is certain to dispatch. Under such conditions the strength of Rengo is reinforced and its selection of the news becomes a matter of the utmost concern, for when the great newspapers give the news in only the form in which it comes from Rengo they are made the mouthpieces of the Rengo policy.

Only in a few instances have there been suspicions that either Kokusai or Rengo has deliberately distributed news which it knew to be untrue, and in almost every instance close scrutiny has exonorated the news agency. The operation of the censorship, the working agreements with other news agencies, the invocation of embargoes, and the ability to withhold news received from outside sources obviates the need for mutilating news.

Neither Kokusai nor Rengo has engaged in censoring the news, for, in normal times, at least, most news contains no special bias, and may be handled "straight." But, in emergencies or on special occasions a news agency or a correspondent may easily convey a wrong impression by selection of the facts or of the angle from which the facts are viewed. This practice is much harder to control because perversions, when contained therein, are more insidious. With the passing of the independent correspondent from the larger Japanese newspapers, Rengo is afforded an unexampled opportunity to obscure, to minimize, or completely to suppress opinions which the Rengo staff may wish to damage; and, by keeping certain viewpoints to the fore, may greatly aid the causes which Rengo favors. Its great advantage of initial presentation of the case, and its facilities for placing its dispatches in hundreds of newspapers where the Rengo version will be unquestionably accepted constitute the Rengo the most powerful sin-

gle agency in Japan for stimulating national emotions regarding foreign intercourse. Its latent potentialities for welding Japanese opinion, and the relative ease of governing its policies (through the eight co-operating journals which, so far as foreign matters are concerned, are already responsive to semi-official pressure) are much too important for the official minds to overlook.

Though the name Rengo is now attached to all foreign news published in Japan, the name is never used abroad. The Associated Press and Reuter's print, with their own indorsement, all news arriving from Japan as though it had been specially collected by their agent in the Empire. The foreign reader has no means of sifting out reports gathered independently from those supplied by Rengo for the use of Reuter or Associated Press men. The outer world, as Dr. Walter Williams says, may thereby gain a false conception of conditions in Japan. Dependent for their news upon the maintainence of close relations with official bureaus of the government, neither Reuter's nor the Associated Press is likely to distribute news displeasing to officialdom, and hence depend-

<sup>o</sup> Mr. Herbert Bailey brilliantly outlined the plight of Reuter's in this connection: "In recent years Reuter's has become nothing but a presenter of official news, handing out to the world the views of foreign governments and refusing to handle anything that would endanger its relations with those governments. No one can point to any revelation of the designs and works of foreign governments that would have roused the ire of such governments. In every part of

ence grows upon the distribution of such news as the Rengo may supply. The conclusions of Dean Williams, in his survey of the world-press, apply as well to Rengo as to Kokusai (29): "Kokusai, while ostensibly a business enterprise of certain individuals, is closely affiliated with the Japanese government. It is rather the expression of the news as the Japanese government would wish the world to know it than of the news as it actually happens."

Since Kokusai held, indirectly, a monopoly over the export of news to many foreign countries from February, 1914, until the arrival of a Reuter correspondent in February, 1925,<sup>10</sup> a study of the news that left Japan might throw a valuable light upon Japan's foreign intercourse, and in particular upon Anglo-Japanese relations. The attempt by Mr. Kennedy to represent Mr. Pooley as continuing as Reu-

the world, Reuter's is held in reverence by the foreign offices of all governments as the most agreeable receptacle of what they have to say" (30).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Strictly speaking, of course, Kokusai was not the Reuter correspondent, but Mr. Kennedy was both Reuter correspondent and general manager for Kokusai. On Mr. Kennedy's retirement, in November, 1923, Kokusai employees "filled in" for Reuter until the arrival of a special Reuter correspondent, Captain M. D. Kennedy, in February, 1925. The Reuter service supplies virtually the whole of the British Empire with Oriental news, and the retention of two offices by Mr. Russell Kennedy was of importance to the British Dominions, since his service covered the period of the discussions over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and of the naval base at Singapore.

ter's representative for two months after Mr. Pooley had been replaced by Mr. Kennedy himself is perhaps a minor incident, but one which readily may be identified. Another minor instance of the unreliability of Kokusai service during this long period was the failure to record the arrest of George L. Shaw, a British merchant accused of offending against the internal safety of Japan, until more than a month had elapsed after his arrest (31).

Much more important is a series of dispatches sent out from Tokyo to vindicate Japan from accusations of aggressiveness toward China. Reports that Japan had opened negotiations with China for "Twenty-one Demands" leaked into the European press. Mr. Kennedy immediately telegraphed a denial, purporting to be issued from the Foreign Office, and stating that the information was "absolutely without foundation." Six months later another Reuter message quoted the Foreign Office as indorsing this denial and as accepting it as an official statement. Researches into the Official Gazette, where all official statements are presumably recorded, failed to disclose any such announcements (32).

At the Versailles Peace Conference, Mr. Kennedy, as Kokusai correspondent, again denied attempts by the Japanese to intimidate the Chinese delegates, asserting, as on the occasion of the "Twenty-one Demands," that the accusations were the work of German propagandists (33).

The most notorious inexactitude of Kokusai appeared in 1921, when Lord Northcliffe, then touring the world, sent a dispatch from Hong Kong to the London Times protesting against Japanese duress over Chinese delegates appointed to the Washington Disarmament Conference. A Kokusai-Reuter dispatch, sent from Tokyo a week later, while Lord Northcliffe was in Korea, denied, on Lord Northcliffe's authority, that the Hong Kong dispatch had ever been issued. "No such cable will appear in the London Times," the alleged denial said, "and this is proof that no such cable was sent." The "denial" was flatly repudiated by Lord Northcliffe in the London Times (34).

The last important erroneous cablegram sent out by Kokusai-Reuter under the Kennedy régime concerned the possibility of indemnification by insurance companies for losses suffered in the Tokyo-Yokohama fire and earthquake of 1923. Despite the rather general adoption, after the Messina catastrophe in 1906, of clauses exempting the companies for such disasters, special laws in Japan were thought by some to require insurance underwriters to pay in full. As many of the Japanese companies had re-insured their policies with foreign, and especially with British, companies, the decision concerning the liabilities of insurance companies was a matter of great concern.

The dispatch from Tokyo, therefore, of a Reuter dispatch, soon after the earthquake, stating that the

various Japanese companies had decided to pay the full insurance losses without regard to the protective "earthquake clauses" was construed by some observers as an effort to recoup a portion of the losses from the British underwriters. Later investigation disclosed that no such announcement had ever been authorized by the Japanese authorities, but at no time was the Reuter dispatch contradicted, corrected, or explained by Reuter's Tokyo agent (35).

The questionable accuracy of past news from Reuter in Japan has evidently tended to discredit Japanese items received in foreign lands, and may have been an influential factor in creating that reluctance of the world to receive Japanese news which the Japanese so earnestly resent. Editors in Peking, London, and Calcutta reported to the writer that they distrusted Japanese dispatches, and the London correspondent of the *Osaka Asahi* laid the cause directly at the door of Reuter-Kokusai itself (36).

More recently the Rengo-Reuter service has not been so burdened by attacks. Its bitterest opponents in the past credit it with good intentions, although fearing that it must inevitably be influenced by Japanese official wishes (37). Whether the new policy brought in by Mr. Iwanaga, or the functioning of the semigovernmental Tobo service, or a more complete understanding of the service by its quondam critics is responsible for the increased confidence cannot now be ascertained.

The service rendered by Rengo in exchanging British, French, Italian, American, and other news for items about Japan is supplemented by the Nippon Dempo Tsushin (Japan Telegraph News Agency), which was established in July, 1901, "as a means for correcting the considerable disadvantages which Japan was suffering as a result of foreign control over the news imported and exported by Japan (38).

For a time the Nippon Dempo was distributor for the Reuter news among the Japanese vernacular newspapers, but in 1907 it linked itself with the American United Press under an agreement very similar to that concluded later between Kokusai and Reuter's. Most of the Transpacific news now received by Nippon Dempo arrives by mail, because of the high cost of cable and radio charges, and the Nippon Dempo has accordingly been among the leading advocates for reduced cable rates. In 1919 Nippon Dempo brought to Japan the messages sent out by the Central News, of London, and also introduced the Transocean wireless news from Nauen, although the latter is now distributed by Teikoku Tsushinsha (Imperial News Agency). Nippon Dempo has been a pioneer in making alliances for Latin-America, South Sea Island, and French news, having subscribed in 1923 to the Pertinax service of l'Echo de Paris, and in 1925 to l'Agence Radiotelegraphique de Indo-Chine et du Pacifique. It inaugurated a Moscow service in

1923, and has been active in a photographic exchange for Japanese newspapers (39).

Newspaper men regard Nippon Dempo as a semiofficial agency, alleging that it receives a subsidy of \(\frac{2}{3}\),000 a month (40). Its prestige was badly shaken when, in 1925, it misrepresented Ambassador Kopp, the newly arriving Soviet envoy, as announcing his intention to spread communist propaganda in Japan, but that the agency is highly regarded by the government was evident by the gift from the Emperor to Hoshio Mitsunaga, president of Nippon Dempo, of a gold cup in recognition of the news agency's contributions to the nation (41).

In August, 1926, however, Nippon Dempo, through S. Oikawa, filed formal complaints with the press commission of the League of Nations, alleging that discrimination had been shown "in certain countries" against independent news agencies in favor of the "official agencies." At Nippon Dempo's suggestion the commission adopted resolutions favoring equality of treatment. The Nippon Dempo complaint was specifically applied to Japan by an editorial in the Japan Advertiser (42).

Prior to its amalgamation with Kokusai to form the Rengo agency, Tobo was regarded as a propaganda news bureau for influencing Chinese factions. Its unreliability and its possibly harmful operations were evident in February, 1926, when it sent out from Swatow a canard that the entire Chinese legation staff

at Moscow had been arrested, and again, somewhat later, when the Tobo correspondents, then included in the Rengo ranks, were charged with having distributed to the Chinese papers propaganda favoring the Manchu faction in a Chinese civil war. In June, 1925, Tobo was permitted by the government to radiocast a 200-word daily summary of Far Eastern news from the navy wireless station at Iwaki (43).

Smaller agencies include Teikoku Tsushinsha (founded in 1894 by a merger of Fukuzawa's Jiji Tsushinsha, 1887, and the Shimbun Yotatsu Kaisha, Fumio Yano's advertising agency, 1889); Tokyo Tsushin, founded in 1890 as a bureaucratic organ for the late Prince Kiyoura; and the Jiyu Tsushin (Liberal News), founded by Toru Hoshi, former minister to the United States and minister of communications, in 1896, as an adjunct to his Japanese "Tammany Hall." The Jiyu is now controlled by Keisuke Mochizuki, minister of communications in 1927 (44).

#### NOTES

- 1. Cf. files of Japan Mail for 1876, January 20, 1877.
- 2. Mail, January 18, 1896.
- 3. Mail, January 18, 1896, February 8, 1896.
- 4. Mail, February 27, 1897.
- 5. Ibid.
- 6. Mail, February 14, 28, 1896, February 27, 1897.
- 7. Mail, February 28, 1896, June 17, 1899, July 1, 1899.

- 8. Mail, November 18, 1911, November 22, 1913; Japan Times, October 4, 1914.
- Letters, filed in Tokyo District Court. De Reuter to G. Blundell, dated September 29, 1911; De Reuter to Pooley, dated September 8, 1912, November 30, 1912, January 18, 1913; Pooley to De Reuter, dated November 5, 1912, November 7, 1912; F. W. Dickinson to Pooley, dated June 25, 1912.
- Advertiser, August 3, 4, 7, 10, 1909. Japan Gazette, August 11, 1909; Japan Chronicle, July 15, 1909; August 9-11, 1909, September 16, 1909.
- 11. Chronicle, op. cit. See also Chronicle, September 21, 1911.
- 12. Mail, March 4, 1911.
- Advertiser, March 4, 1911; Chronicle, April 24, 1913;
   Honda, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, March, 1916.
- 14. Mail, May 3, 1913; Japan Gazette, December 20, 1913; Advertiser, December 20, 1913; Frankfurter Zeitung, February 13, 1914.
- 15. Bulletin, Teikoku Koshinjo (Imperial Credit Bureau); Jiyu Tsushin Bulletin, January 21, 1914; Chronicle, June 19, 1913, August 28, 1913, January 15, 1914.
- 16. Quoted in *Chronicle*, August 17, 1913, September 11, 1913, January 15, 1914.
- 17. Letter, De Reuter to Pooley, dated November 26, 1913.
- 18. Ibid.
- 19. Letter, De Reuter to Pooley, dated November 28, 1913.
- 20. Mail, February 21, 1914, April 11, 1914; Honda, Nihonoyobi-Nihonjin, March, 1916; Letter, Kennedy to North China Daily News, reprinted in Mail, March 7, 1914.
- 21. Mail (daily edition) April 3, 1914; Chronicle, April 9, 1914. For registry, see Mail, April 4, 1914.
- 22. Japan Gazette, December 20, 1923; Mail, February 21, 25, 1914; Hansen.

- 23. Kokusai circulars, issued December, 1918, October, 1920, November, 1923. For the Pooley case, see Mail, July 18, 23, 1914; Gazette, December 20, 1913; Advertiser, December 20, 1913; Frankfurter Zeitung, February 13, 1914; Hansen; Chronicle, December 19, 1913, January 1, 1914, July 23, 1914.
- 24. Letter, Kennedy to North China Daily News, reprinted in Mail, March 7, 1914, and again July 18, 1914; Letter, Kennedy to N. Ohara, public procurator, dated June 23, 1914.
- 25. Advertiser, May 18, 1926.
- 26. Diplomatic Review, March, 1925; Advertiser, June 10, 1925.
- 27. Advertiser, April 30, 1926.
- 28. Advertiser, May 18, 1926; Chronicle, June 3, 1926.
- 29. Williams, p. 35; Honda, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, March, 1916; Martin, p. 33.
- 30. London Nation and Athenaeum, December 8, 1923.
- Proceedings, British House of Commons, August 16, 1920;
   London Times, August 9, 1920.
- 32. London Times and New York Times, January 29, 31, 1915; London Times, June 11, 1915; See also London Times, October 25, 1915; Japan Chronicle, November 4, 1915.
- 33. Advertiser, January 12, 14, 1919.
- London Times, October 29, 1921, April 19, 1922; North China Daily News, October 29, 1921, November 5, 1921.
- 35. London Times, September 14, 1923.
- 36. Osaka Asahi, April 24, 1919.
- 37. Letter, V. S. McClatchy to the writer, dated October, 1925; Chronicle, November 19, 1925, June 24, 1926.
- 38. Mitsunaga, in Advertiser, November 12, 1925.
- 30. Suyeo Nakano, Advertiser, April 8, 1924.

- Hanazono, p. 81; Wilfred Fleisher, in New York Times, May 31, 1925.
- 41. New York Times, April 24, 1925, May 31, 1925.
- 42. Advertiser, August 21, 22, 24, 1926.
- 43. Diplomatic Review, March, 1925; Advertiser, June 10, 1925; McClatchy, Germany of Asia, article 4.
- 44. Mail, June 27, 1896.

#### CHAPTER VIII

#### CORRECTING MISCONCEPTIONS

For many years Japan has concentrated upon prevention methods for checking the creation of unfortunate impressions regarding her political and social life. At home the negative device of censorship and news embargo is considered as effective, but considerable confusion has arisen in the effort to produce abroad the favorable opinion which the Japanese so much desire.

Many Japanese quite honestly regret that in the spreading of the truth about Japan the government has always been unduly laggard. "The best side of Japan is still invisible to foreign eyes," the Japan Mail wrote in 1913. "It is sincerely to be hoped that every citizen will do what he can to make the nature and the fine achievements of Japanese civilization better known, especially to the English-speaking peoples" (1).

Publicly this method of "inspiring" pleasant feelings is referred to as "giving accurate information of Japanese life and civilization"; but hostile foreign critics brand it propaganda (2). Despite the frequency with which waves of remarkable editorial unanimity sweep over the vernacular gazettes, there

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is no reason to suspect a deliberate attempt to dictate to the press by other methods than "advice" or conference decisions, but crude efforts to distribute government opinions through the press were frequent in the early days of journalism in Japan. The Western editors residing in Japan have not yet freed themselves from early complexes which were then established.

A smoother technique was perfected during the Russo-Japanese War, when, by the aid of Motosada Zumoto, the Foreign Office distributed daily bulletins containing official information to war correspondents who were kept immobilized in Japan. So effective were these *communiques*, Mr. Zumoto told the writer, that in several instances British and American newspapers recalled their correspondents rather than pay unnecessarily for additional private information that could not be secured.

The successful operation of this plan, together with the example set by Russian propaganda systems at the Portsmouth Peace Conference, induced Count Tadasu Hayashi, former minister to China and Great Britain, and former foreign minister, to set up a succession of press bureaus to furnish news on diplomatic topics. By 1920, through the efforts of Count Michimasu Soyejima, these were united into a Johobu (Intelligence Bureau) in the Foreign Office modeled largely on the plan of the pre-war German press bureau. Its purpose, as stated by Count Yasuya Uchida,

foreign minister at its inception, was to collect and to disseminate intelligence of a diplomatic character and to correct mistaken reports concerning Japan. Baron Kijuro Shidehara, foreign minister (1924-1927) hints at additional activities which are not detailed (3). Inquiry at a government department presumably well qualified to answer failed to elicit more specific information, but an approved statement was furnished to the writer; "The Bureau is engaged in (a) the collection and classification of information from foreign countries, and in its distribution to interested bureaus; (b) arranging for lectures on foreign relations in universities, schools, and in public and private associations; and (c) the giving out of news, either through the issue of occasional important official statements or through interviews with press correspondents who raise particular questions relating to the subject," etc.

Observers of its policies consider that the Johobu employs its ability to supply or to withhold verified international news as a weapon for the control of Japanese newspapers and of foreign correspondents. Journalists who show a willingness to mirror its opinions may from time to time be offered tidbits of exclusive news that will enhance their journalistic reputations, and may even, it is hinted, be permitted to participate in the distribution of whatever secret service funds the Johobu may enjoy. Newspaper men

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who do not thus co-operate may find grave difficulty in securing official information, lose what Mr. Hedges terms their best source of news, and may thus lose prestige with their subscribers. Together with the censorship, this news monopoly becomes an influential factor in rendering the press virtually semi-official.

Even though Johobu news is totally unbiased and quite free from propaganda, it suffers from suspicion as coming from an interested source. The more intense the effort to secure monopoly of news of international interest, the more the news will be distrusted as presenting half-truths only, as suppressing the less desirable aspects of a situation, or as freely colored. The Johobu has not succeeded in escaping such suspicion, and both the large Asahi papers have registered complaints against it as an inefficient agent. Count Sovejima, its sponsor, also has attacked the Johobu, alleging that it has confined itself to the publication of inferior news magazines<sup>1</sup> filled with stale and superficial information, and that it has wasted no less than \(\frac{1}{2}\).500.000 a vear in subsidizing foreign journals and in supporting the Tobo news agency for propaganda in China and in Russia. At times, according to Count Sovejima, the expenses of the Johobu

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> These bulletins are the Gaiji Iko (Foreign Intelligence), Shina-Jiho (China Review), and Rokoku Geppo (Russian Reports). Less than 500 copies are circulated.

have gone as high as twice that sum for propaganda purposes alone (4).<sup>2</sup>

Since, therefore, the Johobu has failed to popularize Japan's policies or to clarify them even to the satisfaction of the Japanese, the tendency appears to replace the bureau by a series of formal weekly conferences with newspaper men, and to rely once more on personal relationships, news-distributing agencies, and on the retention of selected spokesmen "whose names assure fair treatment." Baron Shidehara, speaking in the House of Peers, declared that the Japanese administration recognizes that propaganda has proved ineffective for promoting good, and that no open effort will be made to spread it in the guise of news (5).

Newspaper ownership and official "inspiration" are not, of course, the only vents whereby expressions favoring Japan may find their way to other

<sup>a</sup> According to authoritative statements of the highest credence, no English-language paper in Japan receives a subsidy. The same authority declines to place itself on record concerning the vernacular press, or concerning English-language papers in China or the United States. The statement that English papers in Japan are without subvention must be construed literally, since neither the Seoul Press of Korea, nor the Manchuria Daily News of Dairen denies that it receives subsidies from either official or semi-official treasuries. So far as the vernacular press is concerned, a preliminary statement, approved by a cabinet minister, told the writer that two journals were regarded as having semi-official status. A second letter, on the following day, corrected the first statement by declaring that this status was merely a political contingency subject to change with shiftings in factional alignments.

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peoples. To afford a different approach to wholly different classes other instruments may be employed.

Official hospitality has been remarkably developed as a means for helping to produce the favorable impression which the Japanese desire. Distinguished visitors, eminent in any field, are warmly welcomed and are fêted bountifully. Strict attention to their peculiar needs, a readiness to please them and to introduce them to places or to men whom the visitors may wish to meet, and the provision of skilled couriers and guides kindle in the guest a warmer feeling toward the Japanese and function toward a better understanding between the East and West. Sight-seeing programs are carefully compiled and most punctiliously executed, but independent investigation is not encouraged. Foreign residents, in fact, believe that the official entertainments are purposely prolonged in order to prevent unauthorized research.

Lord Northcliffe's visit to Japan in 1921 affords an excellent example of the care devoted to distinguished visitors. From the moment of arrival in Japan he was attended by Masujiro Honda, who escorted him throughout Korea and Japan and who acted, Dr. Honda later said, as Lord Northcliffe's source of information on Japanese political activities. Dr. Honda's apparent detachment from daily journalism lent an air of independence to his attitude and accentuated his disinterested views, although, as Dr.

Honda wrote, he was "somehow officially connected with the Foreign Office" (6).3

The writings of the native press throughout the period of Northcliffe's visit reveal curious concurrent circumstances. The Great War had led him to oppose the continuing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and Lord Northcliffe was regarded as anti-Japanese because of his criticisms of the Japanese attitude toward China. On his arrival a sudden outburst of news appeared, of just the type likely to persuade a foreigner that Japan was facing problems that only a strong mind could master. Koreans, Russians, Chinese, and Socialists were featured glaringly as plotting against the welfare of the nation. It is reasonable to suppose that Dr. Honda did not permit them to escape Lord Northcliffe's notice (7).

One duty of Japanese diplomatic representatives is in correcting news reports which give a violently distorted picture of Japan. In such a duty, the *Yorod*-

<sup>3</sup> Joseph I. C. Clarke tells glowingly how Dr. Honda and Mr. Zumoto painstakingly and carefully mapped out every detail of a three months' sight-seeing trip in Korea and Japan in order that Mr. Clarke might meet the "highest and lowest in official life" to secure material for a volume on Japan at First Hand. The trip was originally suggested, Mr. Clarke reveals, by Dr. Juichi Takamine, whose "letters worked miracles" in opening up opportunities for interviews (8).

<sup>4</sup> Three bandit raids, a rebel plot, a murder, and attempted arson were accredited to the Koreans. The Chinese were accused of banditry and murder, the Russians of kidnapping, and the Socialists of a riot and a plot.

zu intimated, strict veracity is not a prime consideration. "Not only should ambassadors and ministers challenge and refute every allegation contrary to the interests of their country, but competent persons should also be stationed abroad to supplement the efforts of these officials in this line." As long as half a century ago, the Japan Mail was impelled to criticize the unthinking zeal of some officials for spreading baseless "news" concerning a rebellion in the southern island of Japan. "Telegrams conveying an entirely false impression have been forwarded to Japanese legations throughout the world to be circulated abroad," the Mail disclosed (9).

If, therefore, an article severely criticizing Japanese interests appears in English or American newspapers, it is not uncommon for immediate denials to be written either by the Japanese diplomatic representatives or by such officially independent spokesmen as Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, Dr. Toyohiko Iyenaga, Chuge Ohira, Tokio Yokio, Gonnosuke Komai, or Kinnosuke Adachi. None of these men are enrolled upon the roster of the embassy nor of the For-

<sup>6</sup> In his *Manchuria: A Survey*, published 1925, and in his other recent writings, Mr. Adachi has, curiously, adopted a Japanese practice rather than his former Westernized custom. His name is now reversed, and his writings are accredited to, and sometimes copyrighted by, "Adachi Kinnosuke." This is, of course, Japanese, but may cause confusion by leading some unwary student to suspect a "Mr. Adachi" and a "Mr. Kinnosuke" as both writing books.

eign Office, but they have been assiduous in correcting misconceptions that affect Japan adversely.

The advantages of such a system are profound. As these representatives of independent Japanese public opinion have no official connection with the government, their speeches and their letters to the press serve as ballons d'essai to test out foreign reactions before Japan is definitely committed to any course of action. If their statements are well received, Japan will profit, for a good impression will have been secured. But, if in attempting to refute an anti-Japanism, or to sound out sentiment, the publicist has stirred up an undesired reaction, or has misstated facts, no embarrassment need be entertained by the officials, since these men hold no official status and represent no view other than their own.

The plan of stationing public men at strategic points in foreign lands is probably an adaptation and improvement of an old-time Chinese custom whereby influential foreign correspondents in Peking were sometimes retained as "advisers" to government departments. Their task was not so much to give information to their chiefs as to assure the Chinese that the proper kind of news was being sent to their home papers. Japan had herself experimented with the plan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Some of these men are now retired, some have returned to Japan, and others have died. The personnel is under constant change; but these men, together with the late Dr. Juichi Takamine, have been the most prolific spokesmen.

when she retained Captain Brinkley, of the *Mail*, as shipping expert for the Nippon Yusen Kaisha; but when the better foreign journals and the large news agencies forbade their correspondents from engaging in dual service, Japan revised her methods. As early as 1904 she arranged to send out representatives to plead her cause in Western Europe and America, and the system was still more developed within recent years.<sup>7</sup>

The testimony of distinguished Japanese or of independent residents familiar with Japan, or an official embassy denial possesses sufficient news value to secure its instant publication as a "follow-up" to the article which evoked response, and any of these answers carries with it enough authority to check the bad impression of the original attack. If the denial refers to items originating in Japan, there is but little likelihood, at the existing cable rates or radio tolls,

<sup>7</sup> Viscount Suyematsu visited Great Britain during the Russo-Japanese War, while Viscount Kentaro Kaneko, former Cabinet member and privy councilor, was sent to the United States, together with Dr. Masujiro Honda. Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, then the director of the Communications Bureau, was "dispatched to San Francisco in connection with the anti-Japanese riots in 1907," according to the semi-official Japan Year Book, 1926. In 1908 Ishii was made vice-minister of foreign affairs. In 1913, Dr. Juichi Soyeda, former vice-minister of finance and first president of the Japan Industrial Bank and of the Bank of Formosa, was sent to the United States "in connection with the anti-immigration agitation." Mr. Zumoto twice visited the United States as aide to Viscount Shibusawa, 1915 and 1921. Dr. Shogoro Washio, of the Advertiser, was sent to Europe in 1919, with Viscount Goto (10).

that it will be refuted by rebuttal, unless the item is of the very first rank of importance. Libels unfavorable to Japanese interests may safely be discredited in London or New York in the assurity that several weeks must necessarily elapse before corroboration can be found.<sup>8</sup> By this time the news will have grown so "cold" that there is little value in reviving a subject stale and minor in importance. In consequence, unfriendly correspondence from Japan not already rectified by wire or radio may readily be counteracted.

The practice proves most convenient whenever small matters are to be corrected, but on occasion reports of the utmost magnitude may be so treated. A recent instance is that in which Mr. Iyemasu Tokugawa, first secretary to the London embassy, denied reports concerning post-earthquake massacres of Korean residents of Tokyo. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian Mr. Tokugawa denied that Koreans had been murdered wantonly, and then proceeded to relate, "according to official information reaching this Embassy," the gist of the rumors of Korean atrocities circulated during the earthquake panic period. Arson, rape, and murder<sup>9</sup> committed against innocent

<sup>8</sup> The fastest service between Yokohama and London requires forty days by sea, and sixteen days, if all connections are made perfectly, by land. The swiftest transpacific steamer requires nine days for transit.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> These charges were repeated by K. K. Kawakami in the New York Times Current History, and by Roderick O. Matheson, of the

Japanese were laid at the door of Korean revolutionists (11).

A more effective ally of Japan is the type best represented by Rev. Sidney L. Gulick, a former missionary and a former teacher in the Doshisha, a mission university of Kyoto. Dr. Gulick's tendencies are conservative and his hopes are centered on advancing Japan through the development of education and religion. Both movements, he believes, are flourishing and both hold ample promise of service to international good will, but only if the present peaceful trend of Japanese officialdom shall be continued. To prevent the halting of this progress, Dr. Gulick feels that American activities which irritate the Japanese should certainly be modified, even at the cost of sacrificing minor prejudices in the United States. He is well aware of certain weaknesses in the Japanese charac-

Japan Times, in McClures. As the Japanese government had placed embargoes upon all cable references to the Korean rumors and had not lifted the restrictions until after Mr. Tokugawa and Mr. Kawakami had printed their replies, it would appear as though the government had disregarded its own censorship by sending out the news to embassies (12). How Mr. Kawakami gleaned his information is not clear. The massacres occurred in the early days of September, and Mr. Kawakami's article must have gone to press not later than the middle of the month. No letters could have reached him; and while, as correspondent for the Osaka Mainichi, he may have received a private cablegram in violation of the censorship, the similarity of his article to that of Mr. Tokugawa's invites invidious conjecture.

ter, 10 and has thoroughly expounded their social, psychological, and economic background in his *Evolution* of the Japanese; but his penchant for the Japanese is strong. His efforts for a better understanding of the American-Japanese relations cannot be too highly praised.

Two peace societies have also been established for the purpose of promoting friendship between the Japanese and Occidentals. Both were begun in 1911, the American Peace Society in Japan planning to persuade the United States of her injustice, while the Japan Peace Society was to work for the encouragement of Japan's faith in America's good will. In the search for effective aid in carrying out their purposes both sides sought support in official circles, Marquis Okuma becoming president of the latter body.<sup>11</sup>

Neither group has proved effective. No record can be found of any protests filed by the Japan Peace Society against antiforeign agitation in Japan; nor has it deprecated the "Twenty-One Demands" on China which its own president dispatched. No official

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In his White Peril (1905), Dr. Gulick intimated that Japanese lapses from the moral code were due to white example.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Baron Sakatani, former finance minister, was vice-president, and later headed the Society. Other directors were Yukio Ozaki; Dr. Masaharu Anezaki, of Tokyo Imperial University and former exchange professor at Harvard; Saburo Shimada, speaker of the House of Representatives and editor of the *Tokyo Mainichi*; Gilbert Bowles, missionary, since 1901, from the Society of Friends; and J. Russell Kennedy.

action was begun by it for armament reduction by the Japanese. The Far East, indeed, declared in 1915 that the Society was nothing but "a heavily subsidized government movement to allay American fear of Japan." One constructive measure alone appears to its credit. In 1919 the Japan Peace Society sent a committee to Korea to investigate alleged atrocities said to have been committed by the Japanese. Its report condemned the Japanese government-general as incompetent, and urged that more attention be paid to the observance of old Korean customs. It protested against teaching the Koreans of the mythological military exploits of the Japanese Empress Jingo against Korea. On the other hand, the report ascribed, as the cause of Korean unrest against Japanese rule, "misunderstanding of the spirit in which Korea had been annexed" (13).

The American Peace Society in Japan, led by Gilbert Bowles and J. Russell Kennedy, has held more closely to the purpose of its foundation. It has sedulously cultivated the belief that immigration laws, California land legislation, and the like were the work of political agitators, and that such injustices were not to be construed as the measured judgment of the masses of right-thinking Americans. It has held forth the hope that repeal of discriminatory legislation may be looked for as soon as Americans appreciated how they were being misled by selfish dema-

gogues. Protests and memorials to Congress have supplemented the work of this society in Japan.

Both groups are now virtually merged into the Japan League of Nations Association, under the guidance of Viscount Shibusawa and of Prince Ivesato Tokugawa.<sup>12</sup> The independent enterprises of the Peace Society now center in a Student Association and a Women's Peace Society, which constitute the channels whereby the Youth Movement and the feminist ideas are imported to Japan. One of the most helpful functions of the women's association, as stated by its leaders, is the holding of teas, receptions. and other entertainment for tourists arriving in Japan in order that the true nature of Japanese home life may be visible to the outside world. Another activity. conducted by the students and by the Peace Society, is the arrangement of speaking tours for Western liberals of the type of Bertrand Russell, Harry F. Ward, and Henry Hodgkin.

Little progress is, however, being made. Not only do the peace preservation laws and other legislation effectively forbid active democratic or liberal propaganda, but, in the words of Gilbert Bowles, the exclusion law has made the task impossible. "At present we are virtually standing still, and are unable to foresee an immediate advance." "For counteracting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> A minority of the Japan Peace Society, led by Dr. D. Tagawa, protested against this merger fearing lest the Society would completely lose its identity and destroy its influence.

the suspicion of Japan born of ignorance and of false information disseminated in America by agencies hostile to Japan," the Japan Society of New York was begun in 1907.18 According to its membership leaflets, the principal activities of this association have been the giving of receptions, luncheons, and dinners to distinguished Japanese, the arrangement of lectures, art exhibitions, and the promotion of trade relations. Special editions of newspapers, magazines. and books devoted to the interests of Japan have been distributed among its members. In short, the theory of Japan societies in New York, London, Boston, and elsewhere is very similar to the motive of the New York Evening Post in issuing a "Japan Supplement" as "an undertaking of good will and mutual interpretation." With the enthusiastic co-operation of American and British leaders, "a more accurate knowledge of the people of Japan, their aims, ideals, arts, sciences, industries, and economic conditions" has been diligently spread.

Lindsay Russell, the founder of the New York branch, may be numbered among the most ardent pro-Japanese publicists. Visiting the Orient in 1911, he delivered speeches warmly praising Japan's administration of Korea and Manchuria, disavowing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> This bugbear of an organized opposition to Japan constantly appears in the speeches and the writings of the pro-Japanese. To its machinations are credited all criticisms of whatever sort which are distasteful to Japan.

American ambitions in those regions, and urging the Japanese to proclaim an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Six years later he revisited the East, received the Second Class Order of the Sacred Treasure from the Emperor, and made a series of addresses justifying Japan's activities in China (14).

At Tokyo he characterized China as "bankrupt politically, morally, and financially." He recommended that it should be placed under the receivership of Japan, "the most high-minded, competent, and unselfish nation interested in China." Americans were reminded that "the United States has small interests." in China, and in the face of Japanese competition can never hope to be bigger." In consequence of his remarks the American Association of North China cabled to the American Asiatic Society a public protest that the Russell speech was "unjust, untrue, and contrary to the Open Door." It also asked the Japan Society to disavow its president's remarks, but no action was taken by the latter group. Mr. Russell, however, made a statement that he had not intended to imply that China was insolvent, and that his speech had been intended as constructive criticism.

His comments on Manchuria have also called forth strong dissent, particularly on account of his too narrow delineation of the Japanese possessions. "This small Gibraltar section which Japan cannot afford to see in hostile hands while China is unable to

hold or defend it, in which is located some three or four hundred miles of the roadbed of the South Manchuria Railway (with some twenty feet on either side of the rails), constitutes geographically all Japan's leased rights in Manchuria," Mr. Russell told the New York Evening Post (15).

Official publications of the railroad admit, however, to some seven hundred miles of company lines, while in addition the sites of railway stations "have, in most cases, sufficiently extensive tracts of land to lay out towns therein." Mr. Russell's estimates would limit the company to less than 4 square miles of land, although the company took over 69 square miles in 1907 and added nearly twice as much additionally prior to the appearance of Mr. Russell's article (16).

Mr. Russell furthermore implied that pro-German interests were coloring the news sent from Peking in order to embroil Japan with the United States, with Great Britain, and with China. These charges had already been refuted, a year earlier, by G. Bron-

<sup>14</sup> The land held at Mukden, for example, is about two miles long and a mile and a half in width. Changchun is almost as large. To this must be added, as part of Japan's leased rights, the entire territory of Liaotung, some hundred miles in length and twenty miles in width. Nothing was said in Mr. Russell's article about the 108,300 Chinese governed by the railway, nor of the railway guards, who give the right-of-way the appearance of an army of occupation.

son Rea in answering a supposed speech by Rev. Sidney G. Gulick (17).15

Mr. Russell's interpretation of the origin of anti-Japanese news was later modified. "Japan has been made a storm center," he said, "because American soldiers in the Philippines see red every waking hour, because missionaries in the Orient regard Japan as 'Peck's Bad Boy.' and because of the presence of two [sic] nations in China." He still remained convinced that Japan has done but little to place her story before the world. "Let a libel be published against England, France, Russia, or Germany, and at once, from a thousand throats, there spring denials and a statement of the facts. But one may publish any misstatement or canard against Japan with comparative impunity. In the United States there are only a few Japanese who can or will write effectively in defense of Japan. Their instinctive reserve handicaps them. Bushido, the old Samurai spirit of silence under attack, restrains them" (18).

By one means or another these agencies assure the Empire that pro-Japanese opinions will find the readiest acceptance overseas. Complete control by Japanese officials over the quicker means of interna-

<sup>15</sup> "With one exception," said Mr. Rea, "the newspaper correspondents at Peking are most loyal and patriotic Britons. The exception is the American correspondent of the Associated Press who is married to an English girl. Can we imagine these men filing into the compound of the German Legation in Peking and taking their instructions?"

tional news transmissions guarantees the initial presentation of the news in a light most favoring the Japanese desires. Western minds have been prepared to accept the Japanese interpretation by the constant reassurances of press supplements, unofficial spokesmen. and Japan societies. Tourist visitors, fresh from escorted trips to gardens, temples, and Noh dances, bear testimony of the cultured life and peaceful aims which thinking Japanese enjoy. Peace-promotion groups, intent upon elimination of the cruder forms of anti-Japanism, voice a sentimental hope that nothing further will be done to vex the Japanese, and, in order to allay the interracial hatred, make little mention of the rising antiforeign tide or of the antimissionary feeling in Japan. Because of their conviction that Japan receives an unjust treatment from the West, earnest publicists associated with such groups have welcomed all suggestions of her probity with an uncritical acceptance which might not be granted always to similar American assurances.16 As representative of an unreasoning superfriendship such support is equally as dangerous to proper understanding between the East and West as is the unjustifiable and irrational suspicion which both East and West abhor. Both the soft sentimentalist and the jingo hater are similarly blind and ignorant, but the Japanese have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> It is largely for their ears that the myth has been invented of a doughty, clever, Nippon achieving in a summer's afternoon all that Western Europe has taken centuries to learn to do.

been alert to use them both, the one as a recipient of soothing unction, and the other as a final proof of her continued need for militaristic and undemocratic rule.

No independent source of news is now available wherewith to check the accuracy of news items from Japan. Diplomats are silenced by the requirements of their duty. Business men are either reluctant, as the Japan Times complains (19), to issue statements for fear of injuring their sales, or, more often, lack the necessary training in dispassionate scholarship. The missionary group, remembering its arrests and persecution by the Japanese in recent years, and fearful lest the present antimissionary movement may result in overturning all its life-work, is hesitant to jeopardize its future by making public comment on disputed points of politics. A tiny group of foreign correspondents accredited by leading British and American newspapers affords the only avenue for truthful comment on Japan.

But foreign correspondents also have been brought within the circle of official "inspiration." An International Press Association, founded in 1909 by Motosada Zumoto, 17 exerts a quiet pressure which few correspondents are able to withstand. Promoted with the objects of protecting the public "from un-

<sup>17</sup> An International Association of Journalists had been in existence since 1898 (23). For both groups bureaucratic assistance has been granted. Prince Ito, Marquis Okuma, Prince Katsura, Premier Wakatsuki, and other officials have been enthusiastic patrons, but the granting of government aid has always been denied.

scrupulous newspapermen who misrepresent Japan" and of endeavoring "to improve the standards of correspondence from Japan to outside journals," this Association, acting with official approbation, has become a clearing-house for news (20). Since nearly all the correspondents are unlearned in the language, news for export may be properly recast before it is presented to them for dispatch abroad. Its potential power to withhold news from those correspondents who are judged "unscrupulous" is a factor in securing a uniformity of correspondence which will be satisfactory to the authorities.

Nor is it possible for correspondents to evade the services of this Association. Registration with the Press Association is essential, for unless the correspondent is enrolled with this official agency his messages are particularly vulnerable to denials by defenders of Japan. Such free-lance correspondents may be classified abroad as men of no importance, and their dispatches may be discredited as of slight reliability, for reference to the membership rolls of the Association will disclose that the writers are presumably of no consequence in Tokyo. There is indication to suggest that this mode of disparaging unpleasant news about Japan has been resorted to by attachés of at least one embassy (21).

Recalcitrant correspondents, too, may easily be brought to book by the release of official interviews and statements through the Press Association (in a

manner which was made the basis for complaint before the Geneva session of the International Press Conference in August, 1926 (22), by the granting of priority in radio and cable service to Association members or by the operations of the censorship. A steady narrowing of the scope available for "staff correspondents" in Japan is evidenced, since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, by the gradual withdrawal of such correspondents. Not even the great news agencies are now independently represented by trained journalists in Korea or Formosa. The news, in consequence, is now almost entirely in the control of men whose chief consideration is the spreading of encouraging reports about Japan.

#### NOTES

- 1. *Mail*, November 22, 1913.
- Mail, January 24, 1914; Honda, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, March, 1916; Soyeda, Shinjudai, September, 1918; Soyejima, Diplomatic Review, April, 1925; Japan Times, March 9, 1925.
- 3. Hayashi, *Memoirs*, pp. 226 f., introduction to *Memoirs*, p. 12; Soyejima, op. cit.; Speeches in House of Peers, Soyejima and Shidehara, February 2, 1925; Uchida, speech to Peers, February 23, 1921.
- 4. Osaka Mainichi, October 5, 1924; Osaka Asahi, March 4, 1920 (see also April 24, 1919); Soyejima, speech to Peers, February 2, 1925.
- 5. Shidehara, speech to Peers, February 2, 1925.
- Honda, Spectator, May 2, 1925; Northcliffe, London Times, April 19, 1922.

- 7. Chronicle, November 10, 17, 24, 1921; December 1, 1921.
- 8. Clarke, My Life, pp. 375 ff.
- Mail, June 2, 1877; Chronicle, May 19, 1904, October 9, 1919; Bethell, in Chronicle, May 19, 1908; Interview with Mr. Zumoto.
- 10. See Japan Yearbook (1926), "Who's Who" section.
- Sakatani, New York Times, September 27-29, 1916; Manchester Guardian, October 11, 1923; Northcliffe, London Times, April 19, 1922; Tokugawa, National Review, July, 1922; Advertiser, August 2, 1922.
- 12. Current History, October, 1923; Matheson, McClures, January, 1924 (but see implied retraction in Current History, May, 1927); Japan Times, October 23-24, 1923, December 19, 21, 1923, March 8, 1924.
- 13. Far East, July 17, 1915; Mail, February 7, 1912; Korean report, Gokyo, June 20, 1919; also in Jiji, July 4, 1919; Interview with Gilbert Bowles.
- 14. Mail, November 18, 1911; Advertiser, May 25, 1917, June 13, 15, 1917; July 8, 17, 1917.
- 15. New York Evening Post, July 24, 1917.
- "South Manchuria Railway: Its Origin, Development, and Phenomenal Rise," Dairen, press of Manshu Nichi Nichi, June, 1924, pp. 55, 57 f.
- Far Eastern Review, September, 1916; New York Evening Post, July 24, 1917.
- New York Times, October 16, 1917; "Peck's Bad Boy," New York Times, May 15, 1925.
- 19. Japan Times, November 27, 1924.
- 20. Mail, June 5, 1909, December 10, 1910.
- 21. Chronicle, July 8, 1909, June 10, 1910.
- 22. Advertiser, August 21-22, 1926.
- 23. Mail, June 28, 1898.

### CHAPTER IX

### CREATING A PLEASANT IMPRESSION

As a device for introducing Japan to the favorable notice of the world, the issuance of "Japan supplements" has proved popular. These usually take the form of special sections issued in conjunction with the regular numbers of the periodical which sponsors them; but occasionally whole issues of the newspapers or magazines may be given over entirely to the interests of the Japanese. Such supplements possess no true news value, in the ephemeral sense of the term, but they do serve to illumine better the spirit and the ideals professed by Japanese (1).

The plan seems to have originated, for Japan at least, with R. P. Porter, of the London Times, who had devoted his energies largely to an extension of the supplement idea to South America and to Tsarist Russia. Issues promoted by him in the interests of these countries had shown themselves fruitful sources of advertising for the London Times, and were be-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mr. Porter was the founder of the New York Press, and conducted the paper from 1887 to 1894. He was director of the eleventh census. From 1906 to 1909 he was principal North American correspondent for the London Times. As the director of supplements for the Times he issued no less than twenty-seven Russian supplements between 1909 and 1917.

lieved to have promoted international understanding and good will. Captain Brinkley, of the Japan Mail, who was also the London Times correspondent in Japan, therefore intimated to the Japanese that similar supplements descriptive of Japan might be beneficial both to the London Times and to the Empire. "One supplement," he said, "could accomplish more in introducing the true Japan to Anglo-Saxon notice than all the books ever printed" (2).

The suggestion was enthusiastically welcomed, and in 1910, after six months' close co-operation between Mr. Porter, Captain Brinkley, and Japanese officialdom, the first London Times Japan Supplement was issued.<sup>2</sup> Few later supplements equal the first Times supplement either in size or in diversity of content. Thirty-four separate topics are discussed, and nearly every subject dealt with in later supplements is exhaustively treated. Agricultural and labor problems are the only important topics not separately considered, but many aspects of both questions are embodied in other portions of the supplement.

As in many of the later supplements, the tenor of all the articles was highly laudatory of Japan, for the Japanese point of view was taken throughout. Captain Brinkley himself, a known protagonist of Jap-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Originally this supplement appeared in conjunction with a Japan-British exhibit in London. Later, in a revised and somewhat extended form, it was republished as a book, entitled Japan, the New World-Power.

anese interests, wrote six of the articles; and that many of the other pages were compiled in Japanese government bureaus was admitted by the same authority. Even the seventy-two pages of advertisements were "designed to introduce Japan to the notice of foreign nations," and they were "all accompanied by descriptions and statistics of an exhaustive and instructive character" (3).

The success of this supplement convinced the Japanese that great services could be expected from such a medium, and plans were immediately drawn for extending the practice to America. The San Francisco Chronicle offered a favorable opportunity for spreading information concerning Japan in a section where the truth was badly needed, and in October, 1911, a supplement entitled Commercial, Financial, and Industrial Japan was issued in conjunction with a Sunday issue of that paper. As a rather curious contrast to customary journalistic practice, no advance intimation seems to have been announced by the Chronicle that such a supplement was about to appear; no editorial notice was given of its inclusion; nor was any reference made thereafter to the fact that such a "stunt" had been accomplished.

Officials of the Japanese government were important contributors to the *Chronicle* supplement. Baron Korekiyo Takahashi, governor of the Bank of Japan, Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa, father of Japan's financial system, Toshitake Okubo, director of the depart-

ment of Agriculture and Communications, Buyei Nakano, president of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Zeko Nakamura, governor of the South Manchuria Railway, Viscount Goto, president of the Imperial Government Railways, Chuji Shimooka, head of the agricultural bureau, and other leaders contributed articles dealing with their own departments. Assurances were given that the newspapers of the Empire have no personal scandals included in their columns.

J. Russell Kennedy was a copious contributor to the *Chronicle* supplement, particularly regarding Korean matters. Commerce, local administration, and the progressive policies of Governor-General Terauchi were enthusiastically praised by Mr. Kennedy, and high praise was accorded the missionaries, who, according to Mr. Kennedy, were the readiest class of people to "pay tribute to the work done by the Japanese administration" in governing the peninsula. The last statement is of peculiar interest in view of the accusations then current in Japan that foreign missionaries had been conspiring with Koreans to kill Governor-General Terauchi and to free the peninsula from Japanese rule.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Mr. Kennedy's articles on Korea were probably excerpts from a book which he seems to have intended to publish. Each article ends with the reminder that it is "copyright by J. Russell Kennedy, Tokyo, Japan." Five articles out of six contributed by him on Korean affairs begin with chapter numberings, as though taken directly from a book or manuscript. No mention is made, however, of the source from which the excerpts were taken.

Nearly four years elapsed before supplements were again issued. Meanwhile the Great War had broken out, and after the capture of Tsing-tau, opinion in Japan was sharply divided as to the attitude which the Empire should take toward Great Britain and the other allies. A wave of anti-Ally, and in particular anti-British, sentiment swept over the vernacular press from the summer of 1915 until March, 1916.

News of these attacks reached Great Britain and caused resentment. Counteracting influences were deemed essential, and during the latter half of 1916 five more supplements were issued by the *London Times*. Much space was devoted to refutations of the British idea that Japan was faltering in loyalty to the Allies, and Premier Okuma, Privy Councilor Kentaro Kaneko, Viscount Ishii, ambassador to Great Britain, and other prominent members of the official class deprecated the anti-British agitation as unrepresentative of true Japanese beliefs.

Since no such arguments were necessary in American papers, the United States being still a neutral, attention was diverted, in the New York Evening Post Japan supplement of the same year, toward the furtherance of better relations between Japan and the United States. The contributors were somewhat changed from the Times issue, but Viscount Shibusawa, who had written in the London Times in July to disown "irresponsible journalists whose views are no

index to national sentiment," now wrote, in December, on the essential harmony between the ideals of East and West as shown by these same journalists. He was ably aided in the *Post* supplement by Dr. T. Iyenaga, director of the East and West News Bureau, and by Lindsay Russell, then president of the Japan Society of New York (4).

Immigration takes on a vital interest in the *Post* issue, although it had been barely mentioned in the fourth *Times* supplement. Dr. Sidney L. Gulick wrote, frankly "looking at the question from a point of view fairer to Japan." Nathaniel Peffer pointed to Hawaii as an example of successful assimilation. No space was given to the California opposition.

The somewhat one-sided attitude of the *Evening Post* might have been forecast, in view of the announcement made by the *Post* itself. After stating that the supplement was to be issued twice yearly, "as an offering of peace," the *Post* said that the section was "designed in some slight measure to offset those Hessians of the Press who sieze upon outward differences of race to play upon passions more easily aroused than allayed."

\*No more Japan supplements appear to have been issued by the Evening Post. Newspapermen in Japan speculate as to the cause of the cessation. Those less friendly to Japan point out that the Post printed an article by David Lawrence in which views critical of Japan had been expressed. As Mr. Lawrence was, at the time, believed to be in the confidence of President Wilson, the strictures written by him were thought by the Osaka Asaki and others to be

Another four-year period passed before supplements were again issued by any periodicals of first-rank importance; but with the calling of the Washington conference on naval armament and on Pacific problems a new recourse was had to journalistic aid for the Japanese cause. In 1921 the London Times issued its seventh Japan supplement, and the Manchester Guardian also put forth a Japanese edition. In the following year the Literary Digest devoted an entire issue to Japan, and four special numbers of the Transpacific were given over to Japan's dependencies.

Of all these supplements, the *Times* was evidently the one which was most acceptable to the Japanese. In the very first sentence of the leading article, Count Hayashi, the new ambassador to Great Britain, denied that Japan had been a militaristic or an imperialistic nation. "Too much has been said," he wrote, "about military Japan, well-meaningly or otherwise, and often she has been misrepresented. Now I assure you, Japan has won the thankless reputation of being a militarist and imperialist nation, which allegation, I assure you, events will disprove in fulness of time." In other articles writers dilate upon Japan's good deeds in Korea and Formosa, pointing out that the

official views. A cool reception was given by the vernacular press to the *Evening Post* supplement; and by the *Osaka Asahi*, Mr. Lawrence's article was termed "selfish and egotistic." This fact, the critics of Japan assert, resulted in the failure to arrange for more Japan supplements in the *Evening Post* (5).

Japanese accepted reluctantly the stewardship over those dominions, and even alleging, according to J. J. O'Brien Sexton, that Japan had at one time considered selling Formosa to another nation.

The Guardian is less effusive in its praise. Although the cover bears the phrase, "Published by arrangement with the government of Japan," and although the sections dealing with foreign affairs are written by the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the head of the publicity bureau, the views of Japanese liberals are freely stated. Professor S. Yoshino, who was credited with radical ideas, and Dr. Danjo Ebina. president of the Doshisha University, challenge the officials to relieve the bureaucratic pressure on the nation. Here again, however, Korean and Formosan matters are discussed only by the governor-generals of the dominions, and Ryotaro Nomura, president of the semi-official South Manchuria Railway, writes that Japan has neither territorial nor economic advantage in that Chinese province.

Home Minister T. Tokonami contributes a remarkable article to the *Guardian* in which he "explains" the Japanese attitude regarding "dangerous thoughts": "The ideas which our government regards as dangerous are equally so regarded by pretty well all other governments. There is no attempt to interfere with the progress of ideas or the study and investigation of any new doctrines of philosophy. All that is done is an endeavor to arrest popular propa-

ganda in a few cases. Anyone may study Marx, Kropotkin, Bertrand Russell, or indeed any writer of advanced theories."

In the same supplement "An English Journalist in Tokyo" (probably, according to internal evidence, Hugh Byas) flatly contradicts the Minister by saying that the press of Japan is under a perpetual censorship, and that such books as Norman Angell's Why Freedom Matters, Andrew M. Pooley's Japan at the Cross-Roads, a life of Bebel, and other books had been denied the right to circulate. A copy of the Japan Advertiser, he said, was suppressed for republishing an alleged manifesto from Japanese Socialists to Socialists in Europe.

Three entire issues of the Japan Times devoted their entire contents to complaints against the American immigration policies and to pleadings for a better mutual understanding. Because it judged the American-Japanese situation to be "very delicate," it wished a frank exchange of views, and printed 50,000 copies of a special "Japan to America" issue on expensive glazed paper in order to give to the United States the results of a survey conducted by the Japan Times. A second issue, six months later, followed the dispatch of invitations to prominent Americans residing in Japan to express themselves "with the utmost candor and freedom" regarding American-Japanese relations. "We need no soft-soap articles," said the Times in its appeal. "Hard and unvarnished facts,

unpalatable as they may be, are the only things that will accomplish the desired remedy. The Japanese people will willingly listen to any constructive criticism and friendly advice." Two weeks later the *Times* renewed its call, rebuking foreigners for hesitating to respond through fear of possible business reprisals. Forty-one Americans, all but five of whom were missionaries, responded. Nearly all of them expressed the warmest appreciation for Japan and the deepest sympathy, but they held forth no hope of repeal of immigration laws. The third supplement contained similar expressions from representative Americans living in the United States (6).

The discussion of immigration problems as given by the *Literary Digest* is perhaps a more impartial presentation of the matter, concluding, as it does, with a plea for both sides to study the matter "with honest eyes." None of the treatments of immigration, as given in the supplements, approaches either in scope or in dispassionate attitude to the standard set by the volume on *Present-Day Immigration* issued by the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Another principle reason motivating the appearance of supplements appears to have been a supposed necessity for justifying Japanese administration in Korea and Formosa. Both British and American supplements reiterate the inevitability for Japan's annexation of Korea "for the security of the Far East," and nearly all the editions praise the material progress

enjoyed by Korea under Japanese rule. Mr. Kennedy's articles in the San Francisco Chronicle offer the fullest treatment on this score. His explanation of the justice of the annexation is peculiar. "No objection to the annexation has been raised by any power. It might be well to let the matter there rest." The sixth London Times supplement was largely devoted to the Korean theme, while Dr. Rentaro Midzuno, of the government-general's office, portrayed Korea's awakening in the Guardian. For the Evening Post, former Foreign Minister Y. Uchida, Hamilton Holt, and K. K. Kawakami defended Japan's rule in the peninsula, the argument of Mr. Kawakami being, "Korea should rightfully be Japanese because of a fifteen years' sacrifice of life and treasure" in the vain attempt "to put the Korean house in order." The Literary Digest, conforming to its usual practice of presenting both sides of a contention, quotes Rev. Arthur Judson Brown, director of the United States Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board, and B. Lenox Simpson (Putnam Weale) as favoring the absorption of Korea, with Henry Chung and the editor of the Japan Chronicle in protest. Dr. T. Iyenaga explains that Japanese deplore former atrocities committed by them in Korea. and that the government, by a change of heart, is introducing liberalism. The Digest closes with the reference from the Japan Year Book that "in 1010 the riots in Korea were due to idlers, rowdies, and native Christians."

The same intimation that the evils suffered by Korea at the hands of Japan are things of the past and that the Japanese administration has undergone a change of heart is put forth in the special Korea number of the Transpacific, with the further information that Japanese rule is accordingly no longer resented by Koreans. The contributors to this number are almost entirely Japanese belonging to the official class. The Administrative Superintendent of Korea. the Governor-General and his secretary, the Director of the Japanese Colonial Bureau, the President of the Oriental Development Company, the Governor of the Bank of Chosen, and high officials of the Seoul Chamber of Commerce and of the Western Korea Industrial Railway expatiate on the improvement of Korea under Japanese control and insist that continued Japanese rule is essential to continued progress. Only one Korean, the editor of Dong-a Daily, is a contributor to the Korea edition of this magazine. In a short essay he bewails that the blessings received by native Koreans under the Japanese rule "are nothing more than the crumbs remaining after the dinner."

Similar treatment of Formosan, Manchurian, and Chinese problems is given in numbers of the *Transpacific* devoted to those regions.

Formosa receives far less attention than Korea in the supplements, possibly because of the less dramatic character of Formosa's independence agitation, but two *London Times* supplements consider

phases of the Formosan problem. Both issues accorded high praise to the Japanese police stationed there, and recounted the successful endeavors by Japan to transform a formerly turbulent possession into a clean, modern, and prosperous community. Viscount Goto, former governor-general, who is still believed to enjoy lucrative holdings in Formosa, claimed for Japan a foremost place among the world's colonizing nations. "No massacres, no torture, and no excessive cruelty has stained Japan's record," he wrote. The *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* took violent exception to this sentence as a misrepresentation of fact (7).

Other slanders which, in the opinion of the supplement editors, call for refutation include the common charges that Japan is militaristic, that her government is oligarchial, undemocratic, and financially incompetent, that women are ill treated, and that education is inefficiently administered. These matters are discussed in nearly all the supplements.

Count Hayashi's disclaimer that Japan is militaristic in its inclinations has already been noticed as being published in the seventh *Times*; and the first, fourth, and sixth *Times* supplements also deny militaristic influence. Dr. Iyenaga told the *Evening Post* that the navy of Japan is intended only for defense of her Asiatic interests, and Marquis Okuma, in the same issue, informed American readers that Japan would never permit a militarist to head the government. The *San Francisco Chronicle* and the *Liter*-

ary Digest also assure their readers that Japan is peacefully inclined. Professor Yoshino strikes discord when, in the Guardian, he confesses that Japan has formerly been militaristic in tendency, although by 1921 militarism was waning and must soon give way.

More division of opinion is afforded by discussions of the nature of the Japanese government. The San Francisco Chronicle admitted that Japan was far from democratic and that such parliamentary institutions as existed were administered by the bureaucrats. Captain Brinkley, in the first London Times supplement, and Dr. E. W. Clement, in the sixth Times supplement, describe the government as "an imperialism evolving towards constitutionalism." Dr. Rokuichiro Masujima, an honorary member of the New York Bar and founder of Chuo University, writes: "The Japanese sovereign is superhuman because he at absolutely virtuous and above all human temptation, and he would not condescend, as history has shown, to do otherwise than good to his people." Marquis Okuma and Dr. Kazutami Ukita of Waseda assure Americans that Japan is highly responsive to the desires of popular opinion. The Literary Digest holds that "the Japanese are ardent converts to the ideas of Western democracy" (8).

The Guardian, two London Times supplements, and the Evening Post all congratulate Japan on the rapid progress achieved for woman's rights. Jinzo

Naruse, president of Japan Woman's College, contributes two of these articles, and Madame Ozaki writes a third (9). All the articles are optimistic in tone, and all point to the rapid and steady progress achieved by women in Japan. Little is said, however, concerning the extent of licensed prostitution, of divorce legislation, or of other disabilities against which women in Japan protest. The *Literary Digest* account is noncommittal and is based on secondary sources of unimportant value.

The last of the specially disputed subjects, education, was discussed five times by the London Times, three of the articles being written by Baron Dairoku Kikuchi, formerly minister of education. Walter Dening and Y. Takenobu, editor of the Japan Year Book. are other writers for the Times (10). The San Francisco Chronicle gives a full description of the cultural and technical education available, while in the Guardian Dr. Sanae Takata and E. E. Speight give the only available survey of Japan's educational needs and of the psychology of the student mind. No extensive treatment of the educational problem seems to have been given by supplements printed in English in Japan until, in October, 1925, the Advertiser began the publication of two-page "write-ups" of the leading universities.

Certain other topics of greater or less importance receive only passing comment in the supplements. From other than purely commercial interest in Japan,

little is said of Saghalien, Manchuria, or the Pacific Islands. Japan's relations toward China are barely noticed, although several of the supplements appeared in the year when agitation over the "Twenty-One Demands" was most intense. The London Times had nothing to say on Sino-Japanese affairs, and the Evening Post published only Dr. Iyenaga's plea for the strengthening of China as a protection for Japan, and Hamilton Holt's suggestion that Japan be made the spokesman for China. "Above all," said Mr. Holt, "we should avoid taking sides with either of these countries against the other."

Japanese religion, science, agricultural problems, public utility relations, charity, sport, village life, the family system, and journalism are topics which one or another of the supplements considers briefly, but no great emphasis is placed upon them, nor are any of them frequently the subject for discussion. The Guardian's most active in analysis of Japan's social organization, while the London Times specializes on sport, charity, and theology. Such subjects, however, are not usually productive of the kind of misconception which the Japanese desire to see eradicated. Writers for the supplements turn rather to finance, shipping, industry, and foreign trade in order to impress upon the world the economic soundness of the Japanese Empire (11). By far the most complete early treatment of the economic situation is that contained in the first London Times supplement, but a

very comprehensive modern treatment of these matters is included in the great 534-page Reconstruction Number of the Far-Eastern Review, issued in June, 1925, "as a monument to the Japanese engineer." Thorough articles describe city services, markets, flood and fire prevention, transportation, architecture, radio, and other topics. The writers sometimes fail to discriminate sharply between plans under way and those which have been merely suggested; and the articles are open to criticism in that they seem to assume that undertakings postponed through lack of funds are certain of ultimate completion. Several articles "gush" too freely, notably those concerning the Emperor Meiji "revered by his subjects to a greater degree than any other ruler of modern times," and Mitsui, "where business is humanity."

The Reconstruction Review evidently promised advertisers that reading matter would be inserted in conjunction with advertising, for the Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, the Daido Electric, and the Shibaura and Hitachi engineering works<sup>5</sup> all enjoy fulsome encomiums.

Present-Day Japan, compiled by the Asahi newspapers expressly "to introduce Japan and the Japanese in a true light" and to correct the "sensational and exaggerated reports of mischievous press reporters," discusses Japan's phenomena somewhat

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The latter two enterprises purchased full-page advertisements for their first appearance in any supplement.

more superficially than the supplements heretofore described. It consists of 77 pages of advertisements. 6 of rotogravure, and 24 of reading matter, and was intended for distribution by the Asahi aviators on their flight to Europe. It has also been scattered freely by Japanese shipping companies, tourist agencies, and consulates. This supplement complements the Reconstruction Review by devoting much space to cultural affairs, such as the theater, music, literature, the arts, and sciences, neglected by the Far-Eastern Review's issue. All the articles are highly laudatory of Japanese ability, a characteristic sentence reading: "The fact that the Japanese have had the power to assimilate in half a century the Western civilization, which has had a history of three centuries, attests to the superior quality of the Japanese."

The Advertiser and the Japan Chronicle essay far less comprehensive programs, reflecting much more narrowly the immediate journalistic needs of the moment wherein they were issued. The Advertiser devoted issues to descriptive details of the Prince Regent's wedding, to an encyclopedic treatment of the industrial, economic, educational, and recreational facilities of Osaka, and to the commemoration, in 1926, of the Swedish Crown Prince's visit to Japan. The issues are thoroughly optimistic in tone, even to the point of transforming the "dull mud banks" of the Osaka canals into waterways "quaintly attractive by night." The Japan Chronicle's Kobe Jubilee Sup-

plement is little more than a history of foreigners in the Kobe settlement, with little stress on social, economic, or political aspects, and with no attention paid to cultural development.

Next in importance to *Present-Day Japan*, the *Guardian* and the *London Times* supplements offer the most comprehensive epitomes of cultural Japan. The latter supplements give copious treatment to Japanese prints, garden-building, flower-arrangement, lacquer work, sword-making, and drama, while as a further means for increasing the pleasant impression, prose rhapsodies have appeared in the same media on Japan's scenery and on the "quaint beauties of Japanese cities" (12).

A brief study of the advertising revenues received by those supplements may cast some light upon the motives actuating the appearance of the journalistic aids to the understanding of Japan. It should, of course, be acknowledged at the outset that the methods of financing these publications are not laid open to the public, and that any deductions drawn must necessarily be circumstantial. Prima facie evidence that the supplements enjoy a subsidy from government or from semi-official sources might be disclosed, but final proof lurks undiscovered, if indeed it exists at all, in the complex bookkeeping of the agencies involved.

But, while this lack of confirmation is frankly recognized, it is, none the less, true that surface man-

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ifestations seem to indicate official encouragement for the issuance of special supplements. Certainly there can be but little doubt that the 108-page Present-Day Japan, the 534-page Reconstruction Review, and the o6-page first London Times supplement were directly inspired by hopes of profitable advertising contracts. Every journalist realizes that it is advertising alone which makes such supplements profitable, for the increased subscriptions resulting from the announcement of a supplement are trifling in comparison with the greatly increased costs of production.<sup>6</sup> And that the Japanese government has viewed with favor, if it has not actually contributed financial aid to these enterprises, is indicated by the admission of the Guardian that its supplement, at least, was "published by arrangement with the government of Japan."

In view of the dependency of supplements upon their advertising, a scrutiny is necessitated of the kind of advertising which was gained. The first London Times supplement carried little advertising which was acknowledged by the paper. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the South Manchuria Railway, the Nippon Yuson Kaisha, all of which may be included among semi-official enterprises, contributed virtually all the paid advertising which may fairly be attributed to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The San Francisco Chronicle sacrified even the hope of greatly enlarged circulation by failure to announce in advance its intention of publishing a Japan supplement, and by neglecting afterward to call attention to the fact that it had been published.

publication of a special Japan supplement. Nor are these included in the supplement itself, for they appear in the regular pages of the *Times*.

But there are forty-seven pages of official information in the first *London Times* supplement dealing with governmental machinery, finance, commerce, agriculture, public works, mining, railways, education, religion, official monopolies, prisons, and the colonies. These pages conclude the supplement and are not marked as advertising, but peculiarities of type face and of special border treatment indicate to the observant newspaperman that half the supplement (less one page) has been prepared outside the editorial office of the *Times*.

Color is lent to this suspicion when, in later issues, precisely similar material is plainly marked as advertising. Three pages in the fourth Times supplement, four pages in the sixth, five pages in the Asahi Present-Day Japan, and four pages in the Evening Post are presented in identical fashion to the first London Times supplement and are admitted to be paid material. They deal with foreign trade, factory legislation, Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, and Tokyo reconstruction, and, in the case of the Evening Post, with an "official compilation of statistics and revenue." On the other hand, two pages descriptive of "Japan's Commercial Museum" in the third Times supplement, and three pages on "Japan's Foreign Trade" in the fifth, appear with exactly the same

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marks of differentiation from the accompanying text, but without the label of advertising.

The Literary Digest also offers a similar problem. At the close of its reading-matter section a long dialogue, entitled "What Is Japanese Democracy?" is printed. It purports to record a conversation between "Franklin Clay," an American newspaperman, and "Shigeru Matsumoto," a Japanese business man. Matsumoto is equipped with press cuttings from articles by "Adachi, a Japanese correspondent for the New York World," to show that "Japanese are ardent converts to the ideas of Western democracy." Contrary to the established policy of the Literary Digest in discussing disputed matters, one side only of the problem is given, and Franklin Clay is very easily convinced.

From the context, from its position in the magazine, and from the special type face, suspicion might arise that 'What Is Japanese Democracy?'' is an advertisement. There is no specific acknowledgment of its status given by the magazine, and a letter of inquiry sent to the editor of the *Literary Digest* has not received attention.

Nor does the full page of data concerning "Japan's Foreign Trade" which appeared in the Japan-to-America issue of the *Japan Times* indicate the source from which it was derived. The material is not identical with the acknowledged advertisements in the *London Times* and *Evening Post*, but it bears

similar distinguishing features which might cause it to be regarded as a paid insertion. The *Japan Times*, however, assures its readers that the entire supplement contains but one advertisement, and as that one is obviously the page taken by the Imperial Hotel, it must be assumed that the data on Japan's foreign trade is intended to be received as legitimate news in spite of its peculiar typographical appearance.

In spite of this disclaimer, the evidence appears reasonable that for other supplements, if not for the Japan Times, unacknowledged advertisements may have been inserted in response to private arrangements made between the publishers and the advertising interests, and that the editors desire their readers to appreciate that such writings stand on somewhat different footing from the accompanying matter presented in a normal fashion. This is a convention well understood among newspaper men, although the necessity for it has not been so pronounced in recent years as it was prior to the birth of higher codes of journalism.

Direct gifts to the papers of additional funds for publication of supplements have seldom been acknowledged openly, although the *Japan Advertiser*, on the occasion of its Swedish supplement, declared it to be the "gift of Swedish residents of Japan" for the purpose of making Sweden better known. A possible form of indirect official assistance to special supplements might, however, conceivably consist of

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advertising contributed by semi-official agencies or through municipalities. Such agencies are fairly common in Japan, for subsidies are granted from the treasury to favored industries, and funds from the imperial household have been invested in many enterprises.

Seven banks possessed of special imperial charters entitling them to preferred status, and, from a strictly commercial point of view, virtually immunizing them from competition, regularly place advertisements in the supplements, although but rarely appearing in the daily press or in other periodicals than the Far-Eastern Review. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the banks of Chosen and Taiwan, the Industrial Bank, Hypothec Bank, Hokkaido Colonization Bank are lavish purchasers of space. The first three. in particular, are generous to supplements. The railways also advertise heavily, although from a commercial standpoint little real advantage might accrue to them that would not be obtained without the advertising. The Imperial Government Railways take full pages in the Evening Post, Transpacific, San Francisco Chronicle, and the Japan-American Japan Times, with two full pages in the Reconstruction Review. The South Manchuria Railway requires three pages in the Reconstruction Review, a page in the Guardian, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Transpacific, and almost a page in the Literary Digest.

It was the only Japanese company to advertise in the Digest.

The Tourist Bureau, owned jointly by the railways, hotel associations, and the steamship lines secures a page in the fifth London Times supplement and in the Guardian. The Formosan and Korean railways also buy space at intervals in supplements. The tobacco monopoly appeared fleetingly in the Transpacific for April, 1922; the Oriental Development Company secures an advertisement in the Message Times and Wedding Advertiser, and regularly advertises in the semi-official Seoul Press.

Special advertising favors seemed to have been given to the Asahi Present-Day Japan, whose purpose, as announced, was to reform Western conceptions of Japan. Public enterprises like the Ishidegawa Municipal Park, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Seoul Clearing House, the Chosen Produce Association ("under the special protection of the Governor-General"), each contribute an eighth of a page in advertising. Twelve local electric power companies add probably unfruitful advertising to the Asahi total. Six tram lines, three makers of tabi (Japanese socks worn in no other country in the world), Formosan brick, paper, salt, beer, and fruit interests, and three semi-official Korean banks find in the Asahi publications their first necessity for advertising. The San Francisco Chronicle, in addition to the regular advertisers which appear in other supplements, enjoys the patronage of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Tokyo

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Electric Light Company, the Imperial Hotel, and others.

The Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, Furukawa, Suzuki, Kuhara, Sumitono, and formerly the Takata interests almost invariably appear in supplement advertising, although they appear but sparingly in the daily press. That some of these buy space at government pressure in return for government contracts and concessions has frequently been charged by foreign journalists residing in Japan, but no proof can be offered for the contention of these critics that the firms contribute to an advertising "slush fund." The admission of the Takata Company, in the San Francisco Chronicle, that the firm held contracts for the imperial Japanese government presents but flimsy evidence to support belief that these companies are compelled to purchase space. Their advertisements are, however, distributed in a manner which might seem strange to students of sound commercial strategy.

Shipping firms, even those recognized as having semi-official status, advertise in better accordance with commercial needs. The Reconstruction *Review*, however, boasted six pages of Japanese steamship advertising, in contrast to half an inch purchased by British shipping interests, and to the half-page purchased by the only American shipping firm to advertise.

An example which might serve to indicate that

advertisements have been used for purposes of politics appears in the history of the Far-Eastern Review, the publisher of this supplement. The Review, a monthly magazine issued in Shanghai, is owned by George Bronson Rea, a writer who at one time was thought so anti-Japanese that "no Japanese would ever have dreamed that he would ever have anything good to say of their country." At the Versailles Peace Conference Mr. Rea was converted to pro-Japanese convictions, and so marked a change occurred in the policy of his paper that W. H. Donald, the editor, twice disclaimed responsibility for articles appearing in the magazine. He then resigned, and Mr. Rea was termed by the Japan Times "the staunchest friend Japan possesses in the world" (13).

Prior to the remarkable change in policy, the Far-Eastern Review printed eighteen pages of presumably semi-official Chinese advertisements, while few Japanese companies bought space. After Mr. Rea's conversion the Chinese advertisements sloughed away, and were at once replaced by Japanese. Within the year the eighteen Chinese pages were transformed into nineteen pages of semi-official Japanese agencies, including the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen, and the South Manchuria Railway. At the close of 1924, thirty-seven pages of pro-Japanese advertisements appeared, from the semi-official sources alone, but not a single page remained of Chinese official corporations.

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That the heaviest advertisements by semi-official corporations occur in papers most friendly to Japan proves only that the advertisers prefer to benefit their friends and not their enemies. Their certainty to advertise in any special supplement which explains Japan may be a tribute to their patriotic fervor. In any case, the outside critic is not privileged to constitute himself the final judge on corporation advertising policy, although his judgment may be better on the commercial value of the media employed. But neither is it inexplicable that captious foreigners are honestly convinced that companies which fail to purchase space in ordinary daily issues are coerced into buying space in supplements. It is notorious that foreigners residing in Japan are singularly credulous of tales which purport to prove that propaganda flourishes, and that they are willing to make conclusions on very superficial evidence. Such aid to propaganda papers, it is true, has been admitted in the past, and it is freely admitted by government officials in Japan that both business interests and the government itself are operating under codes divergent from the Western ethics. The lavish distribution, gratis, of these supplements, and of such volumes as Kinnosuke Adachi's Manchuria by Japanese consulates and by semi-official agencies intensifies suspicion that the publications are not issued for purely commercial purposes. But that the inclusion of the advertisements is due to more than patriotic zeal or mere coincidence is not

established as a fact, however much the prima facie evidence may breed suspicion.

#### NOTES

- 1. List of important supplements: London Times, First, July 7, 1010; Second, June 3, 1016; Third, July 15, 1016; Fourth, September 2, 1916; Fifth, October 14, 1916; Sixth, December 16, 1016; Seventh, June 16, 1021; New York Evening Post, December 30, 1016; Japan Chronicle, Kobe Supplement, 1918; San Francisco Chronicle, October 22, 1911; Manchester Guardian, June 9, 1921; Literary Digest, Japan Number, January 7, 1922; Transpacific, Special Numbers, Korea, April, 1922; Shanghai, June, 1922; Formosa, August, 1922; Manchuria, October, 1922; Japan Times, "Japan to America," October 1, 1924; "America to Japan," December 20, 1924; "A Message from America," June 20, 1925; "Franco-Japanese Trade Mission," May 9, 1925; Japan Advertiser, "Prince Regent's Wedding," June 10, 1924; "Osaka Exposition," April 12, 1925; "Swedish Supplement," September 19, 1926; "Sesqui-Centennial Number," October 10, 1926; Far Eastern Review, "Reconstruction Number," June-July, 1925, Volume XXI, No. 6; Tokyo and Osaka Asahi, "Present-Day Japan," the Overseas Asahi, April 25, 1925.
- 2. Japan Mail, February 12, 1910.
- 3. *Mail*, August 27, 1910.
- 4. Third London Times.
- 5. Osaka Asahi, January 4, 1917.
- 6. Japan Times, November 11, 27, 1924.
- 7. Third and Fourth London Times; Japan Chronicle, December 28, 1916.
- 8. Masujima, Fifth London Times; Okuma and Ukita, New York Evening Post.

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- Naruse, Fourth London Times, and Evening Post; Mme Ozaki, First London Times.
- 10. (All in London Times). Kikuchi, in First, Second, and Fourth Supplements; Dening in First Supplement; Takenobu, in First and Sixth supplements; S. H. Wainwright, Fifth Supplement.
- II. (a) Religion: First and Fifth London Times; Literary Digest. (b) Science: F. Omori, First London Times; Evening Post; Literary Digest. (c) Agriculture: J. W. Robertson Scott, Second London Times. (d) Public Utilities: Isoo Abe, Second London Times. (e) Charity: First and Third London Times. (f) Sport: First and Second London Times. (g) Villages: Manchester Guardian. (h) Family: Guardian. (i) Journalism: Takahashi, Fourth London Times; Byas, Sixth London Times; Guardian; San Francisco Chronicle. (j) Finance: Brinkley, First London Times; Sakatani, Second London Times; Soyeda, Sixth London Times; other articles, unsigned, in Third, Fourth and Fifth London Times, Guardian, Evening Post, San Francisco Chronicle.
- 12. (All in London Times supplements, unless otherwise noted). (a) Prints: Third, Fourth, Sixth. (b) Architecture: First, Fifth. (c) Gardens: First. (d) Flower Arrangement: Fifth, and Literary Digest. (e) Tea: Second, and San Francisco Chronicle. (f) Art: First. (g) Lacquer: Fourth. (h) Swords: Sixth. (i) Scenery: First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth. (j) Cities: First, Second, Sixth. (k) Legends: Fourth, and Literary Digest. (l) Drama: First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Guardian, San Francisco Chronicle.
- 13. Japan Times, March 6, 1924; Far Eastern Review, "Contents Table," February, 1920; March, 1920, p. 153.

#### CHAPTER X

## INTERPRETING JAPAN TO FOREIGNERS

The foreigner in Japan, in his ignorance of Oriental languages and social customs, is isolated and bewildered to a degree incomprehensible to western travelers in any Occidental land. In any foreign nation the presence of aliens illiterate in the vernacular will, of course, evoke a need for publications which interpret the spirit and ideals of the engulfing hosts and which will enable the expatriates to keep abreast of progress in the motherland; but in the East the foreigner is even more dependent, for it is but rarely that a Westerner can read the Oriental writings.<sup>1</sup>

But the wall erected around the Empire by the written language is but one barrier which the foreigner must overcome. His circle of acquaintances is necessarily limited. Even for the Japanese the social life is not extensive, for official preferment and imperial decoration represent the only avenues to intergroup relationships. The foreign merchant's circle of acquaintances is seldom larger than the small group of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The number of foreigners who read Japanese with fluency is quite unknown, but certainly is small. In 1875 the Japan Mail believed that less than five aliens could read the native journals. The number is, of course, much larger now, but 10 per cent of the foreign residents would be a most extravagant conjecture (1).

business men with whom he comes in contact; the diplomatic circle is a most constricted orbit; while the foreign teacher and the missionary, enjoying somewhat larger numbers of friendships among the Japanese, are by no means widely known.<sup>2</sup>

Under these conditions the foreign language press becomes a real necessity to link the East and West. Its importance as a social force and as a propaganda agency has long been known to able native editors and to the government, but no agreement has ever yet been reached concerning what rôle the foreign papers ought to play.

The Japanese conception of the function of the foreign press has been well summarized by Motosada Zumoto, editor of the *Herald of Asia*: "Once the foreign editor has cast in his lot with the Japanese he should be content to accept the circumstances. As a conductor of a newspaper property, the foreigner, unlike the Japanese, is only here on sufferance. The foreigner coming to Japan has to choose whether he

<sup>2</sup> Dr. James H. Cousins, formerly of Keio University, discourses upon the remarkable separation between the Oriental and the Occidental staffs of that institution. The former, many of whom are fluent in English, flock by themselves; eight foreign teachers, four of whom are versed in vernacular Japanese, constitute another clique. Rarely is there sustained conversation between the two groups. More mingling may be possible in missionary circles, but, during a full year in one of the older and more influential Tokyo establishments, six experienced residents, five of whom were fluent in spoken Japanese, gained less than a dozen new enrolments for purposes other than cheap study of the English language.

will be a friend or a foe of this country; he cannot be wholly neutral and sit on the fence. The parading of a nation's ills in public may be a wholesome journalistic practice if undertaken by a citizen of the country thus ridiculed, but it is hardly becoming on the part of foreigners, nor likely to prove acceptable to the country thus treated" (2).3

This conception has, on the whole, been accepted as just by the Japan Times and by the Japan Mail, but has been strenuously opposed by the Japan Chronicle and by the Japan Advertiser. The lastnamed, particularly during the editorship of Frank H. Hedges, championed the "golden mean"; but the Chronicle, together (in the years before the Tokyo earthquake) with the Japan Herald and Japan Gazette, was a militant protagonist for complete press liberties (3).

Virtually all Japanese newspapermen agree that the English-language press has consistently misrepresented the East. Yukichi Iwanaga, manager of the Rengo news agency, may be quoted as a typical commentator: "The East is very badly interpreted to the West by the existing foreign press. I do not wish to disparage my clients, but I cannot deny that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> The words, printed in the *Herald of Asia*, exactly duplicate an editorial published six years earlier in the *Japan Mail* (4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Advertiser might claim exemption from this charge, since, according to Mr. Hedges, it is primarily intended to give Western news to Japanese.

foreign press does not work well in Japan." This failure is no new complaint. As long ago as 1807. Captain Brinkley wrote that the general record of the foreign press during thirty years "has been emphatically repellant from the Japanese point of view." Nevertheless, twenty years before his Japan Mail had complimented the "local foreign press" and had said that Japan owed it a very deep debt of gratitude. "It has fulfilled two important duties: First, it has painted for the West a picture, fair and truthful on the whole, of the progress, conditions and aspirations of this Empire. If not absolutely flattering, no one can say that the more winning features have not been placed in the best light, or that a kindly shade or drapery has not here and there been so disposed as to deserve the gratitude of the nation. Secondly, it has very fairly reflected to the Japanese government the opinions entertained by foreigners of its course of action" (5).

Among the principal arguments advanced to prove poor mirroring by the foreign press are that the alien newspapers are given over to sensationalism and inaccuracy, that they assume the inferiority of Japanese, and that they deliberately print propaganda in Occidental interests. In a lengthy editorial on the "Force of Evil," the *Japan Times* seeks to show how a "nagging attitude" develops (6):

There are daily sheets and weeklies that cater to foreign residents only and live by dishing up local news and things in

general in such a manner as would suit only the prejudiced palates of non-natives. These publications interpret all that comes within their observation only in such a way as would whet distrust in, and animosity against, the people of the country where they are published. They declare with indignation that they write exactly what they see and hear, with no desire whatever to harm anybody. Precisely so; but the eyes with which they see and the ears with which they hear are prejudiced and diseased and convey nothing correctly to them but what comes from their own people or race.

These newspapers are in the habit of engaging their writers in England, America, or some other country, offering them a salary which sounds quite large. Those journalists find the condition of things far different from what they had imagined at home, and the feeling of dissatisfaction and general cussedness weighs so heavily upon them that everything they observe presents itself in a hue and shape as ugly as the condition of mind in which they find themselves.

Regardless of the justice of this particular appraisal, it is undeniable that the mechanics of a Far-Eastern foreign language paper do not conduce to good journalism. The newspapers are seriously understaffed and lack trained reporters.<sup>5</sup> There is no

<sup>5</sup> The Advertiser and the Chronicle rarely have more than six foreigners on their active reportorial staff, and few of these are available for general reporting. Probably less than half speak Japanese, and fewer still can read the written language. A contributory factor to the Advertiser's weakness is its custom of engaging comparatively untrained men. Its staff is usually recruited from the graduating class of the University of Missouri School of Journalism, whose dean, Dr. Walter Williams, has been retained for consultation by the paper. The graduates are, of course, well-trained academi-

effort to make original investigation into local happenings, and scarcely any search for independent news. At times of crises, or when some item of great interest appears, a few interviews are solicited, but customarily the foreign press follows the example set by the *Japan Mail*, which boasted that it had not printed three original interviews in twenty-five years (7). Reporters are occupied in "re-writing" news clipped from the American or British gazettes. As with the vernacular organs, "follow-ups" are rare.

For its local news, the foreign papers rely upon "tips" from government officials, statements issued by official sources, or translations from the native press. At times a fairly close *entente* may be arranged between an English-language paper and a vernacular journal; such as was the case, in 1924, between the *Advertiser* and the *Jiji*; but usually the translations supply the bulk of news.

The dependency of the English-language press upon those employees who interpret for the editors the spirit of the vernacular newspapers brings an undue prominence upon the men who hold these key positions. Native editors are well-nigh unanimous in discrediting translators as men unable to make a livelihood in vernacular newspaper work. Mr. Zumoto, himself for many years translator on the *Mail*, con-

cally, but lack the background of sustained active training in street work or in "digging" news. Their unfamiliarity with Oriental conditions is obvious.

demned translators as men "who do not understand Japanese newspapers or Japanese politics. There is no career ahead of them, as there would be for a newspaper worker on a Japanese newspaper. They give a totally false impression of Japan." Mr. Sheba, of the Japan Times, admits that good translators are difficult to find, and says that even the best translators find difficulty in analyzing the truth of Japanese news writings. In common with a number of other commentators, he finds that "Japanese reporters are untrained, careless, and prone to sensationalism. For this reason it is not safe to translate their articles."

Anglo-Saxon editors are equally certain that their translators are trustworthy and reliable. They cite the case of Mr. Zumoto and of Dr. Takahashi, both of whom were formerly translators on the Mail, and who were later editors of the Japan Times and officials of the government. A. Morgan Young, editor of the Chronicle, declared that two of his own translators had been taken over by the Foreign Office, and that one other man had been sent to Europe by the Osaka Mainichi. The Advertiser staff contains the name of Dr. Shogoro Washio, a foremost political philosopher, and of Shunkichi Akimoto, the Yomiuri correspondent at the Versailles Peace Conference. who was highly praised for his efficiency, in 1925, by Prince Iyesato Tokugawa. The Times has also had a number of eminent university professors as translators on its staff.

The propensity of foreign-language papers to criticize Japan drew adverse comment, in 1908, from W. T. R. Preston, Canadian trade commissioner, in the *National Review*. After attributing their "anti-Japanism" to the detention of military correspondents in Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, and after alleging that their inactivity so embittered the writers that they sought an outlet by penning criticisms of Japan, 6 Mr. Preston wrote:

Some newspapers printed in foreign languages are controlled and edited by notorious anti-Japanese influences. These individuals have no stake in the Empire except residence. Their organs continually impugn Japanese character, administration, and authority. The government is ridiculed; the administration is pronounced incompetent; the public finances are alleged to be on the verge of bankruptcy; veiled hints are given that foreigners need not look for justice in legal tribunals; the authorities are accused of spoliation of foreigners. Nothing whatever is left undone to weaken respect for authority at home or to destroy public confidence abroad. Japanese are referred to as "Japa" or "natives," phrases which are as objectionable to them as "Cockney" is, applied to an educated Englishman (8).

This attack was followed by an interview in which Mr. Preston expressed belief that, unwittingly, but "as sure as night follows day, they [the foreign pa-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>o</sup> Anti-Japanism in the foreign press far antedates this war.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The writer has examined files of the foreign journals published in Japan extending over many years. Careful watchfulness for an instance in which the abbreviation "Jap" was used revealed no use of that term. The word "native" was employed, but evidently in no derogatory sense.

pers] are giving occasion for a serious antiforeign sentiment among the Japanese" (9).

The Herald and the Chronicle, incensed by these remarks, accused Mr. Preston of unfairness toward the foreigners residing in Japan, and intimated that he was not "strictly honest." Both papers were sued for libel and found guilty. The papers were both fined and were compelled to insert apologies as advertisements in ten vernacular newspapers. This was said to have been the first instance in Japanese press history that a newspaper was ordered to pay damages on a libel conviction (10).

More certainty exists regarding the origin of the foreign language press than of the vernacular newspapers. Despite the fact that the English-language papers antedate the Japanese newspapers, much more attention seems to have been devoted to maintaining complete files.

From its inception the foreign press endeavored to expound and to interpret the Orient to the transient Occidental resident, for the initial number of the Nagasaki Shipping News and Advertiser, issued June 22, 1861, was planned "to satisfy a craving for more knowledge about Japan and its interesting people." The Nagasaki foreign community was, however, too small to support the venture, and so the paper was

<sup>8</sup> The *Chronicle's* fine was paid by the proceeds of a voluntary contribution made by foreign merchants in Kobe. Mr. Preston was soon after promoted, and left Japan.

transferred to Yokohama, where it took the name of *Japan Herald*, the first number of the revised journal being issued November 23, 1861.<sup>9</sup>

Inspection of the first Yokohama issue reveals that cable news, clipped from the Singapore papers, gave London telegrams of September 18,10 and that for local news the *Herald* reported a fire that had destroyed a quarter of the houses in the Japanese section of Yokohama. The paper seems to have been financially successful, but its founder, an auctioneer named Schoyer, preferred to devote his attention to his regular business, and sold to the firm of Hansard and Keele. When Hansard was obliged, on account of his health, to return to England, both he and Keele sold their interests to John Reddie Black, but the Hansard name was retained for its advertising value (11).

Black converted the paper into a four-page daily October 1, 1866, with the motto, "Onward, Press Onward." Little news was published, and on many days the *Herald* consisted of nothing but advertising, although the paper bore an editorial note priding itself on being "interesting to the general reader by leaders, discussions, local intelligence, and by frequent no-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Seven years later a Nagasaki Times and Shipping List was published, which, after a year, was removed to Kobe in 1869 and merged with the Hiogo News. Both papers were later sold to the Kobe Chronicle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> An American cablegram reported that General Garibaldi had refused an offer to become commander-in-chief of the federal armies.

tices of the people, their government, laws, literature, manufactures, and of the natural productions" (12).

Black's leaders possessed an editorial power for both foreigners and Japanese. In his *Memoirs*, he tells how a group of politicians sought his aid to free a returned diplomatic mission which had been imprisoned for failure to accomplish its task. Black wrote an editorial urging that the envoys be released, and, although only half a dozen Japanese were subscribers to the *Herald*, Black believed that his leader had been instrumental in restoring freedom to the prisoners (13).

Rivals suspected that Black's influence was derived through the close relationship between the *Herald* and the British legation, whose paid advertisements comprised a large part of the news. Through these and other advertisements the *Herald* returned the remarkable profit of \$12,000 yearly; but Black's other business commitments were less successful, and in July, 1867, the *Herald* was put up for bankruptcy auction. The sale did not actually occur, however, since A. T. Watkins, a son-in-law of Hansard, discovered flaws in the transfer papers given by his father-in-law, and claimed title to the *Herald*. The claim was upheld by the British Consular Court, and the *Herald* changed its ownership, retaining Black as an employee (14).

Watkins' régime was not successful. Within three months an insurrection in the staff, caused, according

to rumor, by Watkins' short temper and irascibility, led to the withdrawal of virtually all the employees. A rival paper, the *Japan Gazette*, was founded with Black as editor and E. J. Moss as manager. Watkins sold the *Herald* to J. H. Brooke, an Australian politician, and moved to Kobe, where, in January, 1868, he set up the *Hiogo and Osaka Herald*.

Brooke was a man of fiery energy and of dreadnaught enterprise, and in his thirty-five years' control over the *Herald* caused that paper to be known as the most constant critic of the Japanese. Because he was convinced that several generations must elapse before the lives and property of foreigners could safely be intrusted to Japanese law, he argued vehemently against the abolition of extrality privileges (16). In order to counteract his diatribes the government was constrained to give financial aid to several other foreign-language dailies. Captain Brinkley, of the *Mail*, was an especial advocate assisted by the administration for the purpose of combating Brooke's ideas.

Brooke died in 1902, and two years later the

<sup>11</sup> Unlike his predecessors in Japanese journalism, Brooke had enjoyed a previous journalistic experience. At eighteen he had edited a Lincolnshire weekly, but he had left newspaper work to study science and had become lecturer at the London Polytechnic. He is said to have been one of the early experimenters in the collodion process of wet-plate photography. Later he had emigrated to Australia, where he was elected to the Victoria Legislative Council, and at thirty-five had been Minister of Land. He came to Yokohama in 1862 (15).

Herald was auctioned (over the bid of the aged E. J. Moss) to a syndicate of German residents. With Thomas Satchell, now of the Chronicle, as editor, the Germans utilized the *Herald* as the English-language adjunct to their own Deutsche-Japan Post, established in May, 1902. The anti-Japanese attitude of the Herald was continued, violent criticisms being published of Japanese administration of Korea and of supposed exploitation by the Japanese of Yokohama foreigners. Mr. Satchell left the Herald for the Mail in 1010, and was succeeded by Charles A. Parry, the holder of a bitter antimissionary complex. An editorial written by Mr. Parry intimating that missionaries habitually misrepresented facts stirred up such an outcry in Japan that the suppression of the Herald was narrowly averted, Mr. Parry resigning from the staff (17).

At the outbreak of the Great War, both the Herald and the Deutsche-Japan Post were finally suppressed as against public peace. An exultant editorial in the Japan Mail greeted the decision with characteristic lack of restraint. "The Japan Herald has been a disgrace to foreign journalism. Its methods have been the methods of the thug. The Japan Herald has been as effective and annoying as the viperish shrillings of some sideway slut." The abuse, due, according to the Mail, to the Herald's alliance with the "forces of evil" arrayed against Japan, seems scarcely just, although the constant criticisms of the Herald

had roused opposition even in the minds of foreigners residing in Japan (18).<sup>12</sup>

Closely allied to the Japan Herald in the critical attitude toward the Japanese was the daily Japan Gazette, established by J. R. Black October 12, 1867, after the secession from the Herald. Like the Herald, the Gazette was published at Yokohama, and it was the first foreign evening daily in Japan. Successive changes in ownership deprived the Gazette of the advantages of unified policy long enjoyed by the Herald, Mail and Chronicle. Black sold his paper to a syndicate of Yokohama business men, whose personnel was altering continually. L. D. K. Adam, now of Rengo, who was editor from 1906 until the Gazette's extinction in the 1923 earthquake and fire, was never able to overcome the disadvantages of his shifting owners.

Like the Herald, however, the Gazette's record

<sup>12</sup> The *Chronicle*, a purely British organ, edited by a man whose son, a volunteer, was killed in action, protested at the strictures of the *Mail*, and also against the decision to suppress the *Herald*. It asked the Japanese to permit the *Herald's* editor, H. G. Ball, a British subject, to establish a new paper, the *Japan Daily News*, but permission was refused. Ball, and Martin Oswald, of the *Post*, were given one week to leave the country (19).

<sup>18</sup> Black says that the *Gazette* forced the *Herald* to change from a weekly to a daily paper, but copies of the daily *Herald* exist bearing dates of at least a year before. Hanazono agrees with Black, but Hanazono's entire chapter on the foreign press is copied verbatim from *Young Japan*, sometimes without crediting the source (22).

was one of consistent criticism of Japan. As early as 1887 it condemned the government for press censorship. It upheld extrality, defended foreign holders of perpetual Yokohama leases against expropriation, and accused the Japanese of misrule in Korea. Toward the end of its existence the Gazette suffered from the competition of the Advertiser and the Japan Times, and, after reducing its size in 1918, suffered a death blow in the earthquake. For fifty-four years, ending in 1923, it published a valuable "Japan Directory" of foreign merchants engaged in the import trade (20).

An important, though short-lived, journal was the weekly *Tokyo Times*, established in 1877 by Edward Howard House, formerly a *New York Herald* correspondent. According to Captain Brinkley, House was "unquestionably the most brilliant writer ever connected with journalism in the Far East." Through the influence of Marquis Okuma, then a cabinet minister, House received a government grant for the support of his paper, and was guaranteed a

"House taught English, at a school later absorbed into the Imperial University, from 1868 to 1873. He was war correspondent in Formosa in 1876. He was also a dramatist, having collaborated with Dion Boucicault in Colleen Bawn, and was for five years lessee of St. James Theater in London. As a musician he trained the Imperial Band and was a founder of the Meiji Musical Society, later the Imperial Conservatory of Music; as a novelist, he wrote Yone Santo, a Child of Japan, on the theme of mixed marriage. Stricken with paralysis in 1883, he was granted a pension until his death in 1901 (23).

subsidy for at least a year, provided he attacked Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister. House's paper launched such persistent attacks against this diplomat that, as the *Mail* wrote, "the name *Tokyo Times* stinks in the nostrils of British residents" (21).

Other purposes are also evident. The *Tokyo Times* was the only foreign paper to uphold the Imperialists in the Satsuma Civil War, and was alone in stressing the need for immediate abolition of extrality. It demanded the return to Japan of the indemnities exacted by the Powers for expenses incurred in bombarding Shimonoseki in 1863, and, through House's efforts, the Japanese believed, the American portion was remitted. But the maturing of plans whereby Captain Brinkley might acquire the *Japan Mail* caused the *Tokyo Times* to be discontinued at the close of its year.

As one of the first foreign publicists to be retained upon an English-language journal for the better propagation of Japanese interests, House's policies were the model for other editors. In an early issue he promised that "the *Times* will not prostitute its columns to the uses of malice, spite, or greed," but almost at once he began to berate his contemporary rivals as venal and perverse. In June, 1877, the *Mail* referred to the *Tokyo Times* as a "pharasaical print whose weekly task it is to poison, so far as its feeble powers permit, the minds of the people against foreign intercourse." At the time of House's death, the

Mail, then in the *Times'* position as government protagonist, paid House tribute as "the first to make the public reflect about Japan and its rights. He was Japan's pioneer friend" (24).<sup>15</sup>

Except for the Japan Chronicle, foreign papers in the Kwansai territory (Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto) have not been as successful as in the Tokyo-Yokohama (Kwanto) region. The numbers of foreign residents seem approximately equal, and normally the Kwansai papers might expect an advantage, so far as European news is concerned, of an earlier reception of the foreign mails. Since mail boats ordinarily delay at Kobe from twelve hours to a day or more, this prior reception would permit a Kwansai editor to clip from European letters and exchanges important news relating to Japan and to sell his paper in the capital at least a day before his Tokyo-Yokohama rival. For American news, the Kwanto paper would be similarly benefited, but until recent years the more important news, so far as the foreign press in Japan was concerned, originated in Europe and Great Britain rather than in the United States. But the handicap of distance from the capital proves, in practice, too great for Kwansai papers to overcome.

Soon after the rebellion that had disrupted the

<sup>16</sup> Although House received, in 1883, the Second Class Order of the Sacred Treasure in recognition of his services, neither the name of House nor of his paper is mentioned by either Hanazono or Kawabe in their press histories. He was, however, honored by the government in the Meiji Shrine festival of 1925.

Japan Herald, A. T. Watkins started the Hiogo and Osaka Herald, of Kobe, the first English weekly in the Kwansai. This was inaugurated January 4, 1868, a week before the formal opening of Kobe to foreign commerce. The new venture was comparatively profitable, but again the autocratic temperament of Watkins incited a secession. Filomena Braga, a Portuguese compositor, left the Herald to establish, April 23, 1868, a rival weekly, the Hiogo News. The new paper was of the same size as the Herald, but was considerably cheaper, being printed on a small copying press, and the older paper withered (25). 16

Within a year the *News* passed into two other ownerships. Braga sold the paper to James E. Wainwright, an American auctioneer, who brought to the paper the American consular advertising, and Wainwright passed it on to Frank Walsh, the first English master-printer to open his own plant in Japan.<sup>17</sup> The paper, enlarged in size and at a higher price, was converted into a daily. In 1885 John Creagh, a solicitor, became the editor, and three years later bought the paper. Within a few weeks Creagh resold to a syndicate of Kobe business men, by whom the paper was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> In April, 1869, it was sold to Frederic M. Crutchley, a solicitor, but soon died.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Walsh had been employed at his uncle's printshop in Shanghai, but had come to Japan in 1868 to found the *Nagasaki Times and Shipping List*. This was moved to Kobe and was merged with the *Hiogo News*. In 1888 Walsh returned to England, where he died in 1014.

transferred in 1898 to Robert Young, of the Kobe Chronicle. Young detailed B. A. Hale, later of the Hong Kong Daily Press, as editor, and the News became an evening paper. A few months later a fire destroyed the entire plant of the News, burning nearly all the files, and the paper was amalgamated with the Chronicle.<sup>18</sup>

Among the smaller Kwansai foreign journals the most prominent is the Kobe Herald, founded in 1886 by Alfred W. Curtis and edited by him, with but one intermission, until 1926. For a two-year period, 1917–19, the editorship was held by J. S. Willes, formerly literary editor of the Japan Times. During his régime the Kobe Herald reprinted an article, originally written by Bertram Lennox Simpson (Putnam Weale) for the Shanghai Gazette, suggesting that the rice riots in Japan were partially occasioned by the Japanese Emperor's inexperience in governing. For this suggestion, which Mr. Willes called "a historical truism which could offend no one with a sufficient knowledge of the English language," the Kobe

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The name is still retained as a subtitle of the daily Japan Chronicle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Mr. Curtis came to Japan in 1873, at the age of fifteen. He became chief of the correspondence bureau of Mitsubishi, transferring to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in the same capacity when the latter company was organized in 1885. On the recommendation of Captain Brinkley, also an attaché of the N.Y.K., he was transferred to Kobe to establish the Kobe Herald as a counterfoil to the anti-Japanese Hiogo News.

Herald was convicted for casting aspersions upon the imperial house and for incitement to riot. Willes was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment and to a fine of \(\frac{\pmathbf{F}}{2}00\). On appeal the sentence was reduced to three months, but Willes had left the country. A similar prosecution, alleging libel, was brought by the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai against Colin Henry Lee, editor of the Shanghai Gazette, but was dismissed as harmless to good international relations by the British Consular Court (26).

The Kobe Herald is, in general, a loyal supporter of the Japanese government, but on two other occasions has run foul of the press laws, once for publishing news concerning fleet movements in the Russo-Japanese War, and again for comparing the bureaucracy of Japan with that of Tsarist Russia (27).

The paper is of restricted influence, and its most notable achievement was the publication of an illustrated Russo-Japanese War supplement which holds a high place among the English-language reference works of that period. In June 1926 the Kobe Herald was merged with the Far-Eastern Advertising Agency under the title of the Kobe and Osaka Press. Douglas M. Young became the managing editor, but Mr. Curtis remained as editor. The appraisal value of the Kobe Herald was set at \(\frac{4}{2}\)5,000 (28).

Three minor papers, none of which was in the Kwansai, included the *Tokyo Independent*, issued during 1885 only by Dr. F. W. Eastlake; the *Rising* 

Sun and Nagasaki Express, founded, in February, 1876, by W. L. Lewis, and still existing as the Nagasaki Press; and the Japan Press, published for three days during April, 1915, by Shunkichi Akimoto "to let the world know truthfully what is going on so as to avert the calamity of being misunderstood and suspected." Mr. Akimoto was struck down by an assailant and the paper went into bankruptcy (29).

Two English-language papers have been started to defend Japan against supposed journalistic attacks. The older of these, the Seoul Press, now the only existing English-language paper in Korea, was founded in December, 1906, to offset the strictures of the Korea Daily News, an English edition of the Dai Han Mai-il Shinpo. Acting under orders from Prince Ito, then the Japanese resident general in Korea, Motosada Zumoto, Prince Ito's secretary, launched a series of daily attacks upon the Korean paper on the ground that the Dai Han was seditious in demanding complete independence for Korea from Japan. Mr. Zumoto's efforts were successful; the Dai Han and the Korea Daily News were both suppressed, and their editors were sentenced to imprisonment.

Mr. Zumoto left the Seoul Press in 1909, and was succeeded for a time by Dr. Masujiro Honda; but the latter soon withdrew to join Mr. Zumoto's Oriental Information Bureau in New York.<sup>20</sup> Isoo Yamagata,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Dr. Honda, formerly principal of St. Margaret's school, Tokyo, was a Japanese government representative in the United States

formerly conductor of the *Yorodzu's* English column, took over the editorial duties until, in 1922, he returned to the *Yorodzu* and to the editorship of an English-language Christian monthly in Japan. Shigero Miyoshi, former chief of the foreign section of the Formosan government, replaced Mr. Yamagata as the *Seoul Press* editor.

Toward Koreans, the Seoul Press is professedly friendly, but it believes them to be "mostly ignorant and prejudiced" and says that they are "slowly rising from a decadent and slavish temperament." According to the Press, Koreans "frequently overvalue themselves and put forth claims such as they scarcely deserve. It is not surprising that those knowing their real value cannot help but be disgusted and offended at their conceit." Only one-half the Korean "students" in Tokyo, the Press believes, are real students "in the true sense of the word," the rest being malcontents or idlers sponging on the government (30).

The chief purpose of the paper is frankly to popularize the Japanese administration of Korea, especially among the foreigners residing in the peninsula. Mr. Miyoshi, its editor, admits quite frankly that at the present price of five sen a copy, and with a circu-

during the Russo-Japanese War. Later he was research attaché in ancient culture and civilization for the imperial household. Until his death in 1925 he was a frequent contributor to the Japan Advertiser, writing under the pen name of "A Japanese Pacifist" (31).

lation which he estimates as "Oh, much less than 1,000," the *Seoul Press* cannot endure without financial assistance from the government or from semi-official corporations. "It is very difficult," he says, "to maintain a foreign-language paper in Japan, and still more so in Korea. Only foreigners buy it. Neither Koreans nor Japanese students subscribe."

A flash of independence characterized the Seoul Press for a few months during the editorship of Isoo Yamagata. The paper pleaded for a more brotherly feeling by Japanese toward Koreans, and urged relaxation of the oppressive laws restricting freedom of speech. It warned against the abuse of the police spy system, and cited the Russian débâcle as a possible parallel unless reforms were introduced. Nearly all these views were expressed immediately before a speech in which Mr. Yamagata told a missionary conference that he had been ashamed of himself for having defended the militarist régime of Governors-General Count Terauchi and Viscount Hasegawa. Mr. Yamagata announced at that time that he intended to resign his post if the military tactics were continued (32).

Nevertheless within two months the *Press* was defending the burning of mission schools and the murder of unoffending Christian Koreans. These "unpleasant scenes," the *Press* said, "were unavoidable," and "our troops were perfectly right." "It

was war on a small scale and war is Hell, as General Sherman once remarked" (33).

On three occasions the Seoul Press has declared that testimony hostile to Japan's rule in Korea has been deliberately fabricated by American missionaries. An alleged conspiracy to murder the Governor-General, it declared in 1912, had been hatched in mission buildings with missionary aid. Again, in 1919, immediately preceding Mr. Yamagata's speech, the Seoul Press accused Rev. Henry G. Welborn of lying when he told the San Francisco Examiner that missionaries were attacked and beaten by Japanese soldiers. In 1920 the same accusation was laid against two members of the Canadian Presbyterian Mission who narrated stories of alleged Japanese atrocities (34).

With the improved governmental systems introduced by Governor-General Viscount Minoru Saito, the Seoul Press, according to foreign residents, has modified its attitude. Lest it be accused of anti-Christianity, it now prints a daily Bible text at the editorial masthead (35).

The other foreign-language paper established by the Japanese to give a proper interpretation to the opinions of Japan is the English edition of the Osaka Mainichi, established "in honor of the visit to Japan of the Prince of Wales," in April, 1922. The issue was originally designed to reproduce, in English, the contents of the Japanese edition, the Dai-Mai, but re-

striction of its size to four pages until late in 1925 prevented that ambition from being satisfied (36).<sup>21</sup>

Not only is the English Mainichi not a replica of the Dai Mai, but, on several occasions the general tone expressed by the two papers has been discordant. The Japanese edition seems to have shown a greater measure of hostility to foreigners than has the vounger paper. This was noticeable when the Dai Mai was accusing a Norwegian of attempted rape. and also when the Japanese edition published libelous attacks upon the crews of ships engaged in earthquake relief work.22 The English Mainichi also softened the strictures against foreigners published by the Dai Mai at a time when the city of Kobe was discussing the municipalization of a recreation ground maintained, under treaty rights, by the Kobe Rowing and Athletic Club. Similarly, the English Mainichi omitted mention of the "religious club" in Kobe where foreigners, according to the Kobe supplement of the Dai Mai, danced naked in order to enter Heaven (37).

The first appearance of the English edition was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> It is possible that the unexpected success of the Japan Times under Mr. Sheba may have hindered the Mainichi in its plan of being the chief English-language spokesman for the Japanese. A sister English-language paper, issued by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, failed after a two years' life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> These attacks accused the crews of refusing to rescue Japanese men, and outraging more than fifty Japanese women, who were afterwards flung into the sea to drown (38).

# INTERPRETING JAPAN

accompanied by an editorial announcement that "hitherto English-language papers, being edited by foreigners, fall far short of representing the real social and political conditions, sentiment, and character of the Japanese people, so far as English-language papers have been owned by other nations or subsidized by the Japanese government." In view of this criticism it is interesting to note that a careful survey of the contents of the *Mainichi* carried on throughout the month of November, 1925, revealed only ten items not equally well reported by either the *Chronicle* or the *Advertiser*. No record was kept of the number of items in which the *Mainichi* was deficient.

These ten items in which the Mainichi was superior reported an exhibition of Tokyo primary-school craftwork under the auspices of the Mitsukoshi Department Store; an exhibition of home products by the Japan Women's University: a plan by the Kobe Social Service Bureau to lend umbrellas free of charge; a plan to open a public pawnshop, market, and lodging-house in Osaka; a lecture, under Mainichi auspices, by Dr. Ku Hung-min on "True Political Economy"; an indorsement of kana as a means for writing Japanese; praise of the Braille edition of the Mainichi: the Meiji University English-Speaking Society debate, under Mainichi auspices; the formation of an association to study conditions in Manchuria; and a report that Dr. Kusano, of Keio, had succeeded in isolating the germ of measles (39).

The month selected may, of course, have been exceptional, although no reason is apparent for so thinking; but in any case the Mainichi seems to have fallen somewhat short of its announced intention. Certainly the history of the paper fails to justify the high promise held out for it in the first number issued, when Count Takahashi, the premier, declared that it "will go far toward the removal of all prevalent misunderstandings and suspicions concerning our country." This was indorsed in the same issue by Count Uchida, the foreign minister. Baron Den, the governor-general of Formosa, wrote: "It is proper that Japan should have two or three first-class English papers published here which will secure readers everywhere in the world so as to interpret Japanese views by Japanese."

#### NOTES

- Mail, April 17, 1875.
- 2. Herald of Asia, March, 1920.
- 3. Advertiser, February 6, 1924; December 5, 1924; Interviews with Messrs. Zumoto, Iwanaga, Sheba, Bowles, Hedges, Sugimura; Preston, National Review, July, 1908.
- 4. Mail, January 24, 31, 1914.
- 5. Mail, May 20, 1876, April 3, 1897.
- (a) Sensational: Messrs. Sheba and Zumoto. (b) Inaccurate: Dr. Nitobe. (c) Propaganda: Mr. Zumoto. (d)
   Assumed superiority: Mr. Takahashi. For general criticism on all these heads, see MacLaren, p. 238; Mail, November 18, 1911; Japan Times, March 3, 1925.
- 7. Mail, April 3, 1897.

## INTERPRETING JAPAN

- 8. National Review, July, 1908.
- 9. Mail, October 3, 1908.
- 10. Mail, May 29, 1909; June 2, 4, 1909.
- Japan Herald, July 18, 1867; George W. Rogers, in Mail, December 5, 1903.
- 12. Japan Herald, January 1, 1867.
- 13. Japan Herald, June 24, 1865; Young Japan, I, 349.
- 14. Japan Herald, July 9, 12, 18, 1867, August 3, 1867, January 9, 1902.
- 15. Mail, January 11, 1902; Chronicle, January 15, 1902.
- 16. Mail, January 11, 1902, February 11, 1905.
- 17. (a) Korea: Mail, December 23, 1905. (b) Merchants: Mail, October 3, 1908, February 20, 1909. (c) Missionaries: Japan Herald, July 22, 1910.
- 18. Mail, September 19, 1914; Chronicle, September 17, 1914.
- 19. Mail, September 19, 1914; Chronicle, September 24, 1914.
- 20. (a) Japan Gazette, January 31, 1887. (b) Foreign Press: Mail, November 13, 1897, February 5, 12, 1898. (c)
   Leases: Mail, April 23, 1910. (d) Residents: Mail, October 3, 1908, April 29, 1911.
- 21. Mail, December 2, 1876, December 21, 1901, January 4, 11, 1902; Mason, New East, II, 243.
- 22. Young Japan, II, 87 f.; Hanazono, p. 20.
- 23. Mail, December 21, 28, 1901; Mason, op. cit.
- 24. Mail, January 27, 1877, June 30, 1877, December 21, 1901.
- 25. Young Japan, II, 108; Chronicle, "Kobe Supplement"; Chronicle, January 28, 1909, November 19, 1914.
- Mail, May 14, 1904; Chronicle, April 19, 1917, April 10, 1919; Kobe Herald, September 30, 1918, January 8, 20, 1919.
- 27. Kobe Herald, September 27, 1904; Chronicle, April 26, 1917.
- 28. Mail, April 16, 1904; Advertiser, February 8, 1926.

- 29. Mail, February 19, 1876, February 18, 25, 1905; Advertiser, June 11, 1915.
- All in Seoul Press. (a) Ignorant: October 10, 1919. (b)
   Disloyal: October 5, 7, 1919. (c) Conceited: October 5, 1919. (d) Students: March 19, 1925.
- 31. Advertiser, November 26, 1925.
- 32. All in Seoul Press, during 1919. (a) Brotherly: September 26. (b) Freedom: September 4, 28, October 1, 4. (c) Spies: September 9, 10, October 8. (d) Yamagata speech: September 27.
- 33. Seoul Press, December 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 28, 1920. Speech by Kiyoshi in Peers, January 22, 1921.
- 34. San Francisco Examiner, August 15, 1919; Seoul Press, September 8, 9, 1912; September 10, 1919; December 7, 10, 1920.
- 35. Interviews with S. Miyoshi, W. W. Taylor, of Seoul, Dr. R. M. Wilson, of Kwanju; Dr. Swallen, of Pyengyang; letter, Rev. J. G. Holdcroft to Gilbert Bowles, dated May 18, 1925.
- 36. Interview with Naoshi Kato, editor of Osaka Mainichi, English ed., and Katsuji Inahara, editor of Tokyo Nichi Nichi, English ed. Osaka Mainichi, November 21, 1924.
- 37. Chronicle, November 6, 27, 1924, January 7, 1926.
- 38. See Notes, chapter iv, Nos. 21, 22.
- 39. See Osaka Mainichi on the following dates in November, 1924: 1, 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 21, 29.

#### CHAPTER XI

## THE FRIENDLY FOREIGN PRESS

Perhaps the best-known foreign paper was the *Japan Mail*, edited for many years by Captain Frank Brinkley.<sup>1</sup> It was the offspring of the original *Japan Times*, a weekly established in September, 1865, by

<sup>1</sup> Captain Brinkley was born in Ireland in 1841, and was educated at Dublin University and at Woolwich Military Academy. He came to the East as aide-de-camp to his cousin, Sir Richard Mac-Donald, then governor of Hong Kong. He first arrived in Japan with a detachment of British legation guards in 1867, but, except for a brief visit to Peking as a member of Prince Ito's staff when negotiations were pending over Korea, never thereafter left the country. After mastering the language, Captain Brinkley taught at the Marine Artillery College in 1871, and five years later was made professor of mathematics at Kobo Daigaku (Imperial Engineering College, later a part of Tokyo Imperial University). He wrote a twelve-volume "Oriental Series" on history, literature, religion, custums, art, and ceramics, being the recognized authority on the lastnamed subject. He contributed the article, "Japan," to the ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, wrote a historical romance, a Guide to English, Self-Taught, for Japanese, and published a Japanese-English dictionary. He was married in 1878 to Yasuko Tanaka, daughter of a Mito samurai. As a special mark of imperial favor, he was granted the Third Class Order of the Sacred Treasure and the Second Class Order of the Rising Sun with Double Rays, thus ranking among the three hundred highest personages in Japan. In view of this recognition it is somewhat pathetic that in Hanazono's history of Japanese journalism, Captain Brinkley is mentioned only as "a friend of Japan who died in Japan," and that

Charles Rickerby, of the First Yokohama Bank.<sup>2</sup> With the aid of Ernest Satow, of the British legation, Rickerby used the *Times* to advocate the overthrowing of the shogunate and the establishment of a strong central government with whom the foreigners might hold more friendly intercourse (1). The *Times* was also a strong supporter of an improved harbor for the city.

When the Meiji Restoration supplied a responsible national authority, the close connection between the British legation and the *Times* dissolved, and two years later Rickerby sold the *Times* to W. G. Howell, a Shanghai merchant, and to Inspector-General-of-Customs Lay. By them the name was changed to the *Japan Mail Daily Advertiser*, and the paper was issued daily. The *Times*, however, languished, and Howell sold to G. C. Pearson, from whom the paper was transferred in January, 1881, to Captain Brinkley.

By his thorough knowledge of the vernacular speech and writing, by long connections with the cultured groups of Japanese, and by his marriage to a Japanese, Brinkley came into contact with perhaps a

he was omitted entirely from the list of "foreigners who have served Japan" in the Meiji Shrine ceremonials of 1925. He died in 1912 (2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In 1878 Rickerby founded a second Japan Times, over the protests of the Mail, which claimed the right to use the title. The second Times was short-lived, being sold to the Mail within a year (3).

higher type of Japanese than those known to other editors. He thus came to absorb more friendly sentiments toward the Japanese than those in vogue among his rivals. This attitude, according to his close friend and associate, Walter Dening, induced the government, through Prince Ito, to assist the *Mail* by guaranteeing it a minimum circulation,<sup>3</sup> while in addition to the editorship, Captain Brinkley, as adviser to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Foreign Office, received ¥10,000 a year from each of these two agencies as a subvention for the *Mail*. He denied, however, that his "birthright of free speech" had ever been limited by any arrangement with the government, and he pitied those editors who were "deliberately shackled in a self-appointed slavery" (4).

Following out a plan announced early in his editorship that he had "no intention of taking the taste of a majority of our readers as the sole criterion of what shall or shall not be printed," he used the *Mail* primarily as a high-class propaganda organ. He staunchly advocated abolition of the old unequal treaties, was the chief foreign protagonist in both the Chinese and the Russian wars, promoted the plan for an Anglo-Japanese alliance, and fervently upheld

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> J. Russell Kennedy says, "Brinkley was given the *Mail*, lock, stock and barrel, by the government."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> His appointment in 1892 as correspondent in Japan for the London Times aided materially in his efforts to win the friendship of the English-speaking world for the Japanese contentions.

the Japanese contention whenever it was in any way assailed. He consistently denied the right of foreigners to engage in controversy on matters of Japanese domestic policy; nor was he convinced that the foreign press was necessarily a blessing to Japan. In fact, he instigated rumors, later credited by him to Jiji, that the abolition of extrality would give the Japanese an opening for debarring foreigners from journalism in Japan. Though professing not to believe that these rumors were portents of intended action, Brinkley pointed out that "Japanese experience with the foreign newspapers has not been at all calculated to inspire a desire for their continued existence." His only comfort was, as always, for the foreigner to "trust the Japanese government to deal liberally" (5).

Distrusting foreign residents sometimes suspected Brinkley of deliberately misrepresenting foreign sentiments in order to enhance his own value as a medium for favorable publicity for the Japanese. When Yokohama foreigners believed themselves exempt from paying taxes on certain properties for which they held perpetual treaty rights—a belief later upheld by a Hague Tribunal—the Mail referred to them as defying legal taxes. The American minister at Tokyo, Colonel Buck, reported that the Mail not only quoted the United States as approving of the tax, but that it continued to repeat the statement

after he had personally denied that approbation had been given. On the eve of the arrival in Japan of the American "Round-the-World Fleet," the Mail reprinted a jingoist article by Captain Richmond Pearson Hobson predicting an imminent naval conflict between Japan and the United States. A week later the Mail disavowed approving of the article, but wrote that it had been copied to provide "an excellent entertainment." The Preston articles in the National Review, and Melville E. Stone's attacks on foreign residents in Oriental lands were reprinted with approving comment (6).

The sharpest darts of Captain Brinkley were, however, reserved for rival foreign-language papers which did not share his pro-Japanese opinions. Two of them were publicly declared, when patriotic emotions were running highest during the Russo-Japanese War, to be insidious enemies sympathizing with the Russians. The Japan Gazette, the Herald, and the Hiogo News were dealt the lie direct. His Yokohama contemporaries were branded as "diseased journals." A prolonged verbal battle, reminiscent in tone of the American frontier journalism, but far more delicately executed, was waged for years with Robert Young of the Japan Chronicle. These two journals refused to exchange copies for review, but

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Identical phrasing was used by the Japan Times, twenty-eight years later, to describe newspapers unfriendly to Japan (8).

none the less commented freely on each other's failings (7).6

Brinkley enjoyed controversial writing. He had a knack of filling in the body of his editorial with subject matter somewhat foreign to the point under discussion, but permitting him to shift the argument to some position more easily defended by himself. Insertion of saving clauses at the beginning and the ending of his editorials afforded him a shelter against the charge of evading the points at issue. Then, if challenged by his adversaries, he could ridicule his critics as "perverted mischiefmakers," "crafty liars," "harlequin tricksters," or as "distorters of the truth engaged in the black art of deceit" (9)."

<sup>6</sup> As descriptive of the methods followed, the following repartée, appearing in January, 1898, on some unimportant topic now wholly forgotten, is illustrative: "The Mail is economical of truth." "The Chronicle is more courteous than careful." "The Mail is extremely loose and careless in its use of fact." "The Chronicle should devote more time to reading matter which it undertakes to controvert." Discussions between Brinkley and the Chronicle (which he almost always referred to as the "Kobe Quibbler") invariably degenerated into verbal wrangles in which the issues were swallowed in obscurity long before the debates closed.

<sup>7</sup> In 1897 the *Chronicle* made accusations that low salaries paid to government officials promoted "squeeze" and bribery. The *Mail* replied by inviting it to name one specific instance that would prove the accusation. The *Chronicle* then cited instances of bribery in a Niigata textbook scandal, Formosan concessions, the Yokohama waterworks, Tokyo water-pipe contracts, Tottori repairs, the Hamatsu post-office, the Ishikawa public works, and others. Captain Brinkley then remarked that "this marshaling of cases, some of which have been proved in courts of law and some of which rest on

Any assertion that Japanese morality was of a lower standard than that of Westerners stirred from the Mail immediate objection. When Rev. A. B. Scherer hinted at "widespread dishonesty and abandoned impurity" because Japan officially profited by licensed prostitution, and because it "tolerated the sale of young girls," Captain Brinkley rose to the defense. Admitting a comparative lack of morality among the middle-class traders, he absolved the higher grade of merchants, officials, gentlemen, and students as "punctilious in their sense of honor." In denying that the Japanese government tolerated the sale of young girls by their parents, Captain Brinkley wrote: "Abandoned impurity does not thrust itself under one's eyes as in almost all Occidental cities. Japanese gentlemen do not indulge in impure talk, nor do their papers parade obscenity.8 Mr. Scherer forgets that every European or American who visits this country regards it as axiomatic that he belongs to a superior race" (10).

mere rumors, are matters of public knowledge, and while they undoubtedly show that grounds exist for impugning the integrity of Japanese officials, we cannot think they warrant wholesale accusations. Fuller testimony should be given." Later the *Mail* refused to give the matter additional consideration, since "the *Kobe Chronicle* knows no more about the matter than everybody else knew already." By this time Brinkley had effectively smothered the charge of undue parsimony in the salary schedules (11).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Yet Captain Brinkley was assiduous in denouncing the "Third Page" as "an open sore." Incidentally, in what countries do the gentlemen speak in such a strain?

The Mail categorically denied, at all times, every implication of Japanese misgovernment. Reports of Japanese atrocities in Korea were denounced as "shocking lies" and as "iniquitous falsehoods" due to the "hostile orchestra of the Japan Herald, Japan Gazette, and Japan Chronicle," who "perpetually trifle with the truth." "Will the day never come," the Mail once asked, "when journals in Europe and America may be trusted to speak about affairs in the Far East with some measure of accuracy and discrimination?" (12).

Throughout Captain Brinkley's editorship the *Mail* stressed the cultural and literary phases of Japanese life. On artistic matters he was himself an acknowledged master. Dr. E. J. de Becker, the most eminent foreign lawyer in Japan, reviewed current legislation, while for literary appreciations he relied upon Walter Dening, a former evangelist. Dening's contribution was an invaluable fortnightly summary of the Japanese magazines, both general and religious. No other foreign paper in Japan has approached the *Mail* in excellence so far as these themes are concerned. The *Mail* was also fortunate in possessing the services of James Ellicott Beale, the first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Accusations made by Dr. E. J. Dillon that Japanese troops had helped to loot Peking were dismissed with the reminder that Dr. Dillon was "in a sick and nervous condition inconsistent with the formation of sound judgments" (13).

thoroughly trained newspaper man to be engaged on any foreign-language paper in the country.<sup>10</sup>

After Captain Brinkley's death, in 1912, the editorship passed to Thomas Satchell, and the Mail was moved to Tokyo. Mr. Satchell resigned in the following year, and was succeeded by Rev. J. Ingram Bryan, who, in turn, was replaced by J. M. Barnard, formerly of the Pall Mall Gazette and of the North China Daily News. In 1914 a half-interest in the Mail was purchased from the Brinkley estate by J. Russell Kennedy, at a cost of \(\frac{1}{2}\)9,000, on behalf of the new Kokusai Tsushinsha. The new management attempted to retain the Brinkley style, but the old savor disappeared and the Mail degenerated. It was merged with the third Japan Times, October, 1917.

The present-day survivor of the Japan Mail is the Japan Pimes, the third paper of that name, begun in February, 1897, by Motosada Zumoto at the sug-

<sup>10</sup> Dening came to Japan for the Church Missionary Society, but, in 1882, left the ministry because of religious doubtings. For a time he was editor of the Japan Gazette, but in 1885 was appointed an instructor at the Sendai High School. Beale, a Cornishman, was a printer, and later a reporter for London Sporting Life. In 1875 he was made manager of the Hong Kong Daily Press, but joined the Mail in 1881 with Captain Brinkley, remaining until 1897. He was in reality editor of the paper, for Brinkley remained much of the time at home in Tokyo, rarely visiting the offices, and sending his "copy" by messenger to Beale at the Yokohama office. On leaving the Mail, Beale became secretary of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce until 1910. In 1912 he returned to England, where he died in 1914 (14).

gestion of President Yamada, of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Yukichi Fukuzawa, of the *Jiji*, and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce. Beginning, perhaps, under a misapprehension that foreign-owned journalism would be prohibited after extrality was ended, the *Times*, with the approval of Viscount Aoki, then foreign minister, soon joined the *Mail* as the spokesman for the Foreign Office (15).

Mr. Zumoto ably edited the *Times* from 1897 until 1904, when, at the solicitation of Prince Ito he

<sup>11</sup> Mr. Zumoto, a Yale graduate, was chief translator on the Mail from 1885 to 1805. He became private secretary to Prince Ito. and went with that statesman to Korea when Prince Ito became resident-general there. As part of his assignment, Mr. Zumoto established the Seoul Daily Press in 1906, in order to combat the anti-Japanese Korea Daily News and the Dai Han Mai-il Shinpo. Largely through his indefatigable efforts the rival editor was convicted of instigating sedition and was imprisoned. Mr. Zumoto received the high Korean decoration of Tai Keuk "for meritorious services to the residency-general." He was then transferred to New York, where he established the Oriental Information Bureau "to furnish intelligent information to the American people with regard to Far-Eastern affairs." In April, 1916, he established the English-language weekly, Herald of Asia, "to give an independent view regarding Japanese domestic and foreign policies." The next year he won a seat in the Diet, but failed of re-election. Early in 1919 the Foreign Office made him publicity manager for the Siberian Expedition; and when the Herald of Asia was destroyed in the Tokyo earthquake, Mr. Zumoto was assigned to revise the official school textbooks in history for the Department of Education. On several occasions he has visited international conferences as a representative of the Japanese journalists, and was Japan's spokesman at the Williamstown Conference of 1925. He founded, and has long been president of, the International Press Association of Tokyo (16).

resigned in order to become the official press attaché at the Foreign Office. While the war continued, Mr. Zumoto wrote the daily press communiques, he told the writer, not only for the Foreign Office, but for the army and the navy. "Prince Ito really desired to give my services free of charge to the *London Express* in order to counteract a dangerous anti-Japanese propaganda in Great Britain, but the Foreign Minister advised that I be retained as the official publicity representative."

In 1911 Mr. Zumoto rejoined the *Times*, but not as editor, and remained connected with that paper until the *Times* was sold to Kokusai in 1914. Dr. Kazutomo Takahashi, also a former translator for the *Mail* and for the Foreign Office and a professor at Keio University, edited the paper from Mr. Zumoto's departure in 1904 until 1918. Successive leasings of the paper passed the *Times* from one control to another (once to men so unskilled in journalism that they sold the files as waste paper) until, in February, 1921, it was befriended by a Kokusai-Chamber-of-Commerce-Mitsui syndicate, and by the Foreign Office.

Like the *Advertiser*, the *Times* is particularly concerned lest radicalism win control. Labor strikes, it thinks, are dangerous. When the employees of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha struck, in 1924, <sup>12</sup> for a greater

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For a full account of this strike and of the part played therein by Yonejiro Ito, see the writer's "Industrial Democracy in Ja-

measure of industrial democracy, the *Times* was a powerful defender of the company. "If such mutinous spirit and wanton disregard for authority is allowed to prevail, all commerce and industry will go into complete demolition, Japan itself will disappear, and Bolshevism will reign supreme" (17).

Socialists, according to the *Times*, "are associated with law-breaking, and, it is generally believed, would try to carry their subversive ideas into execution every time they can take advantage of any misfortune that may befall the country." The *Times*, therefore, regularly reports the discovery of bomb plots, although it half deprecates the use of police spies as a means for uncovering the evidence (18).

Slight aid is rendered by the *Times* toward bettering the condition of the Eta (or the outcasts); but on the contrary, the *Times* assists in spreading ru-

pan," Nation, (February 11, 1925). The Bolsheviks, of course, win little sympathy from the Times. In 1918 the Times paid its respects to Lenin and Trotzsky as "making their ways on their miserable bellies to Brest-Litovsk, a sight to make the strongest stomach turn and the meanest spirit rise in revolt." The same men, with Krylenko, were further described as "the greediest mongrels of the scavenger pack, wriggling their way, ventre a terre, hither and yon at the bidding of the Kaiser," and as "the men who have sold their nation." The Times went on to warn Japan of German spies walking the "open thoroughfares of Japan and flaunting their ribald and filthy contempt of all that is decent and human and right." By implication, in 1925, the Times held the shock of the Bolshevik rebellion as responsible for the mental illness of the Japanese Emperor (21).

mors that the Eta are really Bolshevists, and that they plan to murder prominent Japanese (19).<sup>18</sup>

Three weeks after the Home Office and the metropolitan police announced that red propaganda was lessening in the Empire, the *Times* visualized "five million workers in Japan" as being "rapidly carried to the Left, many being professed Communists and others anarchists." Five days later it warned against a radical mass-meeting planned by the Fabian Society. It urged all radio subscribers to tune in when the official broadcasting station placed "Giovanni, Giovanni," the Fascist marching song, on the air, and asked them to learn the music (20).

Koreans also are suspected of plots against Japan. Although the *Times* realizes that the constant printing of unsubstantiated rumors of Korean discontent precipitated a panic-stricken pogrom against Koreans in the post-earthquake days, it cannot refrain from continuing to publish additional rumors. Not only were the worst libels against Koreans reprinted twice, after Mr. Sheba had confessed, over his signature, his shame at having believed them, but throughout 1924 plots to spread Sovietism, to bomb buildings, and to murder prominent Japanese are frequently ascribed to Korean instigation. These reports usually consist of vague dispatches, without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Under the headline "Eta Advocate Recognition of Red Republic," the reader finds only a forecast that an Eta convention may discuss the matter (22).

names, dates, places, or details specified, and without any source of authority being mentioned. As typical of the Korean "plots" given front-page "scare heads" in the spring of 1925, the following is cited (23): "Police Fear Korean Plot." The article states that the police bureau warns against newly arrived Koreans and "anti-Soviet Jews." They are said to be in touch with 3,000 members of a Korean secret society in Hawaii: "There is much going back and forth. The report is vague as yet, but the authorities fear that some plan is being incubated against Japan." This article ran for a column on page 1, with a breakover of another third of a column on an inside page.

Constructive news about Korea is lacking. That Korean wives have a "divorce fad" (no statistics are given); that a newly arrived Korean lost his family of ten, but that he would never think of looking for them in a bathhouse; that trains in Korea are forced to halt because Koreans make a practice of sleeping on the tracks; and that Governor-General Saito is ruling beneficially constitutes the bulk of Korean news in the latter half of 1924 (24).

The sole item available to show that Koreans and Japanese seek a better mutual understanding was published in February, 1925. It described the arrival in Tokyo of a Korean mission representing "an important movement for securing a heart-to-heart understanding with and the cultivation of harmony be-

tween Koreans and Japanese. The union is very young and is at present not possessed on any constructive plan of work. The present mission is to call on prominent Japanese and to obtain their views on the problems of Korea and to make them a guide." This item was followed the next day by a front-page account headed, "Koreans with Drawn Daggers Attack Imperial Hotel," giving details of angry crowds and of disorder which the writer, who was present at the Hotel at the time specified, failed to observe. No arrests seem to have been made, although the *Times* relates that police broke up the mob (25).<sup>14</sup>

In spite of its own record, the *Times* once more ventured, in February, 1925, to impress upon its readers the danger of believing irresponsible rumors concerning the Koreans.

Like the Seoul Press, the Japan Times prints extended theological discussions. In November, 1923, its letter columns were crammed with contributions on the topic, "Was the Earthquake the Result of Sin?" In January, 1924, under a double-column headline, it carried a "dialogue" between "The Father, "The H. G.," and "The L. J. C." in the "Council Chamber of the Trinity," in which the earthquake, fire, and tornado that burned alive 42,000 refugees at Honjo, Tokyo, was described as being planned (27).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The appearance of reports such as this has a close correlation with the time when large tourist parties are arriving in Japan (26).

In the words of "The L. J. C.," the Honjo fire was "something to make these poor heathens realize Hell. Suppose we caused tens of thousands to be burned alive, such a sacrifice might become a blessed advantage to the nations and the missionaries." "The Father" answers, "Your reasoning is indubitable, I agree." "The H. G." enters, saying, "I think that will be all right." The "dialogue" ends with the stage direction, "All Three rising, 'Our will be done on earth, Amen.'" No letters whatever were printed by the *Times* for ten days following this "dialogue," nor at any time were letters printed touching on this topic.

On social topics the record of the *Times* is good. It has consistently opposed licensed prostitution, and has strongly urged that the "new Tokyo must be a clean Tokyo, with neither vice nor graft." It has attacked bribery, urged the improvement of labor contract laws regulating girl factory workers, and has attacked the "medieval repression" of the Department of Education. The Times desires Japanese school histories to be free from myth, but has itself perpetuated the tale of the "Precious Throne, founded by the Emperor Jimmu in 660 B. c. and continued in unbroken line, uninterrupted, undisputed, and unopposed." A very remarkable departure was a strong editorial, November, 1924, warning that Formosa was suffering from "maladministration of justice, unduly strict censorship, and antiquated government."

The *Times* insisted that unless reforms were at once provided, Formosan "revenge will not only be irresistible, but most destructively vindicative." This editorial followed close after a special tour of the island undertaken by Roderick O. Matheson for the *Japan Times*, in which he found only rosy prospects for good feeling and gratitude for Japan's services in governing the island (28).

Under the editorship of Sometaro Sheba, formerly a newspaperman in Hawaii, the *Japan Times* has, within the past five years, shot forward rapidly. Equipped with a high-speed press, the largest and best equipment of all the foreign papers in Japan, the pressroom turn-out has risen from 2,032 copies on the day before the Tokyo earthquake, to 6,300 at the end of 1924.<sup>16</sup>

An analysis of this increased circulation revealed that 55 per cent of the gain was by foreign subscriptions, and 45 per cent by Japanese. Of the new Japa-

16 "Press run" is, of course, not identical with "paid circulation," but the *Times* is unique among foreign-language papers in Japan in giving any public estimates of its sales. It is especially indignant that the *Advertiser* claims "double the combined circulation of all other foreign dailies published in Japan," and offered to bet \$\frac{\pi}{1}\$,000 that the *Advertiser's* sales were smaller than the *Times'* alone. The stakes were to be divided among the Japan Red Cross, the Tokyo Union Church, and the American School in Japan. The *Advertiser* took no public notice of the challenge, prefering to believe, as its editor privately said, that the *Times* was not a "foreign daily." The *Chronicle* also declined to aid the *Times* in refutation of the *Advertiser's* claim (31).

nese subscribers, approximately 80 per cent were mercantile establishments, and the remainder students. The *Times* estimated that its circulation could be classified as 25 per cent among foreigners, and 75 per cent among Japanese, of whom 85 per cent were in the business or official classes, and the remainder students (29).

The peculiarly friendly relations which the *Times* has enjoyed with leading diplomatic and industrial leaders was evident when, in 1925, it sought to find a president. In February, Tokichi Tanaka, former vice-minister for foreign affairs, and former chief of the Intelligence Department, assumed the post, but resigned in May upon his appointment as ambassador to Russia. He was succeeded by Yone-jiro Ito, former president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. The willingness of men of such rank to associate themselves with a journal of 6,000 circulation was deemed a high approval of the *Times* as an agent for international relations.

But the close associations with high officials have not been devoid of misinterpretation. So prominent a newspaper and political figure as Mr. Mochizuki accused the *Times* of being a "Foreign Office journal," and the charge has been repeated by the *Japan Advertiser* and by the *Fourth Estate*. The charges were denied, however, by the *Times*, which insisted that it is "unsubsidized, unbribed, and under no obligations." It pointed out that similar charges of receiv-

ing subsidies have been made against the Advertiser as "an organ of the Moscow Soviet," and against "the unctuous Chronicle" as a recipient of German gold. "These rumors," said the Times, "are, of course, absurd." In conversing with the writer, Mr. Sheba was indignant at the suggestion that his paper was suspected of receiving subsidies (30): "I have absolutely no subsidy. I would not have undertaken the management of this paper under any such conditions. I learned from my newspaper work in Hawaii that a subsidized newspaper cannot prosper and that it sacrifices the respect and the confidence of its readers. I believe in conducting a newspaper fairly and above board and by fair methods. I will tell you frankly who my backers are. They are Mr. Ito, Mr. Yamashina, of the Chamber of Commerce, and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha."

Foreign newspapermen in Japan remain convinced, however, that the *Times* still receives a subsidy. A new press, capable of printing a newspaper of 50,000 circulation, was acquired by the *Times* in January, 1925, after having been imported from the British Army of Occupation newspaper in Vladivostook by the Japanese War Office. Both Frank H. Hedges, of the *Advertiser*, and A. Morgan Young, of the *Chronicle*, declare that this press was a free gift by the War Office, the General Staff, or the Foreign Office, to the *Japan Times*. A high official of a certain government department, who forbade mention of

either his name or of his office but who would certainly be foremost among those best qualified to give information on the subject of subsidies to foreign-language papers, was not so sure that the *Times* does not receive financial aid from official sources: "You must remember that the system in Japan has always been different from that in your country," he explained. "In America they shrink from the idea of the government's intermeddling in business or from its giving monetary assistance, especially to a newspaper; but in Japan the newspaper may be regarded as a public necessity which should rightfully be assisted from the public funds when such sums are needed. I should not be at all surprised if the *Times* is on the Foreign Office subvention list at present."

Save for its labor and Korean news, the pages of the *Times* have been reasonably accurate. It did, however, publish a long detailed "Special Cable to *Japan Times*," describing the signing of the Locarno treaties and appearing on the streets of Tokyo five hours before the treaties had actually been signed (32).<sup>16</sup> As an organ of opinion it has lacked effectiveness, although its roster has contained at times a number of proficient journalists.<sup>17</sup> Among its greatest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> This difference is, of course, net, allowing for actual difference in time between Tokyo and Locarno.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Among its staff have been listed Professor Y. Takenobu, of Waseda, former translator for the *Mail* and publisher of the *Japan Year Book*; Shun Akimoto, translator for the *Advertiser*, correspondent for *Yomiuri* at the Versailles Peace Conference, and for-

contributions have been the publication of a number of special supplements discussing fully the Japanese reaction to the American immigration laws, giving reassuring comments by Americans to the Japanese, and aiming at "a frank exchange of views." Because it judged the American-Japanese relationship to be "very delicate," the *Times*, regardless of expense, published 50,000 copies of one of these special Japan-to-America issues on costly paper for wide distribution in America. Similar supplements have been issued for explaining Japanese conditions to the Russians, and in commemoration of a French trade mission to Japan.

#### NOTES

- \*I. G. W. Rogers, December 4, 1903; J. P. Mollison, Januuary 16, 1900.
  - October 29, 1902; Dening, in Japan Chronicle, November 7, 1912; Hanazono, p. 65.
  - 3. March 27, 1897.

mer editor of the Japan Press; Thomas Cowen, founder of the Manila Times and of the China Times of Tientsin, and a correspondent for the London Times in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars; Francis McCullough, former war correspondent with the Russian armies, captured at Port Arthur and brought to Japan as a prisoner of war; Percy Whiteing and Daniel Langford, professors at Keio University; and Roderick O. Matheson, formerly news editor of the Advertiser, later, of Kokusai, and correspondent for the Chicago Tribune.

<sup>\*</sup>Citations in Nos. 1-14, inclusive, are taken from the Japan Mail, unless otherwise noted.

- 4. May 28, 1910, October 29, 1912; Toyo Jiro, October, 1921; interviews with Messrs. Kennedy and Zumoto.
- 5. (a) Treaties: November 12, 1884, January 11, 1902.
  (b) Foreign Press: January 7, 1888, May 28, 1910. (c)
  Extrality: February 27, 1897, November 13, 1897, February 5, 12, 1898; Jiji, April 6, 1897. (d) Propaganda: April 3, 1897, May 26, 1900, May 4, 1904, July 2, 1910, December 17, 1910, October 29, 1912. (e) Independent from majority: November 12, 1884, November 2, 1912. (f) "Trust Japan": April 3, 1897.
- 6. (a) Buck: April 5, 12, 1902; Chronicle, May 28, 1902.
  (b) Leases: April 5, 12, 19, 1902. (c) Hobson: October 17, 24, 1908. (d) Preston: September 18, 1908. (e) Stone: April 29, 1911.
- (a) Enemies: May 1, 1904, October 1, 1904. (b) Liars:
   September 25, 26, 1908, October 3, 1908. (c) Diseased:
   July 31, 1897. (d) Quibblers, March 18, 1899.
- 8. Japan Times, March 3, 1925.
- 9. (a) Evasion: Tokutomi, in *Kokumin*, October 30, 1912.
  (b) Mischief-makers: April 19, 1902. (c) Tricksters: October 3, 1908. (d) Craftiness: April 19, 1902, April 28, 1906. (e) Distorters: October 24, 1908.
- 10. October 14, 1905.
- July 1, 6, 10, 1897, August 10, 1897; Chronicle, July 3, 1897, August 28, 1897.
- 12. (a) November 7, 1903, January 16, 1904. (b) Lies: April 20, 1912. (c) Triflers: November 7, 1903, December 23, 1905, May 4, 1912. (d) Orchestra: December 23, 1905; May 19, 1906, December 15, 1906, May 30, 1908, August 22, 1908, October 3, 1908.
- 13. February 23, 1901.
- 14. Dening, in *Chronicle*, December 11, 1913; Beale, October 19, 1912; *Chronicle*, January 14, 17, 1915.

- \*15. Mail, February 27, 1897; Interviews with Messrs. Kennedy, Sheba, Zumoto.
  - 16. Mail, May 15, 1909; interview with Mr. Zumoto.
  - 17. September 23, 1924.
  - 18. (a) Lawbreakers: October 12, 1923. (b) Bombs: January 17, 18, 22, 24, 1924, May 6, 1924, August 6, 1924, September 5, 16, 1924. (c) Spies: October 20, 1924.
  - 19. July 11, 12, 1924.
  - September 23, 1924; October 15, 20, 1924; for radio, see
     November 20, 1925.
  - 21. March 1, 1918, May 9, 1925.
  - 22. March 3, 1924.
  - 23. (a) Sheba's apology, October 24, 1923. (b) Libels on Koreans: December 19, 21, 1923, March 8, 1924, June 2, 1924. (c) Sovietism: July 10, 1924, October 24, 1924. (d) Revolts: March 25, 1924, December 17, 1924. (e) Banditry: August 1, 11, 12, 1924. (f) Bomb plots: January 7, 18, 24, 1924, March 7, 1924, May 16, 1924, June 6, 1924, September 25, 1924. (g) Murderous Koreans: August 19, 1924, September 26, 1924, January 14, 1925, February 27, 1925, April 20, 1925.
  - 24. (a) Divorce: July 3, 1924. (b) Lost: October 10, 1924.
    (c) Trains: August 27, 1924. (d) Saito: September 26, 1924, October 24, 1924, January 14, 1925.
  - 25. February 14, 15, 1925, December 29, 30, 1926.
  - 26. February 2, 1925.
  - 27. January 12, 1924.
  - 28. (a) Vice: June 8, 1924, July 26, 1924, December 1, 1924.
    (b) "New Tokyo": November 21, 1923. (c) Bribery: May 6, 1924. (d) Education: October 22, 1924, December 9, 1924. (e) Myths: March 10, 1924, December 1,
- \*Citations in Nos. 15-32, inclusive, are taken from the Japan Times, unless otherwise noted.

- 5, 12, 18, 19, 1926. See Bunkichi Horioka, Nihon oyobi Han Taiheiyo Minsoku no Kenkyu (Japanese and the Pan-Pacific Races), Tokyo, January, 1927. (f) Jimmu: May 9, 1925. (g) Formosa: November 10, 1924.
- 29. February 2, 1925.
- 30. December 12, 1924; Mochizuki, in Chronicle, July 5, 1917.
- 31. Circulation figures, November 5, 1924, December 5, 1924; Challenge, January 31, 1924; Chronicle, February 7, 1924
- 32. December 1, 1925.

#### CHAPTER XII

# THE JAPAN ADVERTISER—AMERICA'S NEWSPAPER

The Japan Advertiser, the only American paper in Japan, was founded at Yokohama in 1890 by Meiklejohn, a master-printer. For its first year no news was carried, the paper serving only as an advertising bulletin, but in 1891 Meiklejohn was joined by Robert Hay, a reporter of the Japan Gazette, and under Hay's direction the paper speedily assumed a leading place among the English-language journals (1).1

Meiklejohn and Hay continued in association until, in 1895, the *Advertiser* was sold to James R. Morse, founder of the American Trading Company, and he, in turn, transferred the paper shortly before the close of the century to Arthur May Knapp, a former Unitarian missionary. Under Knapp's proprie-

<sup>1</sup> Meiklejohn left the United States to join the Japan Mail. After a few months on that paper, he left the Mail in 1873 for the Japan Herald, and five years later became printer for the short-lived Tokyo Times. When this paper ceased publication, Meiklejohn continued as a job printer. Hay had been since 1883 on the staff of the Mail and of the Gazette. He claimed to have been the first shorthand reporter to arrive in Japan. When Morse bought the Advertiser, Meiklejohn returned to the United States, where he died in 1904. Hay rejoined the Mail as managing editor, dying in 1909 (2).

torship the paper had a series of financial difficulties, drawing at one time so close to actual bankruptcy that the American Association of Yokohama was called upon to save the paper from extinction.

Early in 1909 Knapp sold the paper to a syndicate of American business men headed by E. W. Frazar: but as the purchasers desired to remain in the background, the stock of the Advertiser was ostensibly transferred to the name of J. Russell Kennedy, then the correspondent for the Associated Press. A tangled series of financial operations followed, according to the narration by Mr. Kennedy himself: "Knapp sold to me, acting for Frazar and other Americans. I owned the stock for them," said Mr. Kennedy in speaking to the writer. "Then I sold the stock to George W. Scott, an Englishman who was backed by Takata & Company, and when the Takata's purpose was fulfilled, Scott offered to give the paper away as a dead loss. No foreign paper in Japan can make money without outside support, and, as he had no subsidy. Scott offered me the paper as a gift. I found Benjamin W. Fleisher in Yokohama, and as he was a protégé of mine-I had given him his first job in Japan—I took Fleisher to Scott. Scott, however, refused to sell to Fleisher, but at my insistence gave the paper to him for \(\frac{1}{2}\)30,000. He advanced Fleisher \(\frac{4}{3}\),000 as a first payment, and gave him ten years to pay the balance."

These transactions were conducted, for the most

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part, under cover, and are not recorded in the official history of the *Advertiser*, published as a serial in April, 1924. Mr. Kennedy's connection with the paper was not disclosed until his resignation was announced in April, 1909. Even then, it is suspected, Mr. Kennedy retained an interest in the paper, although, as an Associated Press correspondent, such connections are frowned upon by the news-gathering association.

This connection was surmised when in August, 1909, three editorials, entitled "Dangerous Tax Dodgers," "It Is to Laugh," and "In Self-Defense" appeared. They were attributed by the Japan Gazette to Mr. Kennedy's authorship, although the Advertiser denied that he had written the articles. E. J. Harrison, then editor, resigned in protest at the disclaimer, and sent the original manuscript, in Mr. Kennedy's handwriting, to the Chronicle. In 1925 Mr. Kennedy admitted to the writer that the editorials had been written by him (3).

No subsequent changes in ownership took place. The *Advertiser* was moved to Tokyo in 1913. Editorial changes, however, have been frequent. E. J. Harrison,<sup>2</sup> editor from 1907 to 1909, was succeeded

<sup>2</sup> Harrison was a colorful personality. Coming to Japan in 1897 for the Japan Herald, he later transferred to the Japan Times and the Japan Chronicle, was correspondent during the Russo-Japanese War for the London Daily Mail, and, after peace was declared, joined the Advertiser. He left the paper in 1907 to become secretary for Mr. Kennedy, but soon returned to the Advertiser. After

by Cecil Grev. of the London Standard, who arrived in Japan in August, 1909, held the editorship for one week, and returned at once to London. I. N. Penlington, an editor of the Far East, followed Grev's brief tenure, remaining until March, 1912, when he again rejoined the magazine. Charles R. Hargrove, former acting correspondent for the London Times at Washington, succeeded Penlington and remained as editor until 1014, when he returned to the Times. He was replaced by Hugh Byas, former subeditor of the London Times Weekly. Byas remained until July, 1917, resigning to join the New East, and was succeeded by Gregory Mason. The latter retired in the following April, after a somewhat stormy editorship, and Mr. Byas returned to the Advertiser until, in 1922, he became the Advertiser correspondent in London, R. Lewis Carton then combined the functions of London Times correspondent with that of editor of the Advertiser, and remained until his contract was terminated by the earthquake. When publication was resumed, in January, 1924, Frank H. Hedges. formerly of the Washington Star and later Peking

again resigning he was the New York Herald correspondent, and then, in 1913, went to Vladivostock to join a Russian paper. During the Great War he was successively an officer in a Chinese coolie labor battalion, a member of the British propaganda bureau at Archangel and British consul at Kovno. He was one of the few foreigners to become so proficient at judo (Japanese wrestling) as to gain the coveted black belt of mastery. He has written two books on modern Japan (4).

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correspondent of the Advertiser, took over the position until November, 1926, when Mr. Byas returned to the editorial chair. Mr. Byas's place at London was filled by F. A. McKenzie, war correspondent, from 1900 to 1910, of the London Daily Mail, editor of the London Times Weekly from 1910 until 1914, and Chicago Daily News correspondent at Moscow prior to 1926. Mr. McKenzie is the author of several books upon Korean problems (5).

For the United States, the Advertiser's importance cannot be overemphasized, since, until late in 1023, virtually all the Japanese news received by American newspapers from sources other than the Kokusai-Associated Press service was filtered through the Advertiser office. Its staff members were the special correspondents for the New York Times, the Public Ledger-New York Evening Post syndicate, the United Press, Central News of London, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Christian Science Monitor, New York World, and other papers. Since the earthquake, special correspondents, not connected with the Advertiser, have been stationed in Japan by several journals, and the dependency of the United States upon Advertiser news has not been as absolute as in the past; but except for the Ledger-Post and World, the newspapers just mentioned were still supplied, in 1926, by Advertiser employees.

Because of this dependency the singular ill-fortune which has pursued the Advertiser's news affects

Japanese-American relations, for the staff members of the paper cable overseas the news as printed in the Advertiser. Soon after Mr. Mason's accession to the post, a sensational article, published under a two-column headline, announced that Russian anarchists had twice attempted to murder Senator Elihu Root, then a special commissioner to the Kerensky government in Russia. The article, written by Mrs. Mason, was at once repudiated by Hugh A. Moran, a member of the Root party, by the British, French, and Italian military attachés of the mission, and by three fellowtravelers with Mrs. Mason. In an official statement the Russian Embassy accused the Advertiser of misquoting an interview with the Embassy's First Secretary and of violating pledges and distorting facts. The Advertiser answered that the Embassy made "unqualified misstatements," and declared that denials were the result of attempt to "soft-pedal the news." Three denials of the sensational report were sent to the Chronicle, and one to the Japan Gazette, since, as Mr. Moran explained, the Advertiser refused to print a statement of correction without mutilations which completely destroyed the meaning of the statement. "Persisting in such a story, and bolstering it up with misquoted interviews," said Mr. Moran, "descends to the depths of perfidy" (6).

It is possible that the *Advertiser*, in its search for sensation, has sometimes carried its policies beyond the limits of good taste. Following the Messina earth-

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quake, the Advertiser wrote that residents of Tokyo and Yokohama were conjuring up uncomfortable visions of a similar catastrophe in Japan. "Nor can it be said that these fears are without foundation. Saturday's playful tremor may perhaps be regarded as a rehearsal or a curtain-raiser; the real drama has yet to be staged, and staged it will be." A week later the Advertiser published gruesome "details" attributed to a "maimed and battered survivor in a European hospital" of an earthquake which would, in the future, annihilate both Tokyo and Yokohama.

Protests from the *Mail* against this "prophecy" were met by rejoinders from the *Advertiser* that the objectors were "overexcited," "unnecessarily caloric," and "neurotic" (7).

Four months after the great Tokyo earthquake had occurred, and but three days after a second sharp shock had been felt, new earthquake predictions were repeated by the Advertiser under a two-column front-page headline. On the day set for the calamity a front-page article reminded Tokyo readers of the accuracy of predictions. Seven months later the Advertiser preened itself with an editorial stating that it had refrained from publishing earthquake predictions because "they seemed exceedingly vague and unscientific, although those making the predictions are among Japan's most eminent seismologists" (8).

The war period was especially subject to misunderstandings. In the first month of the war the Ad-

vertiser told of two captured German cruisers at Hong Kong, "with their upper works completely shot away" and with blood stains where "streams of red had issued from the scuppers, staining the vessels' sides to the water-line, bearing mute witness to the number of lives that must have been sacrificed." This story was accepted on the unsupported testimony of one C. L. Powell, a traveler from China, and pictures of the crippled ships were printed to verify the tale (9).

Resemblance of the pictures to those of Russian warships at Port Arthur caused residents in Japan to challenge the whole story as a "fake." Faced with the album in which the original picture had been published, the *Advertiser* admitted the deception but endeavored to exculpate itself by saying: "There can be no doubt that it is an excellent photograph of crippled ships," and that "there are a couple of old gunboats at Hong Kong used for target practice which would make a grim picture of the ruin caused by a naval battle and might mislead an observer."

In the same month the *Advertiser* carried an exciting story of the pursuit of the liner "Nile" across the Pacific by German submarines. The story arose because of the arrival of the "Nile" at Yokohama nine hours ahead of schedule, but passengers and crew alike denied the truth of the sensational reports (10).

Similar carelessness, in the summer of 1916,

caused fright among the summer residents of Karuizawa, a popular mountain resort for missionary families. In reporting that burglars had murdered two Methodist missionaries, the *Advertiser* printed a warning from its Karuizawa correspondent: "We have felt much too safe at Karuizawa. With the present methods of police patrolling and with household protection which is practically nil, a few robbers could murder any number of households and no one would be the wiser." The correspondent then proceeded to warn every household to keep an automatic pistol, and urged that military officers be detailed to teach foreigners how to shoot "as a measure of armed preparedness."

In an editorial published on the same day the Advertiser deprecated the spread of "nervousness and funk" which residents of Karuizawa were feeling, and praised the Karuizawa police as the most efficient of any country town, but the editor, the then correspondent of the Central News of London, cabled only the plea for armed preparedness to London. So distasteful was the Advertiser's comment to the Karuizawa community that Rev. A. Oltmans, of Meiji Gakuin, was moved to write a protest for the "unwarranted impressions conveyed by the Advertiser correspondent" (11).

In the following month, however, the *Advertiser* printed terrifying reports on an infantile paralysis "epidemic" at the same resort, based on the discovery

of two cases of the disease, causing the Karuizawa physicians to issue a protest manifesto to the paper; and again in September a "cholera scare" was announced. On this occasion the *Advertiser* announced that guests of the Karuizawa Hotel had been forced to move out of that hostelry to the Mampei Hotel because of the prevalence of disease, and the Karuizawa Hotel could secure retraction of the libel only by insertion of a paid advertisement of correction. Ten days later the *Advertiser* printed a retraction, but in an inconspicuous location and in an unapologetic manner (12).

Reluctance to correct libels based on hasty acceptance of unverified reports seems to have been fairly common with the Advertiser during one portion of its life. A few days after the "cholera scare" the Advertiser reprinted an alleged interview from the San Francisco Examiner, purporting to quote George R. Allen, of Yokohama, as declaring that Japan, Russia, and Germany were forming a triple alliance, and quoting as Mr. Allen's authority the Nippon Advertiser (a non-existent paper) and the Japan Advertiser. On the strength of this "interview," the Japan Advertiser referred to Mr. Allen as the "King of Liars," and called on him to produce proof. Mr. Allen wrote a letter protesting that the Examiner interview was a fabrication and that he had already repudiated the statement falsely attributed to him. This was printed by the Advertiser under the caption, "A Weak

Explanation," and a second letter was dismissed with the brief footnote: "The Advertiser is only interested in this matter in so far as it referred to the Nippon Advertiser and the Japan Advertiser." No word of regret was printed by the paper for having dubbed Mr. Allen "King of Liars." Colonel Paul G. Ossipaev, of the Russian General Staff, protested at a later date because the Advertiser quoted him as advising Japan to withdraw from Siberia. Because the Advertiser refused to print his letter of denial, Colonel Ossipaev was obliged to write his explanation to the Chronicle (13).

On other occasions the Advertiser has undergone severe criticism. It misquoted an editorial of the Sydney Morning Herald, representing the Australian paper as assuming aggressive anti-Japanese views. It published an alleged special dispatch from Paris describing the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty, giving complete circumstantial details four days before the event took place. The dispatch was attributed to the Foreign Office, but in the correction the blame for the error was thrown upon "a Tokyo news-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> That the Advertiser did, at times, print retractions is witnessed by its printing, on the front page, in December, 1916, corrections of two items previously published by it. One error was ascribed to misleading information received from the Yokohama police. In 1917 it apologized to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company for having said that the steamships would give 1,000 tons of cargo space free to the Red Cross each month. The proper figure was one ton (14).

agency." The correction, incidentally, was "buried" in a small and inconspicuous paragraph (15).

As late as April, 1025, the Advertiser was careless in its interpretation of the news. Under the headline "Ambassador Kopp Says Pact Is But Scrap of Paper," the Advertiser wrote that the arriving Soviet envoy had announced his intention of spreading communist propaganda, but toward the end of the article, in type finer than that used in the "lead," the Advertiser's own correspondent at Shimonoseki quotes Mr. Kopp as denying any such intention. The false assertion, but not the denial, was cabled by the Advertiser's reporter to the New York Times. Uncertainty is also felt concerning an interview with General Manager Iwanoff of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which M. Iwanoff is quoted as declaring that Russia would help the United States to fight Japan. This interview was repudiated by M. Iwanoff in a letter to the Advertiser stating that he had refused to comment on political or diplomatic matters to the Advertiser correspondent. Denials were also sent to the Japan Times by both M. Iwanoff and by the Soviet Ambassador (16).

Under prevailing conditions of newspaper technique, where speed of publication is the primary desideratum, any journal will at times print items which it has not thoroughly substantiated. Rumors received from ordinarily responsible sources will not in every case be given prior investigation. Nor can errors in

judgment be regarded as a factor unduly militating against a paper's policy. Of the major English-language papers in Japan, the *Advertiser* probably deserves the palm for carelessness and unreliability; but its major fault, and one for which there seemingly is small excuse, is its unwillingness to make correction for its errors when they are pointed out. Happily, this fault has been most visible in the issues of a decade past, but traces may be found in recent times in its treatment of the Kopp and Iwanoff affairs.

As a medium for understanding the cultural life of Japan the Advertiser is invaluable. A one-year survey of the paper, made in 1924, discloses a veritable encyclopedic treatment of local customs and social practice. Shunkichi Akimoto's daily column, variously entitled, gave timely and prolific descriptions of the various religious and popular festivals, discoursed upon the story of the "Seven Gods of Good Luck," described the decorations and the fittings of a Japanese house, revealed the curious encounters met in rambling about the Tokyo suburbs, and clarified a host of other matters of enlightenment to foreigners. Pen pictures of the more prominent Japanese statesmen were included, and in 1925 a series of articles on conditions in Korea won high praise from Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, president of the House of Peers (17).

Other aids to a cultural appreciation of Japan included nineteen essays on vernacular literature, writ-

ten, for the most part, by Dr. Shogoro Washio, thirty critiques of Japanese art by Dr. Masujiro Honda; a series of articles on "Yamato, Cradle of Japan," giving the traditions of Japan's first province; various "Tokyo Reminiscences," published almost daily for two months: a biweekly summary of religious thought in Japan, inferior, however, to the type introduced by Walter Dening in the Mail; five thorough analyses, by Professor E. W. Clement, of the Tokyo Higher Normal School, on the history of the Diet and of the Taisho era (1912-24); a treatise, with explanatory discussion, by Dr. A. J. Neville Whymant on the oceanic origins of the Japanese; and thirty-three articles by Suveo Nakano on the history of Japan's foreign intercourse from the earliest times. Weekly columns on "Stage and Screen," new books, Ainu ethnology by Ven. Dr. John Batchelor, the most eminent authority on the subject, and a "Far-Eastern Sketch Book," by Frank H. Hedges, rounded out the cultural contributions of the Advertiser during 1924. Among the more notable contributions of former years were Dr. E. J. de Becker's weekly summaries of supreme court decisions in 1916, the forty or more travel sketches of unfrequented corners of Japan written in 1918-19 by Charles A. Parry, Professor Clement's papers on "Constitutionalism in Japan," published in 1919, Hugh Byas's painstaking survey of the contents of the native press in 1916, and, at all times, the

reprinting of the more important articles on Japanese affairs published in America and Great Britain.

This catholicity does not extend to the more controversial subjects likely to draw unfavorable notice from the censor. Such matters as the labor, feminist, and youth movements are avoided, save for sketchy and innocuous accounts, sometimes laboriously humorous, but more often as despondent in tone as the assertion made by Dr. Washio: "Nearly all university students or young women are going loose in the streets, cafés, motion picture houses, and Marunouchi offices" (18).

In order to escape the censor the Advertiser goes to perhaps extreme lengths in commenting on the labor, radical, and Socialist demands. Rarely is an occasion lost for putting the views of these classes in an unfavorable light, even at the cost, at times, of seeming to confuse inextricably labor unionists, Communists, Anarchists, Pacifists, and Socialists. The news "features" them in conjunction with bomb plots, rioting; and "dangerous thought." Frequent headlines tell the reader that police and secret service men are "watching reds"; May Day parades are predicted to be bloody; labor groups are "nests of Communists"; and labor speeches invariably are reported as "inflammatory harangues" urging revolution. Because Manabu Sano, a Socialist formerly on the faculty of Waseda, had spoken in a Fukuoka public hall, the Advertiser branded the Fukuoka Higher School as

having a radical Socialistic tendency. It reported in the columns, and cabled to the New York Times that four Russian labor leaders visiting Japan had "strutted from the station waving a red flag and singing the banned Internationale." In discussing E. A. Ross's theory that the world must reduce its birthrate or suffer from starvation in the future, the Advertiser explained that "he has been ousted from many universities for his ultra-radical views" (19).

Indeed, the Advertiser feels that radicals are given too much leeway in Japan. Under the pseudonym "A Marxian," a special correspondent wrote in October, 1924: "The great stumbling-block in the path of Communism in Japan is the extreme leniency of legislation regarding freedom of speech and publication. The restrictions are so lenient that many Communists, for the sake of both bread and fame, often seek to spend a few months in jail. By so doing, they court notoriety and enhance their own reputations with the public and the publishers. In prison it is possible to live peacefully under sanitary conditions. Who in Japan is really suffering from heartless persecution?" (20).

In other ways the paper is too cautious in its treatment of the news. When Marquis Okuma suppressed newspapers for reprinting arguments made by lawyers in a bomb-explosion case, the *Advertiser* was most guarded in its references both to the case itself and to the news of the suppressions. It persist-

ently "toned down" the news regarding the attempt of Viscount Goto to "lead and guide" the periodicals. In the Kobe Herald case, the Advertiser took its cue from the *Herald*, but delayed the news from two to four days in order that it might see what action was taken by the authorities. If the Kobe Herald's items passed the censor, then the Advertiser "lifted" what the Kobe journal had already published. When China, at the Versailles Peace Conference, alleged that Japan was threatening the use of force unless a Sino-Japanese agreement were concluded, the Advertiser failed to give the news, contenting itself with the bare statement, "China is fussed up over something." Three days later it declared that "English papers carried heated reports of the purported wishes of Japanese officials," without giving more details as to the nature of the Japanese desires. In all these cases other foreign papers in Japan were printing fairly full reports. Yet in spite of all its care the Advertiser has at times run foul of censorship, notably in 1917, when a full page appeared in blank, and in the following year, when it was suspended for publishing news supplied to it by the Foreign Office (21).

Restraint in utterance and insistence on the need for suspended judgment has been characteristic of the *Advertiser* editorials, but opens it, sometimes, to criticism for trying to support both sides at once. Its carefully balanced arguments carry water on both shoulders, as, for example, when it advised against com-

menting on the Hanihara "dangerous consequences" note "until the full text is received," and yet in the same editorial informed its readers that "Mr. Hanihara has seen fit to fling an insult at the United States." Three days later, before the full text had been received, the *Advertiser* changed its mind and wrote a protest against the "childishly resentful action of the Senate." The editorial policy, however, was one of consistent opposition to the exclusion policy (22).

In a heated editorial denouncing Lenin as a "curse in human form," the Advertiser added, as an afterthought, "Time may revise this judgment." It urged Iapan to cut her gold reserve on notes by 50 per cent, but three days later thundered against inflation of the currency. In March, 1924, it surveyed the reconstruction policy and alleged in four "blind articles" that "personal ambition and political considerations were taking precedence over national needs," and that progress had been insignificant. In June, however, in a special supplement, it told of the remarkable rebuilding work, and in December made announcement that Tokyo was now restored to preearthquake appearance. A year and a half thereafter Tokyo papers were complaining that no reconstruction worthy of the name had taken place (23).

Because the *Advertiser* has "a predilection for law and order that amounts to a passion," it is vehemently opposed to the freedom granted to political

thugs and ruffians, particularly when these so-called ronin and soshi cloak their nefariousness under the guise of superpatriotic feeling and ultra-nationalist emotion. The Advertiser has been active in condemning the growing use of these bullies, and has accused them of assassination and assault. But even on this point the paper wavers. It attacked the "self-appointed, self-anointed youths who set themselves up as final and omnipotent dictators of Japan's national spirit and who by force regulate the private affairs of individuals," but a few months later printed a not unfavorable three-column survey of the ronin ideals, only to attack them again on Christmas Day, 1925, as "assassins and mayhem-menacers." For the leader of the ronin, Mitsuru Toyama, the Advertiser has little but praise, believing him a "most romantic reactionary" who is "medieval but sincere." It berated Japanese for hero-worship of this leader two days after the Advertiser itself had praised him as "a modern Robin Hood." Eleven days thereafter, under a double-column headline, the Advertiser printed a three-column tribute to Toyama, couched in phrases of an adulatory nature. When ronin wrecked the forms prepared for the Advertiser's first Monday supplement, in February, 1925, the more intense opposition of the paper ceased temporarily, but by March, 1926, the Advertiser was again designating ronin as degenerate samurai, and was comparing them unfavorably with the Ku Klux Klan (24).

The paper has by no means refrained from critical remarks about Japan. It believes that the psychology of the Japanese is dominated by conservative and nationalistic tendencies; that feudalism is still dominant; that public opinion either does not exist at all, or can be ignored by the ruling factions; that present-day Japan is apathetic and devoid of vision; and that the progress of the nation, during fifty years, has been due to "lucky breaks." It believes that politics are so corrupt that it is inconceivable that they may be rendered worse, and doubts whether a fair election has ever yet been held. It scores the false mythology which masquerades as history, and criticizes Inazo Nitobe's *Bushido* as a misleading book (25).

In more specific matters, the Advertiser has attacked the telephone and tram-car service, opposed high motor taxes, rebuked the low trade morals of certain Japanese, referred to the government's reluctance to punish profiteers, "for whom Japan is a veritable Paradise," mourned the inadequacy of library facilities, and criticized the building of luxurious theaters while schools continue to be housed in barracks. It is opposed to militarism, and believes that school military training will destroy liberalism and that the cult of supernationalism will carry the Empire away from the world-current of affairs. But the Advertiser has receded notably from the views expressed by it in 1909 when it commented on the play,

An Englishman's Home, by writing: "Personally, we should rather remain a flanneled fool at a wicket or a muddied oaf at a goal, than become a uniformed fool in a barrack or a muddied oaf under the hoof of a non-commissioned officer" (26).

In 1915 and 1916 the Advertiser was a potent factor in stirring protest against a flood of anti-Ally sentiment which was filling the columns of vernacular newspapers. It pointed out the increasing number of chauvinist magazines which were appearing, and commented that, since these were not suppressed by the authorities, there must be official sanction for the anti-American and anti-British sentiments expressed. It reprinted excerpts from a Chuo serial, "Air and Submarine Warfare," which predicted an armed conflict in 1938 between Japan and "Bokoku," and by thus drawing attention to the serial succeeded in having further publication stopped by Chuo, "because the Advertiser misunderstood our purpose." It was unsuccessful, however, in seeking to prevent the publication of Japan's World Conquest, published two months later by Reivo Higuchi (27).

For the most part, however, the *Advertiser* allows the burden of its criticism to be written by Japanese members of its staff, "Saito-man," "Santaro" (Shunkichi Akimoto), Tojiro Katakura, Dr. Washio, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Japanese word for the United States is *Beikoku*, and for Russia, *Rokoku*.

Setsuo Uenoda.<sup>5</sup> Thus Mr. Uenoda protests that Japan is too much fettered by the past, and that the Japanese, with feudal minds, are trying to employ the Western tools, "We feel and do not think. We lose enthusiasm too quickly." Mr. Katakura protests against election bribery; "Santaro" attacks the bureaucracy and demands freedom of thought, saving that Japan is spiritually barren and that the authorities are lacking in literary taste. He also condemns Japanese religion, scholarship, finance, and economics as full of sham and implies that foreign pressure alone has caused the Empire to progress. Dr. Washio condemns the House of Peers, of whom he says "the great majority are a species of decadent men noted for their uniformly smooth faces and leisurely manners," declares that the social and administrative measures of the Japanese government are the most inefficient in the civilized world, and announces that modern Japan "has made a mess of life in the name of progress." He is particularly bitter in denying that Eastern life is either spiritual or beautiful. So severely has Dr. Washio attacked his people that on two occasions the editor of the Advertiser felt obliged to insert editorial notes softening the strictures (28).

Another outlet for criticisms of Japan appears in the "Letters to the Editor," by which the Advertiser

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> It is uncertain how much duplication these names contain. The practice of employing pen names is exceedingly common, and the same writer may be using a number of pseudonyms simultaneously.

sets great store. Dr. Whymant's rejoinder to a lecture praising Japan's culture is historic:

Japan is marching away from culture. She barred Rodin's "Kiss," dramatics in the schools, and the nude in art, and is about to condemn the dance. The normal Japanese brain is a simmering stew-pan into which are drabbed periodically new snatches of meat from the outside world. The stewing goes on piecemeal and what is done to rags clings round the new and prevents it from assimilating with the rest. Japan a thousand years ago was a thousand times more cultured than it is today. There is in Japan too much talk about culture and civilization and not enough solid work put into understanding what other nations mean by these terms (29).

This practice of transferring sharp rebukes to the responsibility of Japanese writers or of letter-writers rather than allowing them to be delivered in the name of the paper has served to free the Advertiser from the worse ill-will that is voiced against the Chronicle. It is doubtful if the Chronicle has written libels more bitter than those of the Advertiser, but the latter certainly escaped the calumny heaped upon its Kobe rival. In fact, the Advertiser's editorials receive high praise from Japanese, and have even been reprinted by "Kwazan" Kayahara in his magazine as models for the native press to follow (30).

#### NOTES\*

1. For a serial history of the paper, rather sketchily done, see issues of April, 1924.

\*All citations in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the Japan Advertiser.

- 2. Mail, June 18, 1904, July 24, 1909.
- 3. August 3, 4, 7, 10, 1909.
- Mail, January 6, 1912, August 2, 1913; Chronicle, August 19, 1909, September 2, 1909, April 23, 1914, June 23, 1921.
- 5. May 31, 1917, July 2, 1917, December 31, 1916, October 11, 1926.
- 6. July 27, 1917, August 3, 8, 28, 1917; Japan Gazette, July 28, 1917.
- 7. March 18, 25, 1909; Mail, April 3, 1909.
- 8. January 18, 20, 29, 31, 1924, July 1, 1924.
- 9. August 21, 1914; Chronicle, September 3, 1914.
- 10. August 12, 1914; Mail, August 13, 1914.
- 11. July 17–19, 1926; Oltmans, July 22, 1916; *Mail*, July 19, 1916; *London Telegraph*, July 18, 1916.
- 12. August 14, 16, 1916, September 2, 12, 26, 1916; Japan Gazette, August 17, 1916.
- 13. (a) Allen: San Francisco Examiner, September 24, 1916; Advertiser, October 22, 24, 26, 1916. (b) Ossipaev: February 27, 1920; Chronicle, March 11, 1920.
- 14. February 22, 1916, July 13, 1917.
- June 26, 27, 1919, November 16, 1920; Sydney Herald, December 23, 1920.
- (a) Kopp: Advertiser and New York Times, April 24, 1925.
   (b) Iwanoff; November 16, 24, 1925; Japan Times, November 23, 25, 1925.
- 17. Tokugawa, November 17, 1925.
- 18. February 13, 1925, October 14, 1925.
- 19. (a) For labor headlines, see the following issues in 1924:
  February 7, 14, March 5, 7, 11, May 24, June 6, 29, Septemper 17, November 26, 29, December 9, 16. (b) Ross:
  March 19, 1924. (c) Sano: November 30, 1925. (d) Labor: September 23, 1925.
- 20. October 31, 1924.

- 21. (a) Bomb case and Okuma: June 24, 1916. (b) China: February 6, 10, 1919. (c) Censored: June 30, 1917, May 23, 1918.
- 22. (a) Hanihara: April 15, 18, 1924. (b) Exclusion: January 31, 1924, May 28, 1924, June 10, 1924, etc.
- 23. (a) Lenin: January 24, 1924. (b) Gold: February 16, 19, 1924. (c) Reconstruction: March 9-12, 1924, June 10, 1924, December 24, 1924. See also Tokyo Asahi, Chuo Yorodzu, Miyako, Kokumin, all for September 1, 1926; Chuo, September 10, 1926.
- 24. (a) Law and order: August 13, 1926. (b) Terrorists: March 12, 1926. (c) Anti-ronin, February 7, 1924, October 9, 1924, December 4, 1924. (d) Toyama: February 10, 12, 16, 23, 1924, September 17, 1924, May 20, 1925, August 13, 1926. (e) Youths: April 9, 1924, October 9, 1924; May 20, 1925, December 25, 1925. (f) For recent increases in ronin, see Hochi, April 30, 1926.
- 25. (a) Conservative and feudal: February 18, 1926, March 3, 1927. (b) No public opinion: September 16, 1916, April 23, 1926. (c) Apathy: Transpacific, September 13, 1924. (d) Complacency: May 22, 1924, July 5, 1924. (e) Corrupt: March 18, 1924, April 2, 1924, February 17, 1925, March 11, 1925, May 10, 1925; (f) Myths: February 18, 1926, April 3, 1927. (g) Nitobe, January 14, 1926. (h) Lucky breaks: January 1, 1925; see also Marquis Okuma, Jiji, February 11, 1919.
- (a) Telephones: March 11, 1924. (b) Trams: Transpacific, September 13, 27, 1924. (c) Motor tax: March 21, 1924. (d) Profiteers: August 23, 1924; Transpacific, August 16, 1924. (e) Morals: April 20, 1924. (f) Libraries: September 6, 1926. (g) Schools: January 20, 1925. (h) Militarism: January 26, 1909, November 12, 14, 25, 1924.
- (a) Uncensored, September 12, 1916. (b) Chauvinism:
   July 1, 1916, August 24, 1916. (c) Chuo serial: August

- 20, 24, 27, 1916. (d) Higuchi: October 28, 1916, December 14, 1916.
- 28. (a) Uyenoda: April 2, 1926, March 3, 1927. (b) "Santaro": March 1, 9, 16, 1924, December 24, 1924, January 16, 1925. (c) Katakura: May 2, 1925. (d) Washio: on Peers, March 12, 1924, November 25, 1924; on government, May 2, 9, 1924; on the "mess," July 29, 1924, October 28, 1924. Notes by Advertiser editor, January 25, 1924, March 3, 1924.
- 29. (a) Whymant: October 17, 22, 1924. Reworded by Setsuo Uyenoda, November 24, 1926. (b) for letters on cruelty to dogs in Tokyo public pounds, see *Advertiser*, February 13, 16, 1927, March 16, 1927, April 3, 1927.
- 30. Kayahara, Naikwan, November, 1925.

#### CHAPTER XIII

### LIBELING THE JAPANESE

Despite the friendliness with which the Mail, the Times, the Seoul Press, the Manchuria Daily News, and other English-language papers have viewed Japan, a tradition has grown up among the Japanese that the foreign press is hostile to the nation. Doubtless it is true, as Dr. Takahashi thinks, that many foreigners have been unable to rid themselves of complexes gained before the abolition of extrality in 1899 (1). In early days the foreign papers were convinced that foreigners must stand together for protection of their interests against the Japanese. The special rights enjoyed by foreigners immune from the native laws could scarcely fail to rouse a feeling of superiority among the alien residents.

But with the abolition of extrality, special advantages were no longer held. Thirty years of submission to Japan's legislation and the replacement of the older foreign residents by new men sent out from overseas might normally be expected to diminish the belief in white superiority which might have been aroused by extra-territoriality. Moreover with the passing of the Japan Gazette, the Japan Herald, and the Korea

Daily News, the daily instigation by the press was much reduced.

Yet Japanese still feel antagonism toward the foreign press. Two days before he sailed for Honolulu to represent Japan's press at a Pan-Pacific congress, Motosada Zumoto told the writer that Japan had shown extraordinary patience with the foreign press, and especially with the Japan Chronicle: "If that paper had been published in San Francisco and had attacked the government there as bitterly as it attacks our government, infuriated mobs would have burned down the building. But Japanese are too mildspirited."

The only foreign-language paper now definitely regarded by the Japanese as hostile to their country is the Japan Chronicle, founded October 2, 1891, as a four-page journal entitled Kobe Chronicle. Like the Japan Herald and the Mail, the Chronicle, during the major portion of its existence, was a "one-man sheet." Its founder, and for over thirty years its editor, was Robert Young, an Englishman.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It was the second newspaper to bear the name. The first *Kobe Chronicle* had a brief existence as a parody paper in 1876, when it was established to give "news" of a hotly contested municipal council election (3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Young was formerly a compositor, and later a reader for the Saturday Review. He first came to Japan in 1888 in answer to an advertisement of the Hiogo News, but that paper's policy of "studied insolence and wanton discourtesy toward everything Japanese" repelled him. Having made the acquaintance of Captain Brinkley

To Young the bitterness expressed by the *Hiogo News* and other papers sheltered behind extrality rights seemed fraught with danger, in that the anti-Japanism voiced by these privileged aliens would be reflected in the vernacular gazettes, and thus provoke disastrous international hatreds. Young's object in establishing the *Chronicle* was to express a journalistic spirit more generous, and, as Young believed, more truly representative, toward the Japanese. He favored the abolition of extrality, believing that as treaty revision was inevitable, the better plan for foreigners would be to concentrate on securing proper safeguards for alien lives and property rather than on dissipation of their energies in uncompromising opposition (2).

Announcement of his program highly gratified the Japanese officials, for the new paper would not only reinforce the efforts of the Japan Mail, but would provide an organ in the Kwansai, where anti-Japanism among foreigners was felt to be pronounced. Through the aid of Captain Brinkley, a subsidy of  $\frac{1}{2}$ 5,000 a year was promised to the Chronicle.

through letters contributed by Young to the Japan Mail, in which Young severely criticized conventional religion, Young applied to Captain Brinkley for advice concerning the founding of a paper (4).

No secret has been made of this subsidy, for both its receipt and its discontinuance at the close of the year have been freely acknowledged. Its payment, however, affords an opportunity for critics of the *Chronicle* to accuse it of venality. J. Russell Kennedy, Motosada Zumoto, and others informed the writer that Young turned anti-Japanese because the payment was withdrawn. The

The success of Young's ambitions was attested by an editorial written in April, 1897, by Captain Brinkley, praising the "spirit of justice and fairness that pervades the writings in the *Chronicle*," and appreciating that the *Chronicle* "has studiously refrained from any display of prejudice or contempt toward the Japanese" (6). But as Japan gained self-government, Young's repugnance to what he deemed coercion, privilege, and intolerance caused him to veer the *Chronicle* from a thoroughgoing indorsement of the Japanese to a more critical appraisal. The swing was complete when, after the abolition of extrality, the *Chronicle* defended foreigners from the supposed aggression of the Japanese.

The reversal of the *Chronicle's* original design was not a shift in policy, Young contended, but was merely a restating of old principles. Like Earl Curzon, Robert Young remained convinced that a fundamental antiforeign feeling dominated the ruling classes of Japan. He used the *Chronicle* to maintain and strengthen solidarity among the foreign residents. "The interests of the Western nations in the Far East are really the same," he wrote, "and the success of

Japan Times believes that the Chronicle's criticisms are due to the Kobe paper's desire to hide the fact that it was subsidized. Innuendoes have also been made that the Chronicle was a German propagandist, due, according to A. Morgan Young, to the marriage of Robert Young's sister-in-law to a German (5).

civilization will only be achieved by these nations working hand in hand" (7).

Before the *Chronicle* was six years old it had begun to assail certain abuses in the government, especially in the administration of the judiciary, the police, and the penal system, beginning a campaign which has never since been relaxed, although little support has been accorded by the other foreign-language journals (8).

Young's intense fear that militarism might grow led him to bitter and persistent opposition to Japanese imperialism, and strengthened the conviction that the *Chronicle* was anti-Japanese. His ridicule of the cherished myths of Japanese history and his accusations that Japan's ancient records were literary forgeries repelled other readers. By the supersensitive and overpatriotic Japanese, Young's outspoken hatred of bigotry, hypocrisy, and blind sentimentality could only be explained as due to deeply felt hostility against the Empire. His earnest championing of Korean independence, and his long-continued fight for better government in that peninsula were outgrowths of his fierce antagonism against suppression of liberty and against cant, sham, and slushy optimism.

Press freedom was another ideal for which the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Young pointed out that he was no less firm against the identical evils which he perceived in the British treatment of the Boers, the Irish, Hindus, and Egyptians than he was against Japan's administration of Formosa and Korea (9).

Chronicle fought unceasingly. Probably no other paper in Japan has been as active in its protests against embargoes, suppressions of the news, misrepresentations of the truth, or persecutions of newspaper men. Dr. Lucy Salmon pays it tribute by remarking, "In no other single paper examined have so many articles been noted that have dealt so thoroughly and so persistently with the general fundamental questions affecting the press of all countries." Dean Walter Williams admitted it among the hundred best newspapers in the world, and Joseph I. C. Clarke considered it "the best-written English daily in the Orient" (10).

Mechanically considered, the *Chronicle* also takes high rank among its foreign-language contemporaries in Japan, although the *Advertiser* probably outranks it in news connected with the American field. Its cable news, received through Rengo and Reuter's, has been uneven in the past, for, because of the monopoly by Mr. Zumoto, the *Chronicle*, from 1899 until 1905, was obliged to rely upon independent services, first in conjunction with the *Asahi's* and later with the *Jiji's*. In July, 1897, a *Weekly Chronicle* was founded, chiefly for the purpose of foreign circulation. The *Chronicle* was the first commercial journal in Japan to use the linotype, introducing the machines in November, 1903, and being preceded only by the *Official* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Asahi-Chronicle service scored important "beats," including the first news of Queen Victoria's death, but the inability to secure co-operating journals made the expense exorbitant.

Gazette. On the death of Robert Young, November, 1922, the ownership passed to his chief associate, A. Morgan Young, who is, despite the name, no relative. Associated with the latter Young is the veteran Thomas Satchell, formerly of the Japan Herald and the Japan Mail, and translator of Toyohiko Kagawa's novels of the Japanese proletariat. The Chronicle is the correspondent in Japan for the Manchester Guardian, the Baltimore Sun, and a number of Australian papers.

In view of the almost universal opinion in Japan that the entire foreign press, and in particular the Japan Chronicle, is hostile to Japan, a close examination of the contents of the foreign-language press was undertaken to ascertain the justice of the charge. The year 1924 was chosen for investigation, since at that time international disputes had reached a maximum of frequency and of intensity, and since hostile bias would be most evident at such a period of crisis. Corroborative and illustrative material was then added from journalistic files of other years. References made by the foreign-language press which seemed to slight the Japanese (in any matter other than financial or economic policy) were listed care-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For a time the *Chronicle* employed Thomas Cowen, who, over the signature "F. A. G.," conducted a column famous for its sidelights on the foreign colony. He was acting editor of the paper during Robert Young's absence in England.

fully and were then compared with comments culled from journals known to be more friendly to Japan.

The columns of the native press disclose that Japanese are by no means averse to criticism of their country if the manner of the presentation is not deemed objectionable. Among themselves the tenets of convention require the publicist to imply a decadence in the populace that renders them unworthy of their ancestral glory. When writing of the mission of Japan, or of their nation's history, the tone is one of grandeur mingled with the sad regret that, save for the Emperor and his close relatives, no Japanese may be compared to heroes of the past.

Judged, therefore, by their own writings in the native press, the Japanese are conceited meddlers, corrupt and glaringly defective, insincere and fickle, lacking public spirit, gullible and easily swayed by demagogues because of shallow-mindedness and lack of insight, arrogant yet cowardly, sunk deep in indolence and self-indulgence, an exhausted race which has too greedily gulped down all things new and Occidental (11).

Uncritical acceptance of these self-appraisals would classify the Japanese as a most ill-favored lot, but virtually every Westerner resident in Japan understands that such an acceptance would be most cruelly unjust. No one could fairly estimate the Japanese by the measure of comments made under the lash of custom. Nor does any foreign-language paper

use terms at all comparable to these in any articles written of the Empire or of its people. The foreign editor, however rushed by journalistic exigency and however moved by strong emotion, seldom accepts the conventionalized modesty at its face value. The Oriental penchant for polite self-deprecation is well known, and allowances are almost always made in foreign-language editorial sanctums for the virulence of native opinion concerning native failings.

But also it must be recognized that the Oriental mind, like any other, will prefer that criticism of a native failing come from domestic critics rather than from alien commentators. The marked inferiority complex which Dr. Gulick believes to be inherent in 95 per cent of the people (12) resents libels from a foreign source and insists upon a more than full recognition of the native virtues. Probably it is true that Occidental editors, scrupulously wishing to be fair, may add a heavy premium to Japan's self-rating and yet fall far below the standards which the Oriental may accept as satisfactory. The double standards which critics are expected to observe may be, in largest measure, responsible for international misunderstandings.

To Japanese the alien press becomes intolerable when it states that politics in Japan are bought and sold in open markets, and that intimidation of the voters or of officials is so common as to excite but little surprise; but virtually every great vernacular

organ echoes precisely the same criticism. No foreign-language journal has called the Diet of Japan "a hell where ugly fights and quarrels are the usual procedure." Jiji, the most restrained of Japanese newspapers, thus condemns the popular legislative body of the Empire; and it is equally intense in opposition to the corruption of municipal law-making bodies. Nor would any foreign-language paper dare to say, as does the Yomiuri, that Japan is a century behind Great Britain in development, nor that, as Mr. Tokutomi, editor of Kokumin, declares, "Japan has reached the crossroads where reform or revolution must now be undertaken" (13).

In matters of international relations the Japanese are similarly more intense in opposition to the policies of their government. The flood of imprecations continually launched against their diplomatic staff gives a strong impression of Japanese press independence. It is noticeable, however, that the criticism is almost invariably against Japan's "weak-kneed," "fawning," "effeminate," or "cowardly" activities toward foreign lands, and that almost never is greater moderation or more conciliatory action urged upon the government. Japan's "jingo press" comprises all the major Tokyo and Osaka papers eminent either for their circulation or their influence (14).

None of the foreign papers take so virulent a stand upon such matters, nor do they so unanimously urge the government to initiate "strong" policies.

Their unwillingness to co-operate with the Foreign Office in the latter's desire to demonstrate an essentially peace-loving policy in the face of overwhelming journalistic pressure is a cause for constant lamentation.

The Chronicle's reluctance to admit that militarism has had its day, and that Japan is now essentially a democracy earns for the Kobe paper a vast amount of animosity. At frequent intervals the Chronicle points out that military influences still hold the saddle, and that the sanctity of war is still taught in all the public schools. In public speeches made for foreign ears the tendency among the publicists of the Empire is to stress the pacifistic trends of Japan's policy. Such speeches almost always draw the charge of "insincerity" from the Chronicle, and the frequent instances in which military influences have carried their contention within recent months are always carefully set forth for readers of the paper (15).

Powerful support is offered to the Chronicle's contention by those who, like Yukio Ozaki and Marquis Okuma, attribute Japan's progress to the acceptance of the principle that might makes right. The Asahi's and the Jiji frequently assail the more evident manifestation of militaristic influence in the schools. Protests against heavy military and naval

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> At the time of their writing both gentlemen were officials of the Japan Peace Society, Okuma being president and Ozaki a director.

budgets have been common in the press. But the *Chronicle* alone has been consistent in a journalistic opposition to the military spirit (16).

In educational affairs the foreign press is distinctly less critical than is the native publicist. The Chronicle, and to a less intense degree, the Advertiser, attacks the suppression of individual thought and opposes the highly regimented system of examinations; but both these charges are made more loudly by the Japanese. The Osaka Asahi, for example, regards Japanese education as "lower even than the standard of a third-class power"; Yorodzu believes that nothing in the world is so old-fashioned as the existing educational régime: Chuo and the Osaka Mainichi are agreed that the teaching force is inefficient; Yamato feels that politics have spoiled the schools; and in the fall of 1926 a veritable chorus rose from Japanese newspapers against the alleged reactionary tendencies of the Minister of Education. Neither the Advertiser nor the Chronicle have been sparing in denunciation of the school authorities, but it is quite conservative to say that their comments have been but mild contrasted with the savage criticisms made by Japanese (17).

So far as business affairs are concerned, the foreign press fault-finding seems also to be less irksome than that of the Japanese themselves. There is, of course, a variation to be recognized in the type of criticism made. In the instances wherein the *Chron*-

icle is most concerned the objections which are made are for the most part definitely laid against some one specific firm for some specific action; whereas the vernacular critics are more inclined to overlook the individual instance and to draw more general indictments.

The worst general complaints voiced by the Chronicle accuse the Japanese of inefficiency, recklessness, and disregard of scientific principles. Soichiro Asano, president of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha and one of the leading industrialists of the nation, goes much farther by declaring that Japan is still, industrially, an infant. Ginjiro Fujiwara, of the great Oji Paper Mills, gives a complete assent to Mr. Asano's verdict. Other business men, like Dr. Juichi Soyeda, formerly president of the Japanese Railways, and Tominosuke Kamitono, president of the Nagova Chamber of Commerce, indorse the opinion of the Chronicle. The Seoul Press, some years ago, summed up the matter by ranking Japan's industry among the fourth-class nations. The Tokyo Asahi, as late as July, 1926, sweepingly condemned Japan because the learned men lacked intellect, and could do no more than copy foreign models (18).

On political shortcomings, education, business efficiency, and similar topics comparative unanimity of opposition may be found in both the vernacular and the foreign-language press; but there are certain other subjects upon which criticism is not customarily

cast by native journals. The great government departments which share control over the internal activities of the Empire are freely criticized in private by both foreign residents and Japanese, but, save in the *Chronicle*, the defects are not often subjects for press comment.

The Department of Communications, for example, is a frequent target for the Chronicle, but seldom is attacked by native organs. Its inefficiency in operating telephones and postal systems is self-evident, the latter being below the pre-war standard, though the charges are double or perhaps triple the former rates. The telephone department, according to the Chronicle, employs "highwaymen methods." delaying new installations for years unless subscribers are willing to pay heavy premiums for immediate service. In the spring of 1926 a sum of \forall 1,300 was charged for preferential installation, and in consequence a group of telephone brokers had sprung up with which some agents of the Department were cooperating. Fifty men were fined for conspiring to mulct subscribers, and officials of the Department were found to be conniving in the scheme. Except for mild rebukes made by Yamato, few Japanese editors seriously complained of the abuse. The Chronicle had for years been thundering its charges that the telephone and postal services were thoroughly dishonest (19).

Failure to provide street lighting, sanitary sew-

age systems, and scavenger services is another common grievance for the *Chronicle*. It persists in pointing out the correlation between Osaka's high infant death-rate—"the highest in the world"—and the polluted milk supply. Dr. Nakata, of the Osaka Medical University, supports the *Chronicle's* "crusade," but few other papers lend the *Chronicle* support. They are quick, however, to approve the *Chronicle* for praising Japan's efficient water system (20).

Fear of the police and repugnance against the extra-legal methods commonly believed to be practiced by it are generally expressed quite freely by the Japanese in private conversation, but scarcely any rebuke appears in print save in the columns of the Chronicle. Admitting that the personnel is honestthough Suyeo Nakano, of the Advertiser, says that the force is graft-ridden—and that it is so efficient that greater personal security is made possible than in New York or Chicago, the Chronicle proceeds to draw up a powerful indictment. In the opinion of the paper the police department is permeated with obsolete Chinese ideas, using the system of incommunicado ordeals, employing torture, and extorting confessions. The police, according to the Chronicle, are the greatest law-breakers in Japan (21).

Inquiry appears to confirm most of the *Chronicle's* accusations; but, to quote K. Sugimura, of the *Tokyo Asahi*, "we do not print editorials against the police because their weaknesses are taken for grant-

ed." Tsunego Baba, former assistant editor of Kokumin, complains because the police give out false news, partly to enhance their own reputation, and partly as ballons d'essai which may be disowned as fictitious if the desired results are not obtained. In April, 1926, the Osaka Mainichi denied that Japan may be considered as governed by legal principles so long as the police were permitted to assume supreme authority. The Tokyo Asahi had already urged that police power be curtailed, and Yorodzu had predicted a revolution unless police officials were restrained. None of these papers, however, criticized the methods which are alleged to be employed (22).

An exception to this statement must be recorded in the case of the protests made against the police spy system. In October, 1924, Chuo, Yorodzu, Tokyo Asahi, Miyako and the Japan Advertiser echoed the earlier protests of the Chronicle against this abuse, but no permanent change in policy seems to have been effected, nor was any punishment publicly visited upon those who had misused police spies for wrongful purposes (23).

Recurrent "crime waves" bring charges of inefficiency from such papers as the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Yamato, and Chugai Shogyo, but no paper accepts the Chronicle's explanation that the police are too engrossed in political persecutions to devote time for running down criminals. (The English Mainichi does suggest that at scenes of violence the police may stir

up violence.) Nor is any other paper than the *Chronicle* convinced that the Japanese police show antiforeign tendencies (24).

Two types of explanation may be offered for the peculiar reluctance of the vernacular press to criticize adversely the operations of government departments in control of internal matters. The more popular, if not the more important, reason is that the editors are in wholesome dread of the power of arbitrary suspension vested in the Home Minister and hence print nothing that may call down his wrath. The vague wording of the censorship provisions and the even more cloudy phrasing of peace preservation laws afford him ample power to wreak vengeance on offending journals. A second explanation postulates a lack of social interest by the press. Editors belong to social groups which do not customarily run foul of the more crude police methods, and hence are not personally interested in abuses. Just as in America, the "third degree," while universally condemned, is not a matter for constant newspaper reiteration, so, in Japan, one finds a charity of omission or a friendly silence. There is apparent disinclination to probe deeply into the genesis of Formosan and Korean discontent, and there is a seeming indifference to the commission of injustice. Few, if any, Japanese newspapers send reporters to the dependencies to send back descriptive articles criticizing the authorities, nor are recalcitrant Koreans given the freedom of

press columns as frequently as insurgent Filipino leaders are given leave to write in the United States.

Perhaps the bitterest items in the Chronicle are those referring to the morals of the Japanese. It holds that jealousy is rampant; that offices are permeated by nepotism, cliques, and spies; that, except in judo contests, sportsmanship is at an exceedingly low level; and that the Japanese are savage in their cruelty toward animals. In this connection the Chronicle often cites the treatment of an elephant which for many years has been so tightly chained as to be unable to lie down or to take a single step. Twenty-five years ago the plight of this poor animal was noted by the Japan Mail, and again, ten years ago, Hochi reported that the Nihon Jindokai (Japan S. P. C. A.) had again protested at the continuance of the torture. After the earthquake of 1923 the elephant was moved from Uyeno Park to Asakusa Park, but the old brutality was renewed. Yamato protested, but without avail (25).

The Chronicle believes that this treatment is typical of the Japanese attitude toward animals. A series of experiments conducted by the aviation corps, in which live monkeys were dropped from airplanes "to observe the internal reactions," was denounced by the paper, and the suggestion was made that aviators be substituted for the monkeys. The permission to load the tiny Japanese horses with legal weights twice

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those allowed to the larger horses of the British Empire was also censured (26).

By the spring of 1926 the Advertiser joined the Chronicle in protest against the inhumanity of Japanese. The former was indignant that the Jindokai had dropped to but six members, and it expressed surprise that so few complaints were registered against mistreatment. Its particular anger was kindled when, in August, 1926, a bear cub in the zoo was tortured to death by being bound helpless, "its mouth pried open, the teeth beaten down by hammers, and pieces of flesh dug out with pincers." Both the Nihon Jindokai and the Tokyo Asahi, a member of whose staff was present at the time, also protested, but the authorities seemed satisfied to accept the explanation that the bear had choked himself to death upon a rope. Chuo, one of the few papers to comment editorially upon the outrage, contented itself with using the affair as an allegory of the situation between capital and labor, and made no effective protest against the brutality involved. The "bestiality of treatment" inflicted on dogs in the Tokyo city pound drew severe condemnation, in the spring of 1927, from the Jindokai. Stray dogs, it was said, were cruelly maimed, were fed on repulsive food, and were then clubbed to death (27).

All these incidents recall the judgment made by Rev. S. L. Gulick, that "the longer one lives in the country, the more he is impressed with certain aspects

of life which seem to evidence an unsympathetic and inhumane disposition" (28).

After years of almost single-handed war on licensed vice, the Chronicle was reinforced, in 1025 and 1926, by almost all the native press. The Chronicle had stated constantly that the police were linked with brothel keepers and were being paid by them. Legally, the girls might free themselves by applying to the police authorities, but in practice, said the Chronicle, the police forced girls back into slavery. All this was long denied by Japanese, and the Chronicle's insistence was cited as a proof of its strong anti-Japanism, but in May, 1926, a sudden change appeared in journalistic policy. The Osaka Mainichi, admitting all the Chronicle had said, demanded a revision of the license system with a view toward its eventual abolition. Chugai Shogyo, Yamato, Kokumin, Osaka Asahi, and other papers branded licensed vice as shameful to Japan. Except for Kokumin, which in 1016 had criticized the system, none of these papers had previously been active in the antivice campaign. Sekai and Tokyo Asahi had opposed the abolition of licensed quarters (29).

Perhaps it is an indication of the rising power of the press that within three months the director of police affairs in the Home Office was predicting that the licensing of vice would eventually disappear. He, too, admitted that the Yoshiwara system had been guilty of abuse and that the inmates had been exploited and

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abused. Even *Miyako*, the so-called "geisha paper," branded prostitution as a national shame, although it was not convinced that it would be expedient or practicable to abandon it (30).

Except for the *Chronicle*, none of the papers holds a consistent record of opposition to this evil. The *Advertiser's* policy was to ignore the matter whenever possible, and although the *Times* had flashes of objections, it was by no means as steady nor as forceful in its protests. The sudden shift of attitude by other papers is a tribute to the *Chronicle* and a rebuttal to the slanders that the *Chronicle* was motivated only by anti-Japanism in its long "crusade."

The Chronicle is alone in its opposition to the abuse of the opium traffic, which it alleges that Japan protects. It constantly refers to official statements that Japan is the largest importer of Java coca leaves and of raw i ersian opium, and points out that no records indicate where or in what form the raw drugs are finally consumed. It was the only paper to report in full detail the trial of Hajima Hoshi, president of the largest Japanese drug firm, for smuggling opium into Formosa, and was one of the few journals to report that he had been fined a million yen. Hochi alone among the Japanese papers took any notice of the trial. All other papers were content to indorse the speech made by Yotaro Sugimura, Japanese delegate to the Geneva Opium Conference, in which he said,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ten months later the decision was reversed, on appeal.

"We are a nation of Samurai. With us honor is more important than anything else." They seem to have made no effort to investigate the share of Japan in violating opium agreements (31).

Basing its opinion on the alleged immorality and cruelty of the Japanese, the *Chronicle* scoffs at the popular conviction of a "spiritual" Asiatic civilization superior to the "material" West. It violates all Japanese mores by railing against the "beautiful Japanese customs" and by stating that if cruelty and immorality is its fruit, the national spirit—the almost sacredly revered *Yamato Damashii*—had better be abandoned. It asserts that *Bushido*, the code of chivalry, is in reality a myth, recently invented by Dr. Inazo Nitobe, and warns that Japanese history has been "cooked" for propaganda purposes (32).

Such assaults cannot fail to rouse the resentment of the Japanese, but it must be recognized that the *Chronicle* is by no means without the backing of authority for many of its statements. Basil Hall Chamberlain, long professor of philology at the Tokyo Imperial University, wrote a volume on *The Invention of a New Religion* to describe the comparatively recent origin of both *Bushido* and *Shinto*. Baron Yoshiro Sakatani, former finance minister, believes that *Yamato Damashii* means no more than the national spirit of any other land. Dr. Gulick holds that the "beautiful Japanese customs" have led the nation to stagnation, declares that past historians have distorted

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facts, and states that present-day historians are forbidden to teach variations from the authorized distorted text. When, in October, 1926, Dr. Tetsuiiro Inouve, professor emeritus of Tokyo Imperial University and member of the House of Peers, published his book on Japan's National Constitution and the National Morals, he was forced to retire the volume from circulation and to destroy all copies for having written that the original mirror and sword given to the emperors were no longer in existence, but that the articles kept in the imperial palace were replicas. Objection was also made to Dr. Inouve's suggestions that the message of the sun goddess to the emperors was mythical, and that the sun goddess herself was not a living person. The Japan Times also has admitted that "mythology has been dressed up as fact," and that heterodox instruction has been punished.

The fear of decadence, as stated by the Chronicle, is not uncommon in Japan. "In all respects," wrote "Kwazan" Kayahara, "Japan is at a standstill and is about to crumble." Marquis Okuma reported in 1919 that Japan had been stagnating thirty years. Sanji Muto, Kanegafuchi Mill president, placed his own country far behind the West in the formation of character. Ten years ago Kokumin and the Osaka Mainichi bewailed the decay of morality among the women of Japan. In August, 1926, Chugai Shogyo and Yomiuri complained that medical morality was low, that doctors were too avaricious, and that they sometimes

violated girls intrusted to their care. Prince Saionji, last of the Genro, complained that Japan lacks moral principles available for daily life, although wellstocked with morals suitable for national emergencies. Yorodzu and Mivako thought, in 1926, that "religion in Japan is rotten with corruption." J. Ingram Bryan, former editor of the publication sponsored by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, appraised the sense of "universal and eternal righteousness" in Japan as five hundred years behind the Anglo-Saxon standards, while the Tokyo Nichi Nichi fell into deep despondency: "Let us ask ourselves if Japan has attained any spiritual achievement, Yamato Damashii excepted, which can be shown to the world. Iapan has no phase of civilization of which she can well be proud" (33).

Of minor importance, but tending to aggravate the feeling against the *Chronicle*, are its suggestions that the Japanese are inefficient builders and poor sailors; that the bread is "pretty awful"; that the tea is unlike the Ceylon curing; that, although personally clean, the Japanese permit foreign-style houses and street railways to be filthy; that the language is too cumbersome; and that there exists "a passion for inaccurate statistics." On none of these, except the last, is confirmation found among the native papers (34).

Probably it is true that the particular criticisms made by the *Chronicle* might be endured, as are those listed by the *Advertiser* and the *Times*, were it not

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for the exasperating persistency with which the Kobe paper reiterates its grievances. It is often customary in the East for the frank acknowledgment of a fault to be considered as almost equivalent to an effort to remedy the defect; but of this convention the Chronicle, unlike the other foreign papers, has no conception. Less than the editors of any other journal do the editors of the Chronicle have an understanding or a sympathy for Oriental social codes. They carry British attitudes and British prejudices into their relations with the Japanese, and the resultant clash of cultures cannot but cause confusion. The cumulative harping of the Chronicle on abuses which the Japanese admit but do not end is more insufferable than the single and more biting slurs appearing in the other foreign-language papers.

It is the attitude and the editorial tone assumed by foreign-innguage papers, rather than the detractions actually published, which irritate the Japanese. The alien slurs are by no means as virulent as many of the remarks which the Japanese newspapers print concerning either their own nationals or the foreigners, and the anti-Japanism of the foreign press could very readily be matched by much worse parallel criti-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The "filthy Western habit of eating cheese" disgusts the Mainichi; while the addiction among Japanese to the wearing of gold teeth calls forth an indignant editorial protest from the Tokyo Asahi. The time is not long past when a foreign party to a lawsuit lost his case because the court was perceptibly shocked by the testimony that he had kissed his wife in public (35).

cisms by the vernacular gazettes against the citizens of other lands. Many Japanese, at least in private, will accept the strictures of the foreign press as justifiable and proper, whether the press comments concern domestic policy or the administration methods followed in the dependencies. But these are isolated and, perhaps relatively unimportant, instances.

The reputation of the alien press for anti-Japanism proves, then, on examination, to be based primarily on its unvielding attitude toward certain moral questions, on its objections to the policy of certain government departments which have won, for one reason or another, a "sacred cow" position, and on its unwillingness to accept as thoroughly authentic the customary glamor cast over Japan's history. The conclusion seems well warranted that, were the foreignlanguage press to consent to voice the customary approbation for views which may be semi-official, no serious objection would be raised against the printing of worse libels than are now permitted. By and large the Advertiser and the Times have taken this position, but the Chronicle remains stiff-necked and resisting.10 For this chief reason, therefore, it is the

<sup>10</sup> The Advertiser steers a safe and quite conservative course. On one occasion it permitted a staff correspondent to write, "If I advance my free opinion, I may, and most probably shall, incur the charge of treason." In a series of articles which followed the writer then gave high praise to Japanese administration in Korea, winning a special letter of commendation, for his "truthful presentation of the facts," from the president of the House of Peers (36).

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Chronicle which bears the burden of official displeasure and which is made to bear the brunt of criticism from the publicists friendly to Japan.

#### NOTES

- 1. London Times, September 2, 1916.
- 2. Chronicle, October 2, 1891.
- 3. Mail, February 5, 1876.
- 4. Chronicle, October 2, 1891.
- Chronicle, October 16, 1922; Japan Times, July 13, 1913,
   March 3, 1925; Mail, March 19, 1910, July 25, 1918; Ost Asiatische Lloyd, February 15, 1910.
- 6. Chronicle, November 9, 1916.
- 7. Chronicle, February 5, 1902, March 16, 1902, April 16, 20, 23, 1902.
- 8. Mail, August 22, 1896.
- 9. Chronicle, July 7, 1921, September 1, 22, 1921.
- 10. Newspaper and Authority, p. 88 n.
- 11. (a) Conceit: G. Fujiwara, Taiyo, June, 1925; R. O. Matheson, Current History, May, 1927. (b) Corrupt social life: Kokumin, February 7, 1924; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December 24, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, November 12, 1924; Yamato, October 2, 1925; Chugai Shogyo, July 31, 1926; Yorodzu, March 13, 1926. (c) Lack public spirit: Kokumin, February 7, 1924; Kazutami, "Wamin," Ukita, Jitsugo-no-Nihon, February, 1925; Osaka Mainichi, November 16, 1924; Matheson, op. cit. (d) Fickle, shallow, frivolous: Kayahara, Naikwan, August, 1925; Miyake, Gaikwan, January, 1925; Kojiro Sugimura, Chuo Koron, August, 1924; Professor En Kanai and Baron Mitsunojo Funakoshi, Jitsugono-Nihon, February, 1925; Kamio Chiba, Bunka Seikatsu, September, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, June 16, 1924; Yamato, October 2, 1925. (e) Rude and arrogant: Miyake, Gaik-

wan, May, 1926; K. Mitsukawa, Gaikwan, March, 1924; Dr. Isoo Abe, Kaizo, June, 1924; T. Yonechiyama, Shina, May, 1925; Juko Shiga, Nihon-oyobi-Nihonjin, November, 1924; Ozaki, Chronicle, October 16, 1924. (f) Cowardly: Kokumin, February 7, 1924, April 4, 1924; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December 24, 1924; Ozaki and Chiba, op. cit. (g) Self-indulgent: K. Horiye, Chuo Koron, October, 1924; Hitoshi Ashida and Soyeda in Jitsugo-no-Nihon, February, 1925; Osaka Mainichi, November 16, 1924; Jiji, November 6, 1924; Chiba and Matheson, op. cit. (h) Too eager for West: Kayahara, Naikwan, August, 1925; Toyo Keizai, June, 1924; Yorodzu, October 27, 1924; Shibusawa, Japan Times, December 28, 1926; Uenoda, Advertiser, November 24, 1926. See also notes, chapter iv, No. 4.

12. Gulick, p. 140.

13. (a) Politics bought and sold: K. Horiye, Kaizo, February, 1024, October, 1024; T. Tagawa, Taiyo, August, 1024; Toyo Keizai, June, 1924; Naikwan, December, 1924; Ozaki, in Taivo, May, 1926, and in Advertiser, April 1, 1924; Kokumin, February 24, 1917, January 1, 1924, October 8, 1924; Hochi, February 5, 1924, April 10, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, May 11, 1925; Osaka Asahi, April 25, 1925, May 12, 1925; Chugai Shogyo, July 31, 1926; Japan Times, May 6, 1924; Washio, Advertiser, March 18, 1924, April 2, 1924, April 17, 1926. (b) Intimidation: Osaka Mainichi, November 2, 11, 1924; Washio, Advertiser, February 16, 1924, December 4, 1924. See Notes, chapter xii, No. 24 b-f. (c) Representative government is impossible, because party leaders are unprincipled: Professor Shinkichi Uyesugi, Advertiser, February 8, 1924; Ki Inukai, Advertiser, February 14, 1924; Ozaki, Advertiser, April 1, 1924, and Taiyo, May, 1926; Horiye, Kaizo, February, 1924; Sanji Muto, Taiyo, May, 1926; Osaka Mainichi, November 16, 1924, August 24, 1926, March 30, 1927; Ko-

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kumin, August 26, 1926; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December o. 1024. March 27, 1027; Osaka Asahi, April 25, 1025. (d) Parties ignore labor and farmers: Tokyo Asahi, November 12. 1024; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December 9, 1024; Osaka Asahi, April 25, 1925; Kokumin, October 8, 1924; Horive, Kaizo, February, 1924. (e) "Diet is a hell": Jiii. March 7, 1026; cf. editorials in the Tokyo press during the disorders following scandal charges in the Diet in the closing days of the 1026 and 1027 sessions, especially Osaka Mainichi, March 13, 1926, March 30, 1927; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 14, 1926, March 26, 1927. (f) Corrupt city government: Kokumin, January 11, 1925; Jiji, October 11, 1924, November 6, 1924; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, September 18, 1924, October 8, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, November 16, 1024: Tokvo Asahi. November 12, 1024. (g) "Japan is at the cross-roads," Tokutomi, in Advertiser, April 10, 1924.

- 14. Diplomats are fawning, cowardly, weak: Kayahara, Naikwan, April, 1926; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 24, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, August 16, 1917, June 25, 1924; Hochi, August 15, 1917, December 17, 1924; Osaka Asahi, April 6, 1924, December 21, 1924; Kokumin, April 18, 1926 (but compare the patience shown toward China in the civil war of 1927 in the face of more severe provocation which would formerly have brought from the press demands for instant action).
- (a) Militarism is over: Dr. Ku Hung-min, Osaka Mainichi, November 1, 1924; Prince Yamagata, Boston Transcript, October 13, 1921; Advertiser, April 26, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, November 19, 1924; Osaka Asahi, October 1, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, November 12, 19, 1924. (b) Japan is still militaristic: Ozaki, Naikwan, December, 1924, and World Tomorrow, June, 1925; Okuma, Shin-Nihon, May, 1915; Chronicle, April 10, 1924, September 11, 1924, No-

- vember 20, 1924, May 28, 1925, May 8, 1925, December 3, 1925.
- 16. (All dates are in 1924.) Osaka Asahi, October 1 and 15; Tokyo Asahi, October 17, 18, 30, November 25; Miyako, December 5; Chuo, October 30, November 8; Hochi, November 12, Jiji, October 6, and 17, November 29, December 16; Osaka Mainichi, October 8.
- 17. Ozaki and Kayahara, Naikwan, December, 1924; Matheson, Current History, May, 1927; Bryan, p. 191; Chamberlain, p. 48; Gulick, p. 222; T. Murayama, Fudocho, March, 1927; Osaka Mainichi, October 27, 1924, November 16, 1924, December 16, 1924, March 18, 1925; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, November 13, 14, 1924, August 18, 1926; Osaka Asahi, July 20, 1924, April 13, 1926; Tokyo Asahi, November 17, 1924, August 18, 1926; Chuo, September 24, 1924, October 10, 1924, August 5, 1925; Yomiuri, December 27, 1924, April 18, 1926; Yamato, December 29, 1924; Japan Times, March 11, 1924, October 22, 1924, December 9, 1924; Kokumin, August 15, 1926; Advertiser, March 18, 1927; Washio, Advertiser, February 26, 1925; Uyenoda, Advertiser, November 24, 1926.
- 18. Inouye, Taiyo, October, 1924; Asano and Fujiwara, Taiyo, June, 1925; Soyeda and Kanai, Jitsugo-no-Nihon, February, 1925; Mochizuki, Advertiser, December 24, 1924; Seoul Press, July 23, 1912; Matheson, Current History, May, 1927; Osaka Mainichi, November 3, 1924, October 5, 1925; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, November 5, 1925; Yomiuri, November 15, 1924; Tokyo Asahi, July 23, 1926; Shoda, in Chronicle, April 10, 1924, in Transpacific, August 16, 1924.
- 19. (a) Post-office: Jiji, November 24, 1924, December 18, 1924, July 8, 1926. (b) Trams: Yomiuri, July 17, 1916: Chuo, August 14, 1916. (c) Telephones: Yamato, Sep-

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- temper 20, 1926; Matheson, Current History, May, 1927; Advertiser, March 21, 1924. (d) Traffic laws: Advertiser, April 12, 20, 26, 1926.
- (a) Lights: Jiji, December 15, 1925, August 4, 1926. (b)
   Roads: Yomiuri, November 6, 1918, March 2, 1920, December 26, 1925; Jiji, January 31, 1919, February 25, 28, 1920. (c) Nakata: Chronicle, September 17, 1925. (d)
   Sanitation: Yamato, December 23, 1918.
- 21. For the best summary of the Chronicle's charges, see issue of February 1, 1923; see also Advertiser, May 18, 1905, June 6, 1923, November 29, 1924; Osaka Mainichi, April 11, 1926; Yorodzu, March 29, 1927.
- Yorodzu, October 8, 1924, March 29, 1927; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, January 13, 1927; Osaka Mainichi, April 11, 1926, September 16, 1926.
- 23. For an account of the "police spy case," see New York Nation, April 15, 1925.
- 24. Osaka Mainichi, January 21, 1925.
- (a) Jealousy and cliques: Hirozo Mori, Jitsugo-no-Nihon, February 1925; Matheson, Current History, May, 1927; Osaka Mainichi, August 24, 1926; for denial, see Okuma, I, 208. (b) Cruelty, see Mori, op. cit. (c) Elephant: Mail, October 27, 1900; Chronicle, December 28, 1916, January 24, 1924, March 27, 1924.
- 26. (a) Horse: Advertiser, July 4, 1926; Matheson, op. cit.
  (b) Monkeys: Chronicle, October 16, 23, 1914, November 13, 1924, December 25, 1924, February 18, 1925, December 23, 1925.
- (a) Bear cub: Advertiser, August 12, 15, 1926. (b) Dogs: Advertiser, February 13, 16, 1927, March 16, 1927, April 3, 1927.
- 28. Gulick, pp. 129, 132.
- 29. Japan Times, November 21, 1923, July 7, 1924, December 1, 1924, March 10, 1925, May 18, 1925, June 25, 1925;

Osaka Mainichi, November 13, 1924, April 3, 1925, September 16, 1926; Tokyo Asahi, May 12, 1916, August 12, 1926; Sekai Koron, May 12, 1916; Kokumin, September 12, 1916. In May, 1926, the following papers, on the specified dates: Osaka Asahi and Yamato, 1; Advertiser, 9; Osaka Asahi and Chugai Shogyo, 13; Kokumin, 15.

- 30. Miyako, August 4, 1926; Advertiser, March 13, 1926, May 3, 1926, August 7, 1926.
- 31. Hochi, November 10, 1925; Sugimura, Chronicle, November 27, 1924.
- 32. "A. T. C." in *Japan Times*, May 28, 1925; Gulick, pp. 64, 205; *Times*, March 10, 1924; Okuma, I, 41.
- 33. Sakatani, Advertiser, August 19, 1917; Okuma, Jiji, February 11, 1919; Women, Kokumin, September 15, 1916; Osaka Mainichi, March 13, 1917; Decadence: A frequent theme for Kayahara's Naikwan. Cf. articles in this magazine by Ozaki, December, 1924, Kayahara, December, 1924, August, 1925; Saionji, August, 1926; Asano, Taiyo, June, 1925; Chiba, Bunka Seikatsu, September, 1924; Muto, Jitsugo-no-Nihon, February, 1925; Washio, Advertiser, January 31, 1924; Fukuda, Taiwan Nichi Nichi, August 23, 1923; Bryan, Chronicle, May 19, 1921; Tokyo Asahi, November 12, 1924, March 10, 1925; Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December 24, 1924. Medical men: Chugai, Shogyo, August 11, 1926; Yomiuri, August 31, 1926, October 16, 1926; Yorodzu, March 13, 1926; Miyako, March 25, 1927.
- 34. Statistics: Kokumin, May 13, 1916. Ships: Jiji, March 25, 1927.
- Gold teeth: Tokyo Asahi, May 16, 1926; approved by Advertiser, May 22, 1926; Japanese are ungentlemanly, Miyake, Gaikwan, May, 1926. Japanese are unpleasant looking, Yorodzu, May 8, 1926.
- 36. Advertiser, October 23, 1925.

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Except for fugitive magazine or newspaper citations, the history of Japanese journalism has never been adequately treated, either in Japanese or in English. In the latter tongue a number of partial treatises have been attempted, sometimes limited, as is Dr. Kisaburo Kawabe's *Press and Politics in Japan*, to some specific phase of journalism, or sometimes designed, like Kanesada Hanazono's *Development of Japanese Journalism* for the advertising of some specific newspaper, in Mr. Hanazono's case, the *Osaku Mainichi*.

One general feature discernible in several essays is a tendency to gloss over unpleasant episodes; another is a lack of attention to the application of the censorship or to the uses of the embargo; still another is the failure to treat adequately of the foreign news supply, or even of the machinery for gathering news; and a fourth weakness is the uncertainty as to chronology. It is not uncommon to find half a dozen different dates assigned for the founding of some important newspaper, like the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. Occasionally the work may be written to stress some particular tendency of the press, such as press freedom, which is emphasized by Mr. Zumoto and by Mr. Sawada; the unanimity of foreign policy, which Mr. Sawada thinks important; or the progressive liberalization of Japan through press influence, which is the theme for Dr. Kawabe. No book, magazine, or newspaper, in the writer's experience, has devoted more than a very small space to the foreign-language press.

For this reason the writer was obliged to rely to an unusual degree upon personal interviews with Japanese editors and publicists, whose contributions cannot be adequately listed in a

bibliography. They are, however, credited to their proper origins in the bibliographies which close each chapter of the study.

To avoid needless duplication, the writer has omitted, in the appended bibliography, all mention of works listed in the very admirable and complete "List of Books on Japan" compiled by William Adams Slade, chief of the division of bibliography in the Library of Congress, and published in the Far East number of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (CXXII [November, 1925], 227-40).

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#### APPENDIX

#### LEADING FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PAPERS IN JAPAN

- 1. Nagasaki Shipping News and Advertiser (weekly), Schoyer, June-November, 1861. Sold to Japan Herald.
- 2. Japan Herald, Schoyer, November, 1861-1914. Suppressed as pro-German.
- 3. Japan Commercial News (Portuguese weekly), F. da Roza, 1863-1865. Plant sold to Japan Times I.
- Japan Times I (weekly), C. Rickerby, September, 1865– 1871. Name changed to Japan Mail.
- 5. Japan Gazette, J. R. Black, October, 1867-September, 1923. Plant destroyed in earthquake.
- 6. Hiogo and Osaka Herald (weekly), A. T. Watkins, January, 1868-1869. Failed.
- 7. Hiogo News, F. Braga, April, 1868-1898. Sold to Japan Chronicle.
- 8. Nagasaki Times and Shipping List (weekly), F. Walsh, 1868-1869. Sold to Hiogo News.
- Japan Mail (really a continuation of Japan Times I), 1871-1917. Merged with Japan Times III.
- Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express, W. L. Lewis, February, 1876, to date. Name changed, in 1888, to Nagasaki Press.
- Ostasiatische Zeitung (German weekly), Sutor, 1876 only.
   Failed.
- 12. Tokyo Times (weekly), E. H. House, 1877 only. Failed.
- 13. Japan Times II (weekly), C. Rickerby, 1878-79. Sold to Japan Mail.
- 14. Argus (Portuguese weekly), August, 1881-1882. Failed.
- Tokyo Independent (weekly), F. W. Eastlake, 1885 only.
   Failed.

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- 16. Kobe Herald, A. W. Curtis, 1886 to date.
- 17. Eastern World (weekly), F. Schroeder, 1890-1923. Plant destroyed in earthquake.
- 18. Japan Advertiser, Meiklejohn, 1890 to date.
- 19. Japan Chronicle (formerly Kobe Chronicle), R. Young, October, 1891, to date.
- 20. Japan Times III, M. Zumoto, February, 1897, to date.
- 21. Deutsche-Japan Post (German), A. Madlung, May, 1902-1914. Suppressed as pro-German.
- 22. Seoul Press, M. Zumoto, December, 1906, to date.
- 23. Japan Press, S. Akimoto, April, 1915, only. Failed.
- 24. Herald of Asia (weekly), M. Zumoto, April, 1916-1923. Plant destroyed in earthquake.
- 25. Osaka Mainichi, Mainichi Company, April, 1922, to date.
- 26. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Mainichi Company, April, 1923-1925.
  Failed.

### CIRCULATION OF THE FOREIGN PRESS

No papers, other than the *Japan Times*, publishes an estimate of its circulation, and hence any determination of the distribution of the papers admits of only vague conjecture. In the want of . more nearly perfect estimate, a crude maximum may be set by listing the circulation figures claimed in the spring of 1925 by rival editors (see p. 374).

No one conversant with Far Eastern newspapers would believe these figures to be conservative. Perhaps in all Japan there are no more than 10,000 foreign inhabitants at the outer limit able to read an English periodical. It is, of course, true, as Naoshi Kato, editor of the *Mainichi*, and Sometaro Sheba, of the *Times*, remark, that many Japanese buy English-language papers to learn the foreign point of view or to study the language more intensively. Mr. Kato believes that half his circulation is thus accounted for, while Mr. Sheba estimates that 75 per cent of his subscribers are Japanese. But it is

questionable whether those Japanese who read for the sake of increased proficiency might not be more attracted to the foreign-edited Advertiser or to the Chronicle than to the Mainichi or to the Times, which are sometimes guilty of "near English." Those who subscribe for the sake of learning foreign viewpoints would almost certainly prefer to purchase papers which print more foreign comment than do the Times or Mainichi.

#### CIRCULATION FIGURES

Osaka Mainichi .									26,000*
Tokyo Nichi Nichi									20,000*
Japan Times .									6,300†
Japan Chronicle									3,000
Seoul Press									1,000‡
Japan Advertiser									
Kobe Herald, Nagas	saki	Pres	s, M	anch	uria	Dail	y No	ews	3,000
Total									60.300

<sup>\*</sup>These figures undoubtedly contain a large free list, particularly as the Nichi Nichi failed soon after the estimate was given to the writer by the editor.

It is probably nearer the truth to conclude that many Japanese purchase the *Mainichi* or the *Times* because of some other motive than the undiluted desire for news. Mr. Hedges, of the *Advertiser*, suggests that business firms with government contracts have been known to subscribe for a hundred copies daily at a rate of \$\vec{\*}100 \text{ a}\$ month in order indirectly to subsidize a favored journal. Reports are also met that some government departments, such as the Foreign Office, General Staff, Home Office, War Department, or the Secret Service, may pay a sub-

<sup>† &</sup>quot;Actual pressroom run, January 31, 1925."

The editor says "Well below 1,000."

<sup>§</sup> This is the basis used in soliciting advertisements. The front page of the Advertiser carried in its "ears" for many years the two boasts: "Largest circulation of all foreign dailies in the Far East," and "Double the combined circulation of all the other foreign dailies published in Japan." These slogans were printed less regularly during 1926, following persistent challenges from the Japan Times. The daily pressroom run in June, 1925, of the Advertiser was unofficially, and perhaps unreliably, stated to the writer as about 1,900 copies.

A very generous estimate.

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sidy by paying in advance for subscriptions which are never meant to be delivered.

Such subsidies have certainly been distributed in the past, for the Chronicle, the Mail, and the Times are known to have received government assistance. Foreign Minister Ijuin told the correspondents, in 1922, according to Mr. Hedges, that the Foreign Office had been paying the Japan Times \(\frac{2}{2}\),000; to a Shanghai editor whose paper suddenly changed its policies, \(\frac{2}{2}\)10,000; and various amounts to other journals. Ijuin went on to say that the subsidies were no longer paid by the Foreign Office, but that they had been taken over by the General Staff. Information on this matter is very closely guarded, and no authentic statements can be secured from persons in authority.



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